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
THE INFORMATION AND REFERRAL SERVICE/PROVINCIAL FUND

FINAL EVALUATION

FINAL REPORT

Prepared for:
The International Organization for Migration (IOM)

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I. Executive Summary

Purpose, approach and methodology for the evaluation

The purpose of this final evaluation is to take into account the various project outputs in order to identify how the IRS/PF assisted demobilized soldiers make the transition from military to civilian life. This evaluation aims to analyze areas of impact of both the IRS and PF components and articulate how these areas of immediate impact have contributed to the overall objective of maintaining peace. The team performed this final evaluation in five discrete phases during the periods of November-December 1996 and February-March 1997.

The team collected generic and specific data from several sources. Most documents provided quantitative information about reintegration programming costs and numbers of beneficiaries served. Although some inconsistencies were noted according to different sources, especially in relation to the total outcome numbers for each of the reintegration programs, the relative independence of data sources and different counting criteria easily accounted for inconsistencies.

The most important information and data sources consulted for the evaluation included:

- Databases used for project tracking and reporting. This information included the analysis of multiple databases and their recompilation for statistical purposes.
- Survey instruments applied to demobilized soldiers in urban areas nationwide to construct a situational analysis to assess project contributions to reintegration and pacification goals.
- Demobilized soldiers, through direct and indirect probes used by different program implementers to assess program outcome and measurement of progress.
- Interviews with donor representatives, Government of Mozambique officials, managers in charge of reintegration services at the national level, project implementers' staff at provincial level and provincial GOM representatives.
- Reports from project implementers including beneficiaries' access rates.
- Interviews with demobilized association representatives.

For the purpose of this study, the evaluation team examined social and economic indicators of reintegration derived from CAII's experience with post-war reintegration in other countries and regions. Furthermore, as noted in the section on our methodology, we asked DS what they considered reintegration to be and if and how they were able to feel reintegrated. On the basis of these internal and external measurements, we used the following indicators to measure reintegration:

- Social reintegration: Reestablishment with family; access to shelter; reconnection with community through non-military activities.
- Economic reintegration: Participation in productive income generating activities.

Any specific reintegration project is defined by its ability to impact the beneficiaries attitudes and focus in relation to becoming a potential source for violence and political instability. We assessed contribution to pacification goals by comparing the demobilized expectations and attitudes of project beneficiaries to other demobilized not having accessed IRS/PF services or activities.

The team was comprised of a full time team leader, four part time researchers and an evaluation supervisor. These individuals participated in the evaluation with varying levels of effort according to

the different tasks and phases. The team was also supported by IOM's field staff for the implementation of survey activities in rural areas.

Project design and implementation

The initial design for the IRS was proposed by Creative Associates International Inc. under a consultancy agreement with UNOHAC in November, 1993. It was based on lessons learned from reintegration services for the demobilized, especially counseling and referral programs used in Nicaragua and El Salvador. A major design modification, specifically promoted for the conditions in Mozambique, resulted in the formulation of the *Information and Referral Service*. This provincially based project was meant to provide DS with information on demobilization benefits as an extension service of the UN Technical Unit and refer DS to on-going and potential social and economic activities available. Formal vocational "counseling" was not deemed an option since both human and financial resources were clearly not available to realistically provide such a service.

The Provincial Fund was designed to complement the other three components of CORE's strategy. It was intended to encourage economic reintegration by making small grants available to DS for initiating small businesses and micro-enterprises, and to businesses for projects which would employ DS. The PF would also assist the DS apply for and/or benefit from the skills developed under OSD programs. The project was largely funded by USAID, with IOM as the implementing agency. Financial support was also received by IOM from the World Bank, and Swedish, Italian, and Canadian donors.

CORE foresaw the following six outputs for the IRS and PF:

1. Reach a considerable number of demobilized soldiers;
2. Create conditions for greater social stability;
3. Promote economic and social recovery, particularly of the rural areas where most of the funds would be applied;
4. Direct support to community-based labor-intensive activities involving demobilized soldiers;
5. Direct support to income-generating activities;
6. Help to stabilize the demobilized in their home and/or chosen communities.

The following outputs were scheduled in the original USAID IRS/PF Grant Agreement with IOM:

1. Demobilized soldiers would use the IRS program in all provinces;
2. Database would be set up with a fully operational computerized monitoring system of personal files for referral and overall reporting of activities;
3. Criteria to provide training and reintegration assistance would be established within the framework of the program;
4. Training institutions would be selected to provide facilities to the demobilized soldiers;
5. Materials, such as leaflets and handouts, for the purpose of assisting with the socioeconomic reintegration of the demobilized would be produced and disseminated in the IRS offices;
6. Employment opportunities in different economic sectors would be linked to the referral service in order to facilitate matching on the basis of demand and supply;
7. Support to income-generating activities would be provided through a kits distribution program;
8. Development of guidelines to ensure a flexible provincial fund operation.

In March, 1995, an amendment to the USAID Grant Agreement laid out the following revised outputs for IRS and for the Provincial Fund:

1. Continue IRS services since research shows DS satisfaction with IRS services and information;
2. Provide continued services to demobilized soldiers to remedy problems related to the delivery of demobilization benefits such as government payments, demobilization cards, distribution of kits, and access to food distribution;
3. Advise and generally assist demobilized soldiers in solving their personal problems, maximizing the use of other reintegration programs and other relevant support services;
4. Collect information from demobilized soldiers to produce individual profiles in order to tailor responses to individual need and profile.
5. Inform demobilized soldiers about specific employment, training and income opportunities available to them. Where possible, refer them to employment and other opportunities.
6. Projects funded should succeed in providing employment and income generating activities to demobilized soldiers, or otherwise assist the demobilized in their reintegration process;
7. Projects should be of benefit to the community in general;
8. Demobilized soldiers should be helped to reintegrate peacefully into the civilian society and economy.

Project outcomes

Information and referral service

According to IOM reports, over the course of the project there have been 79,496 visits made by DS to provincial IRS/PF offices, and an additional 30,449 DS were contacted through the outreach programs in rural areas. The total number of IRS contacts made (both in offices initiated by the DS and through outreach initiated by the IRS) was 109,945. The average number of visits of DS to IRS offices was four (4).

34,605 recorded requests were made to the IRS for the following services:

Training, 13,919
Employment, 7,486
Assistance with RSS payments, 1,921
Assistance with other demobilization benefits/services, 5,073
Self-employment, 4,747
Reforma pensions, 833
Disability pensions, 616

The Provincial Fund overall costs were \$4,396,988 for the implementation of 4,415 projects for 26,175 beneficiaries, 22,757 of which were DS. The average cost per beneficiary was \$190.47 and the average project duration was 3 months.

Province	# projects	\$ spent	Tot. benef	\$ per benef.	% cancel
Missing	1	2883	10	288.30	.0%
CAB	222	418247	2609	187.24	7.2%
GAZ	406	460677	2232	235.28	3.7%

INH	370	145237	866	201.08	2.4%
MAN	286	146243	551	245.53	3.1%
MAP	530	675274	2612	262.16	14.3%
NAM	433	1019216	8295	170.68	11.5%
NIA	173	382956	2278	186.72	11.0%
SOF	482	212084	986	198.23	14.1%
TET	257	76348	501	136.12	6.2%
ZAM	1255	857823	5235	149.66	17.7%
<hr/>					
Project total	4415	4396988	26175	190.49	11.3%

Projects were implemented in the following categories:

- Income generating activities/Microenterprise
- Service contracts
- Training
- Institutional strengthening
- Labor intensive activities
- Community development
- Permanent employment/On the job training
- Returnees support

Also, provincial fund initiatives impacted the following sectors:

- Agriculture
- Industry and crafts
- Construction
- Forestry and environ
- Fishing
- Trade and services
- Public works

Other outcomes of the IRS/PF

In addition to the primary outcomes of its core activities, the IRS/PF program has had a number of secondary outcomes as described below.

Institutional capacity building: Ten Ministry of Labor employees were seconded to the IRS/PF field offices (one at each office) in order to increase their skills and knowledge-base, intending to build the capacity of the Ministry of Labor's provincial departments. Areas of competency envisaged were increased computer training, work opportunity identification mapping and contracting processes, and monitoring and reporting instrument development.

Conflict Resolution Team: In addition, the conflict resolution team (CRT) of three government officials, one from the Ministry of Labor, one from the Ministry of Defense and one from the Ministry of Finance, was placed in the IRS/PF head office in Maputo. The CRT (originally constituted and funded by CORE) was intended to be a mechanism which would respond quickly to potential crisis situations and facilitate coordination between the three ministries.

Opportunity mapping: Over the course of the project the IRS/PF mapped a total of more than 10,000 employment opportunities for DS. These were primarily opportunities for PF interventions, and included few opportunities for training or non-PF-related employment.

Support activities to other programs:

UN Technical Unit: The role of the IRS as a provincially based UN unit to resolve demobilization benefit problems proved to be essential to the successful completion of demobilization by offering services to reissue demobilization cards, record transportation needs, Government subsidy problems and food distribution information.

UNDP/RSS: In the initial phases of reintegration, the IRS was vital to maintaining the satisfaction of DS related to the UNDP/RSS program. Although, BPD branches eventually were enabled to implement the payment of checks, the initial phases depended on IRS interventions. In fact, the IRS developed the first RSS payment request and checkbook reissuance forms for the UNDP.

GTZ/ORF and the ILO/OSD: Finally, the IRS/PF offered assistance to the other reintegration programs, specifically the GTZ/ORF in the central region and the ILO/OSD nationwide to identify DS and project activities. This was of particular importance to the success of training initiatives implemented by ILO/OSD which did not have field offices but was managed only from its central office in Maputo. The IRS/PF proved to be of significant importance to the successful implementation of the other UN reintegration projects, a role which developed over the course of the IRS/PF operation.

The Information and Referral Service and Provincial Fund activities resulted in demonstrating positive indications that tasks for which both projects had been created were, in fact, achieved: to support the socioeconomic reintegration of the demobilized soldiers to ensure the successful culmination of the peace process.

- The information and referral service contributed to linking beneficiaries with other programs. For most activities, the access rate reported by the interviewees increased if the respondent contacted the IRS seeking information. As an example, 26 % of the respondents not contacting the IRS received vocational kits. This number increases to 36 % for the ones who did contact IRS offices and received information or referrals.
- However, the information and referral service appears to have had little impact in the DS perception of their own reintegration. In fact, the analysis of the survey results shows that a slight decrease in the median perception for reintegration exists for the cases having received information and/or referral. On further exploration, the team realized that in some cases the IRS might have created expectations for benefits or programs which it could not or was not meant to deliver. These expectations had a negative impact on the demobilized perception of reintegration.
- The provincial fund activities have positively impacted on the beneficiaries perspectives in relation to their own welfare and reintegration.
- The provincial fund contributed to changing the way the DS believe they are perceived by their communities and how they would like to be perceived.
- The provincial fund has impacted in the value the demobilized place on reintegration programming.
- The provincial fund has contributed to improve the DS perspective of the social benefits of peace.
- The provincial fund beneficiaries feel more optimistic about their future than other demobilized soldiers.
- The provincial fund has impacted on the economic conditions of its target population.
- The PF also contributed to the increase in economic stability of the demobilized population. Close to 70% of all demobilized not accessing PF opportunities expect to continue in the same

type of activity in the future. This number increases to almost 85% for the demobilized who have accessed PF activities.

Factors affecting project outcomes

The following areas were identified as challenges to successful IRS/PF programming implementation. PF projects which were able to meet these challenges demonstrated greater success resulting in an increased number of DS considering themselves as having reintegrated into civilian society. These areas were:

- Operational considerations
 - The IRS as a demobilization outreach program
 - Local DPT capacity building
 - Political hindrances
 - Local authority and NGO participation
 - Utilizing the IRS and tracking reintegration
 - Human and financial resources
 - Monitoring and reporting
 - Technical support and market studies
 - Delivery of goods and services (warehouse purchases of goods and kits)
- Project design considerations
 - Access
 - Ds partnerships
 - Location of project
 - Timing of project
 - Desired results of projects
 - Pre-requisite knowledge and training
 - Projects as primary or secondary beneficiary activity
 - Project payments to beneficiaries
 - Social programming
 - DS vs. Community-based projects
- Project category considerations
 - Permanent employment promotion activities
 - Labor intensive activities
 - Micro-enterprise/income generating activities

Conclusions

Project contribution to maintain peace in Mozambique:

⇒ The demobilized were asked for their opinions in relation to the group or groups which have won the most with the arrival of peace.

- For interviewees not having accessed IRS/PF benefits, 70% of the responses included "All Mozambicans" as the primary beneficiaries of peace, followed by 28% "FRELIMO" and 14% "the demobilized". Note that the distribution totals over 100% because interviewees were allowed to choose up to two different answers.
- For demobilized having accessed the IRS/PF, the responses for "All Mozambicans" accounted for 78%, followed by "FRELIMO" with 23 %, and the demobilized with 19 %. An interesting difference is found in the cases responding "No one", decreasing

- from 2% for people not accessing IOM's reintegration programming to about 0.5% for project beneficiaries.
- ⇒ The interviewees were asked for their opinion in relation to Mozambique's immediate future. Considering that previous surveys for rural and urban dwellers had indicated that most demobilized did not consider violence as a valid option for resolving differences, we expected an overwhelming number opting for a peaceful future.
- As we expected, an overwhelming 80% of the sample perceived a peaceful future for all Mozambicans.
 - Differences are not high between IRS/PF beneficiaries and others, but a trend can be observed showing the reduction of opinions related to potential violent futures for Mozambique from the respondents having accessed IOM's reintegration programming activities.
- ⇒ The survey also specifically looked for changes in the respondents' perception of their own personal security and their relationship with IOM's reintegration programming.
- The median for both populations is in the "safer" range, but no changes can be attributed to reintegration programming itself. Therefore, the perception of personal security has improved in our respondents as a result of external factors not directly related to IOM's programs.
- ⇒ We explored the interviewees' perceptions of improvements in their personal and family situation from a general viewpoint.
- The team identified a clear increase in the perception of improvement as a result of participation in IRS/PF activities.
- ⇒ The last factor explored by the team in relation to IOM's reintegration programming's contribution to pacification is the resettlement of the DS population.
- Access to IRS/PF programming has improved the housing conditions for demobilized soldiers.
 - An overwhelming majority of the respondents (about 83%) expect to continue residing at their current residence.
 - Of those expecting to stay at their current location, a clear trend can be identified for IOM's reintegration programming beneficiaries in relation to expected improvements in their houses. Those who have participated in programs, expect to invest in improving their houses much more than those who have not been IRS/PF beneficiaries.

Project contribution to the DS transition from military to civilian life:

- ⇒ We asked the demobilized about their subjective opinion of their own reintegration. We used these responses to correlate several factors associated with reintegration and to assess the impact of reintegration programming.
- Factors affecting reintegration and the specific IRS/PF program contribution for the transition from military to civilian life were analyzed after identifying the relative incidence of these programs in the overall CORE reintegration scheme. For this reason, we first asked the DS which activities they considered the most valuable for their reintegration. The RSS payments and pensions were the most important benefits for reintegration as perceived by the overwhelming majority of the population (83 % of cases). It is followed by transportation activities (52% of cases) and by micro-projects with about 36%. Once again, it should be noted that the total distribution of cases adds up to over 100% because respondents were asked to choose up to three options.
 - Based on the previously explained results, the team recognizes that even when IOM's reintegration programming played a significant role in the DS' perspectives of reintegration, it might not be the only factor involved. Also, having the micro-projects as the third ranked category of importance for reintegration from the DS perspective, the

combination of benefits might have a bigger impact on the population than IOM's reintegration programming per se.

- ⇒ The IRS/PF program also contributed to improving the demobilized soldiers' self perception of reintegration. The reintegration level perceived by the respondents increases from interviewees not having accessed IOM financing to those who did. The increase of perception in relation to their reintegration is not only a function of accessing the program but also of the program's effectiveness. In summary, IRS/PF beneficiaries in general considered themselves more reintegrated than the others, and among these, the ones participating in the most successful projects are also the most reintegrated.
- ⇒ IRS/PF beneficiaries are more optimistic about their future than the demobilized soldiers not having accessed IOM's reintegration programming. The average IRS/PF beneficiaries expect to be "better" next year, when the rest of the sample expects to be the "same".
- ⇒ Another factor considered by the evaluation team as part of the transition from military to civilian life is the DS' self-perception.
 - Over 96% of the respondents would like to be perceived as civilians. This implies a strong desire to be considered part of the mainstream society. However, only 75% of the population considers to already be perceived as civilians. Exploring this further, the team realized that less PF beneficiaries consider themselves to be perceived as civilians than non-PF recipients. The team therefore concludes that the "DS targeted" nature on the IRS/PF activity might have contributed to the perception in DS respondents that they continue to be identified as demobilized rather than civilian because of their participation in these programs.
- ⇒ Finally, the team asked the demobilized soldiers about their level of satisfaction with IOM's reintegration programming activities and how much these activities may have contributed to their reintegration.
 - Almost 60% of the respondents deemed the level of satisfaction with their visits to the IRS to be from "somehow" satisfied to "very" satisfied.
 - Close to 62% of the respondents considered their visits to the IRS to be from "somewhat" to "very" important for their reintegration.
 - About 79% of Provincial Fund participants considered the success of their respective micro-initiatives to be from "average" to "very good".
 - Close to 82% of the respondents ranked the PF activities from "somewhat" to "very much" useful for their reintegration.

Based on the findings and analyses presented in this report, the last section offers suggestions for future reintegration program planning and delivery. Its purpose is to assist future program designers and implementers make informed decisions regarding appropriate reintegration programming options based on lessons learned from the Mozambican model. Issues identified include:

- Reintegration programming design considerations.
- Maintaining realistic expectations.
- Structuring reintegration programming delivery.
 - Combining the IRS/PF in a decentralized model.
 - Information management.

Final conclusion

The immediate availability of IRS services for DS upon their return to civilian society and the flexibility and provincial autonomy for implementing PF projects resulted in very favorable project outputs, based on documented qualitative and quantitative data, which contributed to a successful reintegration process. As in all projects, lessons can be learned from hands-on experience to enhance future programming and improve upon project design and delivery mechanisms to obtain even greater project impact and results. This evaluation reports on both of these components in an effort to serve our client as well as a broader readership to hopefully inform future reintegration programming endeavors. Based on information gathered from various sources, our data analysis reveals that the IRS/PF project did successfully attain its programming objectives by positively contributing to the successful reintegration of demobilized soldiers thus contributing to the overarching objective of maintaining peace in Mozambique.

Structure of the report

A detailed analysis of the processes, context and results of the evaluation follows in the body of this report. The structure is as follows.

- Section II:* **The final evaluation**, summarizes the evaluation purpose, scope of work, assumptions, methodology, team composition and limitations.
- Section III:* **Project design and implementation**, describes the transition from war to peace in Mozambique, the framework for the design of reintegration programming, the different IRS/PF operational phases and the expected quantitative and qualitative outcomes for the activity.
- Section IV:* **Project outcomes**, summarizes each activity outcome from a quantitative perspective for each project phase and for overall project life. This section also identifies the project qualitative impact and factors associated with these impacts.
- Section V:* **Factors affecting project outcomes**, discusses different challenges identified during the project life and how different interventions were or were not able to address them.
- Section VI:* **Conclusions**, details the project contribution to pacification goals and the demobilized soldiers transition from military to civilian life. It also provides with recommendations for other transition experiences and a final conclusion.
- Section VII:* **Appendices**, include our scope of work, glossary, approach and methodology, team composition, bibliography of documents reviewed, a profile of rural vs. urban reintegration, survey instruments, and detailed statistical results from the analysis of available data sources.

II. The Final Evaluation

A. Purpose of the evaluation

The purpose of this final evaluation is to take into account the various project outputs in order to identify how the IRS/PF assisted demobilized soldiers make the transition from military to civilian life. This evaluation aims to analyze areas of impact of both the IRS and PF components and articulate how these areas of immediate impact have contributed to the overall objective of maintaining peace.

B. Scope of work

The team was to complete the following scope of work:

Task 1

Review relevant documentation and complete quantitative and qualitative analyses of IRS/PF services provided.

Task 2

Conduct selected site visits to IRS/PF offices and project sites to determine how the IRS/PF contributed to the transition from war to peace.

Task 3

Conduct a series of interviews with demobilized soldiers in urban and rural areas to complement existing information in relation to their reintegration status and identification of any remaining serious obstacles to reintegration.

Task 4

Compile and analyze the above data in order to identify outputs and impact of the IRS/PF project and the salient factors which contributed to positive outputs and impact as well as those factors which hindered or did not demonstrate positive project impact.

Task 5

Analyze the above findings to extrapolate conclusions and formulate lessons learned about the role of the IRS/PF in the overall Mozambican reintegration program.

C. Approach and methodology

1. Approach

The team performed this final evaluation in five discrete phases during the periods of November- December 1996 and February-March 1996

- *Phase 1:* We developed and secured approval for the scope of work and devised a methodology for fulfilling our mandate (December 1996).
- *Phase 2:* We evaluated and performed statistical analyses for all available data sources, including baseline information from the demobilization, IRS tracking database, opportunity mapping registries and PF tracking systems. (December 1996 and March 1997).
- *Phase 3:* We collected and analyzed data from 1,000 respondents, comprised of ex-combatants from RENAMO and FRELIMO, including disabled veterans (December 1997).
- *Phase 4:* We reviewed relevant documents and interviewed stakeholders to derive qualitative data to supplement the quantitative analysis (December 1997 and March 1997).
- *Phase 5:* We presented our preliminary findings, lessons learned and recommendations to the IOM, using the feedback obtained to finalize the final evaluation report (March 1997).

We relied on a five-pronged approach to assess the project contribution to reintegration and pacification goals in Mozambique.

- *Our evaluation is driven by data.* We were careful to base all of our findings on hard data, and to link all lessons learned and recommendations to these data-driven findings. We did so because we believe that findings and recommendations based on speculation, beliefs or feelings and not grounded in verifiable data do not serve our clients in documenting the impact of their activities.
- *We focused on results.* We asked a series of questions about the various reintegration program options available to our ex-combatant populations. This information was vital to correlate reintegration with benefits.
- *We compared ex-combatants to civilians.* Our scope of work asked us to assess the impact of reintegration programming and the project contribution to pacification goals, and naturally, our research focused on the demobilized. However, we also examined baseline data from civilians, representing, by definition, the standard for reintegration.
- *We assessed how reintegration programming was designed, implemented and managed.* We believe that results begin in the planning stage, when objectives are defined and benchmarks established for achieving these objectives. We therefore examined how reintegration objectives were initially defined as well as how programming was implemented in order to derive lessons learned and make informed recommendations for future design, implementation and management of reintegration programming.
- *We stressed communication with the IOM throughout the evaluation process.* Team members kept the IOM informally and formally apprised of the evaluation's progress,

preliminary findings and stumbling blocks throughout the evaluation process. We valued these key stakeholders' knowledgeable input into our findings and interpretations of data, and we believe that ongoing communication with clients greatly facilitated the process of finalizing the evaluation reports.

2. Methodology

The team was partially based in Maputo and compiled information at the national level with visits to relevant agencies.

The team took the following specific steps to implement the five tasks identified in the scope of work.

- In November 1996, the team leader arrived to the country, briefing meetings were held with IOM staff and management, preliminary data sources were identified and the draft scope of work was revised. After these preparatory activities were finalized, instruments were developed for assessing the situation of the urban demobilized and survey activities were implemented. Simultaneously, preliminary information from existing databases began to be analyzed.
- In December 1996, all data from the urban survey was analyzed and different problems were identified in relation to existing data sources. The team was unable to identify consistent outcome information for the activities implemented and presented its preliminary findings to IOM's senior management. As a result of these findings, the evaluation schedule was restructured to allow for improvements and updates to be made in the tracking databases for the provincial fund and information and referral service. Simultaneously, a survey activity targeting about 1,000 demobilized was designed to gather data in relation to the DS' perspectives of specific project contribution to reintegration and pacification goals. These survey took place by mid December and all further evaluation activities were postponed until project operations were concluded and final outcome information was available.
- By the end of February, 1997 the final evaluation activities were reinitiated with the analysis of the newly updated databases for the project activities. Preliminary statistical findings were presented to IOM and discussed to ensure the team understanding of the conditions surrounding the project implementation. Preliminary information about the reintegration surveys results were also discussed and prepared for final analysis.
- In the first week March, 1997, the team collected of all available information, compiled the final report, presented the evaluation results and held a team debriefing.

D. Sources of data

The team collected generic and specific data from several sources. Most documents provided quantitative information about reintegration programming costs and numbers of beneficiaries served. Although some inconsistencies were noted according to different sources, especially in relation to the total outcome numbers for each of the reintegration programs, the relative independence of data sources and different counting criteria easily accounted for all inconsistencies.

The assessment established a series of findings in this report, driven by interviews with IOM staff at the provincial offices, reports and relevant documents and interviews at the national level with all agencies involved in reintegration programming.

- The team relied on **quantitative** data obtained directly from reporting mechanisms, databases, inventories and an array of documents from IOM's field staff as well as from the central Maputo office.
- The team supplemented and expanded the quantitative data with **qualitative** information obtained through interviews at the national level, reports from IOM provincial staff and a specially developed survey instrument probe of demobilized soldiers at the provincial level.

The most important information and data sources consulted for the evaluation included:

- Databases used for project tracking and reporting. This information included the analysis of multiple databases and their recompilation for statistical purposes.
- Survey instruments applied to demobilized soldiers in urban areas nationwide to construct a situational analysis to assess project contributions to reintegration and pacification goals.
- Demobilized soldiers, through direct and indirect probes used by different program implementers to assess program outcome and measurement of progress.
- Interviews with donor representatives, Government of Mozambique officials, managers in charge of reintegration services at the national level, project implementers' staff at provincial level and provincial GOM representatives.
- Reports from project implementers including beneficiaries' access rates.
- Interviews with demobilized association representatives.

Complete lists of documents consulted are provided in the attached appendices.

E. Team composition

The team was comprised of a full time team leader, four part time researchers and an evaluation supervisor. These individuals participated in the evaluation with varying levels of effort according to the previously explained tasks and phases. The team was also supported by IOM's field staff for the implementation of survey activities in rural areas.

F. Assumptions about the context for reintegration

1. What is reintegration?

There were no standardized accepted definitions of reintegration when the IRS was conceptualized. The first formal Grant Agreement between IOM and USAID simply states that the project will assist the demobilized "in their new civilian life." CORE documents speak of "community-level" reintegration in terms of demobilized "reestablishing themselves as civilians at the community level."

Post-war programming in Mozambique assumed an implicit link between reintegration of the demobilized and the preservation of peace and avoidance of unrest. This hypothesis is shown in the statement of IRS's general objective in the October 1995 IRS/PF Progress Report: "to facilitate the economic and social reintegration of demobilized soldiers to ensure the successful culmination of the peace process in Mozambique". Reintegration can thus be assessed by its results: DS will be considered successfully reintegrated if social peace is maintained. However, reintegration here is a necessary though not sufficient cause: if social peace is not maintained, other factors might have come into play.

2. Social and economic reintegration

Reintegration in Mozambique included two fundamental aspects: social reintegration and economic reintegration. Official documents offer a clearer definition of economic reintegration than of social reintegration. For example, the CORE document states that the "absorption of the (ex-)soldiers into formal economic activities would probably offer the most effective means of achieving long-term reintegration." Social reintegration was not originally explicitly defined, perhaps relying on the assumption that transporting DS to their communities of choice generally implies reunification with families and therefore, social reintegration.

Yet targeting programming specifically to reintegrate the demobilized establishes the DS as a special group or community with special needs, distinct from those of civil society as a whole or other disenfranchised populations. This division of DS from civilians implies *de facto* that DS are not civilians, both in the minds of reintegration programmers and of the DS themselves. Consequently, social reintegration came to mean the eradication of the DS special status and special needs. IRS staff and donors alike defined the purpose of reintegration as "canceling the differences between DS and the rest of the population".

Although this is not a fully operational definition, it is useful for the purposes of this study: reintegration can be assessed in terms of compensating for initial differences between the DS and the rest of the civilian community.

The original USAID Grant Agreement offers indicators of reintegration that include the absence of civil unrest, participation of DS in the IRS system, and community attitudes towards the DS.

For the purpose of this study, the evaluation team examined social and economic indicators of reintegration derived from CAII's experience with post-war reintegration in other countries and regions. Furthermore, as noted in the section on our methodology, we confirmed our sense of what reintegration might be by asking DS what they considered reintegration to be. On the basis of these internal and external measurements, we used the following indicators to measure reintegration:

- Social reintegration: Reestablishment with family; access to shelter; reconnection with community through non-military activities.
- Economic reintegration: Participation in productive income generating activities.

3. Contribution to pacification goals

Any specific reintegration project is defined by its ability to impact the beneficiaries attitudes and focus in relation to becoming a potential source for violence and political instability. We assessed contribution to pacification goals by comparing the demobilized expectations and attitudes of project beneficiaries to other demobilized not having accessed IRS/PF services or activities.

G. Opinion polls and representation of results

1. The reintegration survey

Survey instruments were specifically designed for this activity in order to identify project contributions to pacification goals and support provided to the demobilized for their transition from military to civilian life. A sample of the complete set of the instruments utilized for survey activities can be found in the attached appendices.

Two separate probes were applied to the DS population. The first was utilized to identify the current situation of urban dwellers and encompassed random interviews with some 100 demobilized soldiers in Maputo and Beira urban areas. The information obtained from this activity was compiled in a comparative analysis with previous data from rural areas and is provided in an appendix to this report. The activity proved that even when different factors can be associated with successful reintegration according to the areas, all demobilized

soldiers can be considered as socially and economically reintegrated and therefore, no different than their civilian counterparts. It should be noted that even when reintegration has been accomplished, this does not imply that all the perceived needs or expectations of the demobilized have been addressed or resolved. The accomplishment of reintegration points to the fact that the problems and needs of this particular vulnerable group are no different than the ones perceived by the rest of the population.

After verifying the validity of the “reintegrated” status of the demobilized soldiers, the team focused the activities on the analysis of IOM’s reintegration programming contribution to the achievement of this goal. For this purpose, a second opinion poll was applied to about 1,000 demobilized soldiers nationwide. This activity was designed as a stratified random sample from communities with high concentrations of DS. The following table shows the national distribution of our sample.

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
MAP	1	96	10.1	10.3	10.3
GAZ	2	99	10.4	10.6	20.9
INH	3	102	10.7	10.9	31.8
MAN	4	99	10.4	10.6	42.4
SOF	5	99	10.4	10.6	53.0
TET	6	72	7.6	7.7	60.7
ZAM	7	109	11.4	11.7	72.4
NAM	8	121	12.7	13.0	85.3
NIA	9	86	9.0	9.2	94.5
CAB	10	51	5.4	5.5	100.0
.	.	18	1.9	Missing	
Total		952	100.0	100.0	
Valid cases	934	Missing cases	18		

The instrument included an initial set of questions to qualify a potential interviewee for the survey. Based on past survey experiences, we included a question to identify demobilized personnel involved in private security or military style sectors and personnel with physical disabilities. We analyzed these groups separately and verified if the continuation of extremely vertical authority structures or the special situation of the disabled, could have affected the tone of the responses, particularly in relation to their social perceptions. No significant differences were found in relation to different stratum and therefore the respondents were treated as an homogeneous group for all analyses.

The team also depended on IOM’s field staff to multiply the access to remote locations and expand the survey coverage. Considering potential biases of survey personnel who could have directly implemented DS support activities or being known by the interviewees as IOM employees, we identified each surveyor in the instrument and run a preliminary comparative analysis of the trends in the responses obtained by our own interviewers versus the responses obtained through the collaboration of IOM staff. The dataset showed comparative results and therefore this differentiation was not included in further analyses.

Finally, the team recognized that the method used for the identification of potential interviewees could be another potential source for non objective results. Therefore, all results which were considered as potentially “tainted” by respondents accessed through demobilized associations, special groups participating in a particular project or local leadership, were

analyzed with special attention to the source of interviewees, guaranteeing that the sample represents a general opinion and not a particular sectorial interest.

2. Tables and other numeric data

Throughout the report and appendices with statistical data, many direct outputs from the tools utilized for the analyses are presented. The objective of this direct representation is to provide the reader with access to the raw results of the analyses rather than a summary conclusion. For this reason, some of the information provided may be presented in non-conventional formats. The following definitions attempt to facilitate the reading of raw statistical outputs.

<i>Case:</i>	each of the valid interviews held for the data gathering activity.
<i>Missing case:</i>	a case in which at least one of the parameters under observation is not available, therefore cannot be counted as part of the valid cases.
<i>Frequency:</i>	indicates the number of cases having selected the category or option represented.
<i>Percent:</i>	percentile distribution of all available cases, including missing cases as a valid category.
<i>Valid percent:</i>	percentile distribution of all valid cases not including missing cases as a valid category. This is the measure utilized for reporting results.
<i>Cumulative percent:</i>	shows the addition of percentages counting the previously presented categories and the current one. This facilitates the reading of cumulative results for "better than..." or "worst than..." representations.
<i>Percentage of cases:</i>	when multiple responses were allowed for a single question, this represents the percentage of cases having selected this option in the overall distribution. All options add up to 100%.
<i>Percentage of responses:</i>	when multiple responses were allowed for a single question, this represents the incidence of the specific response in a potential 100% of cases. That is the same as asking how many of the respondents have selected this option. This percentage relates to the specific response and therefore for different options can add up to over 100%.


Median: the line or value that separates the population in halves for any given parameter. In a normally distributed (symmetrical) population, the median is coincident with the mean (or arithmetic average for quantitative observations). This evaluation utilizes the median as the reference for evaluating opinions because it better represents the abnormal distribution found in these populations.

Value and variable labels: each variable under examination has been given a rank value (or code) representing the respondents' answers. This numeric value is used for data processing and analyses. In order to facilitate the reading of information, each possible value has been assigned with a label that describes its meaning, and output information provides these values and labels. The variable label describes the question made to the respondent.

3. Graphical representation of dispersions

Boxplot graphs are used extensively throughout the report as a useful representation of the distribution of any given set of responses as a function of any other factor. Many conclusions and analyses are based on information extrapolated from boxplot graphics, and due to their unfamiliar way of representing results, a detailed example is required.

The following graph demonstrates that PF sponsored projects are perceived as more successful than general population activities in the same sectors.



- Each group of projects is represented.
 - DS projects on the left with a case incidence of 347 responses.

- General population projects on the right, once again with a case incidence of 347 responses.
- The range for each group of responses is shown as the black vertical lines for each type of project.
 - Both groups show the same maximum range of 5 (very successful).
 - Civilian projects show the lowest range of successes (0 or very bad).
- The rectangular red boxplots show the perceived success dispersion for each project category — these red rectangles depict the concentration of responses that falls between 25 percent and 75 percent of all cases within each population or the middle 50% of the respondents .
- The blue horizontal dotted lines within each population's dispersion show the median for each population — the point at which half of the sample falls above and half below.

This graph shows that even when the maximum and median values for both types of projects are the same, civilian projects are far more spread along the “less successful” section of the boxplot, indicating by implication that fewer PF sponsored activities are perceived as failures than the corresponding segment of general population initiatives.

III. Project Design and Implementation

A. Context for project design

1. *The end of the Mozambican civil war*

The Mozambican Civil War officially ended with the signing of the General Peace Accord in Rome on October 4, 1992, when Mozambique emerged from conflict. Years of civil unrest weakened social structures and severely damaged the economic infrastructure of the country. 5.7 million people, approximately one third of the entire population, were uprooted, either internally displaced by war or drought, or were living as refugees in neighboring countries. Rails, roads, and bridges throughout the country were in disrepair. It is estimated that about half of the nation's schools and one third of its health clinics were damaged or destroyed. Agricultural fields and byways were hardened by drought and rift with land mines. Mozambique became the world's poorest and most aid-dependent nation.

Tired of fighting and having lost major arms backers due in part to the end of the cold war and the passing of apartheid, the two sides finally sought to resolve their differences peacefully. Under the peace accord, FRELIMO and the RENAMO opposition agreed to hold a multi-party democratic national election in October, 1994. Good rains in 1993 brought the drought to an end, resulting in Mozambique's first bountiful harvest in years. The stage was set to begin social and economic reconstruction.

Under the peace agreements a new national defense force, the FADM, was created, which comprised elements of both FAM and RENAMO forces. This also meant that a large proportion of both armies had to be demobilized, totaling approximately 96,000 soldiers (including the 'Casa Militar' presidential guards and the 16,000 troops who were mustered out of the FAM shortly before the Peace Agreement was signed).

With scattered and displaced communities and poor employment opportunities, the prospects for demobilized soldiers, struggling to reintegrate socially and economically into civilian life, were bleak. The presence of large numbers of unemployed former combatants, unassimilated into social structures, posed a potential threat to the sustainability of peace in Mozambique.

The Peace Accords provided for the establishment of the United Nations Operation in Mozambique (UNOMOZ) and the United Nations Office for Humanitarian Assistance Coordination (UNOHAC), which were responsible for coordinating aid in the emergency period following the end of the war and assisting the people of Mozambique to move toward sustainable peace and development.

These institutions were of particular importance in view of the critical lack of institutional capacity in Mozambique for peace operations, both in Government and in civil society. The United Nations team offered a forum for discussion and debate for both FRELIMO and RENAMO and management capacity to ensure that both demobilization and reintegration processes did not create obstacles to hinder the peace effort.

2. International aid programming in Mozambique

Aid programming in post-war Mozambique can be seen to have progressed through two broad stages, dictated by the changing needs of the country. At the end of the war, there was an intense need for short-term emergency programming to remedy the immediate shortages of basic population needs (food, clothing, shelter, medicine), and to ensure the basic conditions for relocation were met for both ex-combatants and civilians.

As the potential threat of a return to war began to subside, a transitional stage of aid programming began. During this stage, emergency and development aid was aimed primarily at ensuring sustainable peace through a successful reintegration process. Central to this effort was reintegration programming for demobilized soldiers designed by the Reintegration Commission (CORE) which was established under UNOHAC and was charged with setting out a coordinated reintegration strategy.

Once both sides accepted the reintegration programming designed, implementing agencies took on the task of attempting to ease ex-combatants back into civil society by offering a variety of intermediary projects of goods, services, work, training and cash to assist the disenfranchised demobilized population resettle peacefully.

The successful completion of this transition stage, partially signaled by research which indicated that demobilized soldiers: were no longer a "more" needy or vulnerable group than any other; seemed to pose no greater threat to peace than any other group; considered themselves as reintegrated or equal in relation to their civilian neighbors and friends; found themselves with a similar or better economic status as their civilian neighbors and friends (albeit difficult), indicated that the IRS/PF program was no longer a transitional necessity heralding the beginning of a new period of longer-term, sustainable, broad-based development programming in Mozambique for all populations.

3. IOM activities in emergency programming

IOM implemented its first USAID-funded project in Mozambique in 1993 when it provided emergency assistance for the demobilization of Mozambican soldiers under the USAID grant number 656-0235-G-SS-3013-00. Under the coordination of the Technical Unit of the United Nations Operations in Mozambique (UNOMOZ), IOM was responsible for the transport of demobilized soldiers and their dependents from demobilization assembly areas to the destinations of their choice.

The USAID grant was extended under USAID's Demobilization/Reintegration Support Project (656-0235) for Mozambique which had a Life of Project (LOP) cost of \$15,000,000, amended to \$25,100,000 in September, 1994. The primary stated objective of the program was to assist in the "transportation of vulnerable groups of IDPs (internally displaced persons) to their areas of origin and their resettlement, thus diminishing their concentration in the city, district and local centers." The secondary objectives exhibited a more developmental slant "to reduce the dependency on urban infra-structures and informal trade as well as to

increase the access to land and the recovery of the agricultural sector" (IOM's Role in the Peace Process:8). By November 1994, when relocation operations concluded, some 135,000 DS and their dependents had been transported.

B. Demobilized soldiers reintegration program

1. Support programs for the demobilized

The reintegration support process for the demobilized was coordinated by the United Nations Reintegration Commission (CORE). CORE attempted to create a unified, country-wide reintegration support program, combining the efforts of multiple donors and agencies by the articulation of complementary mechanisms. It created this strategy in consultation with both parties (RENAMO and FRELIMO), and gained donor support for different initiatives in order to enlist the support of recipients and implementers for a coherent, effective reintegration program.

a) CORE's reintegration structure

At the time of demobilization, each demobilized soldier received a "vegpak", consisting of seeds, a machete, and bucket; a set of clothing; cash salary payments; food; continued access to food once relocated; a demobilization card (with photo, signature, fingerprints, and locale for settlement); an RSS check book good for cash salary payments for an eighteen month period; and transport "home" to the location of their choice.

Four mechanisms were created under CORE to assist with DS reintegration:

The Information and Referral Service (IRS) – This project provided for provincial offices which would assist the DS with information on benefits and opportunities, as well as mapping the opportunities available to and problems facing demobilized soldiers at a provincial level. IOM became the implementing agency, with funding primarily provided by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID).

The Reintegration Support Scheme (RSS) – This scheme provided salary payments (based on rank) to demobilized soldiers for eighteen months, beginning six months after demobilization, in their "home" district of relocation. The scheme provided DS with economic support for a limited time period in which to begin social and economic reintegration. This project was executed by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) with funding from many donors and implemented by the Banco Popular de Desenvolvimento (BPD) nationwide.

The Occupational Skills Development Program (OSD) – This vocational training program provided training and vocational kits to demobilized soldiers in order to promote useful vocational skills to find employment or start small scale

micro- enterprises in civil society. The OSD project was implemented by the International Labor Organization (ILO).

In November, 1994, a fourth program was added:

The Provincial and Open Reintegration Funds (PF/ORF) – These funding mechanisms were designed to complement other reintegration projects, especially IRS activities, by supporting economic activity opportunities in the provinces through the funding of community level projects which would provide employment to demobilized soldiers. IOM administered the Provincial Fund in Maputo, Gaza, Zambezia, Niassa, Nampula and Cabo Delgado to provide funding for selected short term productive activities for DS to ensure sustained peace.

In the central provinces of Inhambane, Sofala, Manica and Tete, the Open Reintegration Fund (ORF), was administered by the Gesellschaft fur Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ), and was based on the same concept and functioned as the PF but focused on longer term activity objectives including activity options for non-DS vulnerable populations.

With the closure of UNOHAC and CORE in 1995, responsibility for the coordination of reintegration programs was officially transferred from the United Nations to the Ministry of Labor.

b) Obstacles faced by CORE

One of the primary criticisms of CORE was that it was late in delivering a strategy for reintegration, leaving both parties and donors little time to discuss and critically assess reintegration options, particularly based on other country experiences. This had a number of consequences:

- Neither the donors nor the parties were provided promised information about reintegration processes, procedures and issues early on during the UNOMOZ activity formulation.
- The issues and potential problems and opportunities for implementation of the reintegration programs could not be fully explored due to time constraints.
- Implementers of the above described activities agreed to by both parties did not have adequate time to prepare for operations.

2. Design and implementation of the IRS

The initial design for the IRS was proposed by Creative Associated International Inc. under a consultancy agreement with UNOHAC in November, 1993. It was based on lessons learned from reintegration services for the demobilized, especially counseling and referral programs used in Nicaragua and El Salvador. A major design modification, specifically promoted for

the conditions in Mozambique, resulted in the formulation of the *Information and Referral Service*. This provincially based project was meant to provide DS with information on demobilization benefits as an extension service of the UN Technical Unit and refer DS to on-going and potential social and economic activities available. Formal vocational "counseling" was not deemed an option since both human and financial resources were clearly not available to realistically provide such a service.

This original IRS design aimed to provide a linkage between reintegration programs through a referral service whereby DS would be directed to reintegration activities. The IRS was to create a center in the field where ex-soldiers could gather information on benefits and opportunities available to them. It was intended that soldiers receive no tangible benefits (i.e. goods or payments) from the IRS, rather that it would be a center for information dissemination. The purpose of the IRS, according to the original USAID grant agreement was "to assist ex-combatants to integrate into civilian life by directing them to possibilities for employment, training and vocational kits, and promoting realistic expectations". It was intended that IRS field staff would map the opportunities available to demobilized soldiers in their provinces. This would include physically mapping the locations of health centers, employment centers, job opportunities, training opportunities, banks, Ministry departments, schools, NGO activities, etc.

IRS was the first reintegration program to set up field operations in March, 1994. It barely managed to accommodate the first huge influxes of DS looking for assistance. The IRS provided emergency support to the DS immediately but the lack of set up time hindered its ability to effectively conduct provincial economic opportunity mapping services which was part of its original design. Unfortunately, the IRS was never able to engage in consistent, comprehensive, wide ranging opportunities mapping as other pressing requests placed demands upon its resources including transport activities, emergency aid, and later the Provincial Fund. This is discussed in more detail in a following section.

From the point of view of the donors, particularly regarding the objective of pacification, the IRS function was very important as it would result in field offices obtaining knowledge about DS activities, threats to peace, civil disobedience, options for project funding based on DS need and request, and would allow donors and Government to monitor the process of reintegration.

3. Design and implementation of the PF

The Provincial Fund was designed to complement the other three components of CORE's strategy. It was intended to encourage economic reintegration by making small grants available to DS for initiating small businesses and micro-enterprises, and to businesses for projects which would employ DS. The PF would also assist the DS apply for and/or benefit from the skills developed under OSD programs. The project was largely funded by USAID, with IOM as the implementing agency. Financial support was also received by IOM from the World Bank, and Swedish, Italian, and Canadian donors.

The CORE document outlining the proposed PF (Aug. 1994) stated four objectives:

- **Community level reintegration:** Supporting local initiatives involving demobilized soldiers in projects which would benefit the local community, possibly including labor-intensive work that would provide temporary employment on a significant scale and contribute to the rehabilitation of local infrastructure such as schools, churches and health posts.
- **Promotion of small scale activities:** The PF was to be a small flexible mechanism to support the DS in their efforts to find gainful economic activities.
- **Improve the provincial, district, and local community implementation capacity:** The PF could contribute to capacity building at a provincial level, although resources would be directed towards support of reintegration.
- **Conflict resolution:** As the DS might have conceivably posed a threat to the peace and stability of Mozambique, the PF would provide a mechanism to respond quickly and flexibly to potential disturbances, thereby preventing small and isolated incidents from developing into crisis situations.

The development of guidelines for the provincial fund was listed as an expected output of the IRS in the initial USAID grant agreement. USAID's approach to the PF was slightly different from that of CORE, as it emphasized pacification rather than development as its main objective. USAID's primary objective in funding the PF was to provide short term work for demobilized soldiers, which would not necessarily be sustainable but would provide them with some income and employment while enhancing the possibility of sustained peace.

Amendment No. One to the USAID Grant Agreement required the PF to:

- Identify potential reintegration opportunities;
- Pre-select the best projects from each of the provinces, according to given criteria;
- Properly account for all use of funds;
- Provide for initial allocation of \$100,000 for each of IOM's seven target provinces. It was later to recommend further distribution of funds based on various factors, including the concentration of the demobilized, the capacity of intermediaries to effectively implement programs, degree of instability, performance of the portfolio in a province, etc;
- Monitor the implementation of projects on an ongoing basis;
- Evaluate the first and subsequent phases of projects receiving \$ 25,000 or more, before providing additional funding for these projects;
- Report on demobilized soldiers assisted under the Provincial Fund;

- Evaluate all projects following completion.

IOM took the middle ground, concentrating upon pacification but aiming for sustainability where possible. USAID mandated that a minimum of 50% of each grant directly benefit DS. The World Bank's contribution for Nampula Province specified that a minimum of 80% directly benefit the DS.

Under these requirements, the IOM identified the following flexible criteria as the basis for PF interventions:

- All projects should be funded to provide employment to DS, involve DS in community-oriented activities, or help DS establish themselves in their communities
- Ensure speed of implementation
- Average cost should be less than \$250 per direct beneficiary
- Project activity should be greatest in areas of greatest concentration of DS
- When possible, the PF should link to other projects which support DS
- Projects should primarily use third-party organizations or other intermediaries for implementation
- The main goal of the PF is grant-making

In contrast to IOM, GTZ aimed at longer-term economic rehabilitation and took a more community-based view, feeling that sustainable development programs which would benefit both DS and civilians would be more effective in contributing to the reintegration of DS.

4. Relationship between the IRS and the PF

CORE conceived of the PF as a separate project activity to the IRS. In December, 1994, CAII recommended that the two projects be separated as much as possible in order to ensure that both functions were carried out effectively. However, USAID felt that the IRS and the PF should be administered from the same offices in order for them to make the best use of resources, and envisaged close coordination between the two entities. The projects joined under IOM auspices and were thereafter referred to as the combined IRS/PF Project as stipulated in its USAID Grant Agreement.

In practice, it was very difficult to draw a strict division between operations of the IRS and those of the PF. Although the IRS and PF were administered separately at a national level, at the provincial offices they were administered by a Provincial Coordinator of Programs (PCP) who was responsible for overseeing both the IRS and the PF functions. This resulted in a

blurring of objectives and operational modalities between the IRS and the PF. IOM felt from the beginning that the IRS program was a "program without teeth" (IRF/PF Progress Report :4) because it could not deliver any tangible forms of opportunities to DS. Initially, it was envisaged that the PF would empower the IRS to do this and accordingly viewed the PF as a tool for the IRS.

C. Project operational phases

As described above, the IRS/PF project, together with the other projects under CORE which were aimed at aiding the reintegration of DS, was part of a strategy for the crucial period of transition from reactive, targeted, emergency programming to proactive, long-term, broad-based development programming.

The IRS/PF project was funded through the support of a number of donors but the greatest contribution came from USAID which made available a total of \$11,000,000 through a grant agreement with 3 extensions. A further \$1,500,000 was contributed by Italy while Canada made available \$532,000 for the project. The World Bank contributed \$663,725 for PF activities in Nampula.

These amounts were allocated approximately in the following programmatic areas. The information and referral service received about \$ 7.5 millions. The provincial fund project specific resources accounted for another \$ 5 millions and technical assistants activities received close to \$ 1.1 millions. It should be noted that even when the IRS accounted for the biggest proportion of the resources, it was the first activity to be implemented and therefore, Had to carry most of the equipment provision and logistical/operational costs.

Projects exhibited characteristics of both emergency and development programming. As Mozambique moved away from the immediate threat of war, and the requirements for and constraints on programming changed, the IRS/PF program correspondingly shifted its focus and its mode of operations. For this reason, the IRS/PF developed through four clear phases, which were reflected in the operations, focus and structure of the project. These can be illustrated as follows:

1. Phase I: The IRS coexistent with demobilization (April 1994-November 1994)

IRS began operations in April, 1994 with eighteen people employed as 'counselors' (this title was unfortunately taken from other country designs and did not accurately describe the newly designed functions of the IRS), trained by CAII as information officers, and sent into the field to manage DS problems. At this early stage, the IRS was working out of the CORE provincial offices, which enabled it to be the first of the reintegration projects to begin activities. By July, 1994, all ten provincial offices were operational. While IOM was responsible for all overall implementation, CAII offered technical assistance which included

training; the IRS procedures manual; the registration forms and databases for IRS services, UNDP RSS payment assistance, Technical Unit UNTAC demobilization benefits, and opportunities mapping.

Simultaneously, the IOM was still heavily involved in its transport activities. This was reflected in its operational structure and impacted upon the focus of its activities. The IRS/PF progress report (November 1994 - July 1995) listed four primary objectives for the emergency period:

- Inform, advise and assist DS in accessing benefits provided by UNOMOZ and the GOM for newly demobilized soldiers
- Act as a direct link between the DS and the institutions providing those benefits
- Maintain personal files on individual DS to monitor activities
- Provide information and referrals to DS on employment and training activities

The massive initial influx of DS with problems regarding documentation and demobilization benefits made it clear that the IRS would have to focus its attention almost solely on these issues in this initial phase. Its primary activities were in providing technical assistance to the UN Technical Unit in the field. It assisted with lost, destroyed, and incorrect demobilization cards, the distribution of kits to those who did not receive them at demobilization and helped resolve the immediate problems and concerns of the DS.

One major concern, for example, was regarding the provision of free food. According to the information given to the DS in the UN pamphlet, What the DS Should Know, free food was available for the first few months after demobilization. This in fact had been intended for both civilians and DS through existing food relief programs and only in the rural areas. When the food was not delivered in the urban areas, the IRS had to help maintain calm, meeting with the DS, listening to their concerns, and informing them of the misunderstanding leading to a food distribution resolution developed by the World Food Program. The IRS also served the UN and donors by informing them of the dilemma which needed immediate attention.

The IRS was also responsible for registering the 16,000 FRELIMO soldiers who were demobilized before the Peace Agreements and were only made eligible for benefits under the reintegration programming in 1994 after negotiations with RENAMO. This led to an entire UN registration process, normally administered at assembly areas, to be carried out in all provinces at the IRS offices for the issuance of demobilization cards. IRS staff photographed, registered, fingerprinted and issued demobilization cards for the UNOMOZ Technical Unit.

When the RSS checks began to be cashed, six months after demobilization, the IRS functioned as a technical arm of the UNDP in helping to resolve the ensuing confusion between DS and the BPD. The IRS arranged for the reissue of checkbooks which had been incorrectly printed, helped DS to fill out forms and obtain money from the banks, and helped

to bridge the communication gap between the DS and the banks. In some provinces, a joint committee was set up between the IRS and BPD staff to help stabilize the potentially eruptive situation. Again, the IRS served as a UN arm identifying and remedying problems in the field outside of UN, donor or even Government capacity.

Because of these continual emergency situations linked to the delivery of commitments by the UN, donors and the Government, the IRS was most valued at this time of need for on-site resolution. At the same time, IOM focused its attention and, to a degree, its resources, upon its need to complete transport activities. As a result, the IRS did not have the opportunity to concentrate on more proactive programming, in particular, the proposed opportunities mapping service, which was never fully conducted, due to lack of time, and human and financial resources in the IRS offices.

2. Phase II: The IRS with pilot PF operations (December 1994-February 1995)

IOM's transport activities in Mozambique ended in November 1994, leaving its attention focused solely upon the IRS. This meant that IOM had to change its whole approach from that of transport operation to that of a pre-development aid provider. This involved a major shift in its organizational mindset and in the way that it carried out its operations, shifting its focus from quick, independent reaction to one of planning, consultation, collaboration and action. At the urging of CAII and USAID, this transformation process began with a workshop in September, 1996 and continued to develop as the IRS moved out of the CORE offices and into the IOM provincial offices in early 1995.

During this phase the IRS continued to manage and resolve RSS and documentation issues and referrals in addition to concentrating upon its own internal restructuring. IOM felt that the IRS's status purely as an information dissemination body meant that it was passive and reactive. Its mandate did not include the delivery of any tangible benefits such as training or financial support. It felt that the addition of the PF was vital to its becoming an effective, proactive mechanism for reintegration.

The PF was planned and tested at this time, with preliminary activities in the provinces occurring in the first few months of 1995.

3. Phase III: The combined IRS/PF (March 1995-June 1996)

The PF officially began its activities in March 1995 in the southern provinces of Maputo and Gaza and the northern provinces of Zambezia, Nampula, Cabo Delgado and Niassa. Under a cooperative agreement between IOM and the German organization GTZ which operated the Open Reintegration Fund (which was intended to operate along similar lines to the PF in the central provinces of Inhambane, Sofala, Manica and Tete) DS in all provinces had access to funding for productive activities to promote economic growth and/or stability.

The IRS/PF began outreach activities at this time, conducting field visits in districts outside of the urban and peri-urban areas in order to achieve greater penetration into outlying areas where it was felt that the need might be great. The initiation of PF activities coincided with a further shift in the focus of the program, towards longer term, more sustainable programming. As the immediate aftermath of the demobilization process (problems with documentation and the disbursement of benefits and relocation) subsided, IOM moved away from emergency problem solving to concentrate on support for provincial fund activities in what it saw as "part of the transitional phase between the post-war emergency and the national reconstruction process" (IOM, Progress Report, May 1995:). This shift in focus was reflected in modifications to the national structure of the combined IRS/PF.

As time went on, the need for the IRS to engage in emergency activities diminished and fewer and fewer DS visited the offices for assistance with problems. The more developmental activities envisaged for the IRS – opportunity mapping, referrals and information dissemination – were subordinated to PF activities. The IRS engaged in opportunity mapping, for example, but mainly with regard to potential PF activities, rather than other services or existing opportunities for the DS. Little attention was paid to mapping other employment or training opportunities, or to conduct risk-mapping. The end of the RSS payments further reduced the work load of the IRS.

Towards the end of this phase the IRS's main information dissemination and problem solving function was in addressing pension issues. This was an important and very contentious issue seeing as the Government had agreed to begin paying pensions to all eligible disabled within six months of their demobilization. While the UN had played a vital role in ensuring that disabled soldiers had access to medical assessments and treatment and were registered for their pensions at the time of demobilization, the vast majority of those eligible were receiving no pensions and were demanding that the promises made by Government were fulfilled. The IRS, together with IOM and Government medical staffs, revisited disabled areas, conducted additional medical exams for pensions and worked with the Ministry of Finance to help speed up the rate of payments.

Also of note is the fact that the termination of RSS payments while reducing the workload of the IRS resulted in increased requests for PF funding as DS looked for alternative sources of financial support. As the PF operated from the same offices as the IRS, sharing the same resources, the PF became the main focus of the program and rather than the PF being a tool of the IRS, the IRS ultimately became more of an adjunct to the PF.

The implementation of PF activities changed over time as the project learned from its experiences. In order to encourage its projects to be more successful and sustainable, the IRS/PF began a project consolidation effort in 1996, seeking more serious and competent implementers and financing activities based on local priorities, focusing on self-sustainability goals. Most provincial offices registered micro and self employment projects which were financed in coordination with local authorities.

4. Phase IV: Operational reduction of the IRS/PF (July 1996-January 1997)

In May, 1996, IOM began the phased closure of the IRS/PF program, largely due to financial constraints. An internal communication distributed to its provincial offices on June 5, 1996, explained that this was the result of estimations of donor contributions being overly optimistic and not enough funds remaining from the previous operations for the level of intervention envisaged. CAII conducted a transition study which offered IOM various models for phase-out and its implications and an additional study which analyzed the situation of rural DS to ensure that phase out would not increase or provoke instability, civil disobedience, or the maintenance of peace.

In June, 1996, the funding of new PF projects was reduced. The efforts of the IRS/PF were directed towards:

- Continuation of ongoing activities until their termination
- Continuation of monitoring functions on the reintegration situation
- Continuation of opportunities mapping activities
- Smooth closure of activities

Phased closure resulted in the shut down of provincial offices while maintaining regional presence. In December, 1996, all operations were shut down leaving the Maputo headquarters open to finalize activities and close-out requirements. Collaboration with UN organizations and donors led to the sharing of information for evaluation purposes of all of the CORE reintegration programs initiated.

D. Project objectives

1. General CORE objectives

CORE's stated objective was to offer demobilized soldiers opportunities to engage in productive activities once they had returned to their homes. It maintained this vision throughout, although when the RSS scheme was approved, it became apparent that it would be difficult to fund broad-based, sustainable employment programs with the remaining donor funds still available. Nonetheless, it was envisaged that the combination of the IRS, RSS, OSD and Provincial/Open Reintegration Funds would provide goods and services to a significant number of demobilized to enhance stability, peace and reintegration. The desired result was that all Mozambican citizens would be on the same footing to begin reconstruction and development in post-war Mozambique.

2. Donor objectives

The donors' stance was somewhat different. At the Rome conference in 1992, the donors agreed that they would not support reintegration programs, feeling that it was more important

to assist the six million civilians and DS identified as requiring emergency aid than specifically targeting demobilized soldiers for special benefits. In addition, it was felt that identifying DS as a special group with special needs and privileges would be counterproductive to their reintegration and might support a mentality of entitlement among DS and resentment among the civilian population.

However, it became apparent in the course of 1993, that the presence of a large number of demobilized soldiers who potentially would not reintegrate into civilian society after so many years of war could pose a threat to peace both in the long and short term. As a result, the donors decided to support some reintegration programming. Therefore they approached the issue of reintegration largely from the point of view of pacification rather than sustainable development. USAID maintained this stance throughout the IRS/PF project as it did not feel that economic or social rehabilitation were attainable within the scope of programs for the reintegration of the DS. Future programming, post DS reintegration, once peace was maintained, could then focus on sustainable projects for reconstruction and development.

E. Project expected outputs

Outputs were planned in original CORE documents. Outputs were also scheduled in the original USAID Grant Agreement, then updated in the Amendment. Additional program outputs were incorporated into the project design when new financial contributions were added to the project.

1. CORE documents

CORE foresaw the following six outputs for the IRS and PF:

1. Reach a considerable number of demobilized soldiers;
2. Create conditions for greater social stability;
3. Promote economic and social recovery, particularly of the rural areas where most of the funds would be applied;
4. Direct support to community-based labor-intensive activities involving demobilized soldiers;
5. Direct support to income-generating activities;
6. Help to stabilize the demobilized in their home and/or chosen communities.

2. Original USAID grant agreement

The following outputs were scheduled in the original USAID IRS/PF Grant Agreement with IOM:

1. Demobilized soldiers would use the IRS program in all provinces;

2. Database would be set up with a fully operational computerized monitoring system of personal files for referral and overall reporting of activities;
3. Criteria to provide training and reintegration assistance would be established within the framework of the program;
4. Training institutions would be selected to provide facilities to the demobilized soldiers;
5. Materials, such as leaflets and handouts, for the purpose of assisting with the socioeconomic reintegration of the demobilized would be produced and disseminated in the IRS offices;
6. Employment opportunities in different economic sectors would be linked to the referral service in order to facilitate matching on the basis of demand and supply;
7. Support to income-generating activities would be provided through kits distribution program;
8. Development of guidelines to ensure a flexible provincial fund operation.

3. Amended USAID agreement

In March, 1995, an amendment to the USAID Grant Agreement laid out the following revised outputs for IRS and for the Provincial Fund:

a) IRS expectations

1. Continue IRS services since research showed DS satisfaction with IRS services and information;
2. Provide continued services to demobilized soldiers to remedy problems related to the delivery of demobilization benefits such as government payments, demobilization cards, distribution of kits, and access to food distribution;
3. Advise and generally assist demobilized soldiers in solving their personal problems, maximizing the use of other reintegration programs and other relevant support services;
4. Collect information from demobilized soldiers to produce individual profiles in order to tailor responses to individual need and profile.;
5. Inform demobilized soldiers about specific employment, training and income opportunities available to them. Where possible, refer them to employment and other opportunities.

b) Provincial Fund expectations

1. Projects funded should succeed in providing employment and income generating activities to demobilized soldiers, or otherwise assist the demobilized in their reintegration process;
2. Projects should be of benefit to the community in general;
3. Demobilized soldiers should be helped to reintegrate peacefully into the civilian society and economy.

IV. Project Outcomes

This section summarizes the outcomes resulting from the IRS/PF project based on the set of objectives articulated in the previous chapter. These outcomes are presented chronologically by project phase and then compiled and summarized.

A. Project quantitative outcomes

1. Programmatic outcomes by phase


a) Phase I: April 1994 - November 1994

The initial stage of the IRS program has been termed the "emergency phase". The IRS offices opened as the demobilized were returning to their places of origin and beginning to reintegrate themselves into society. The offices were immediately swamped by overwhelming numbers of DS looking for information and solutions to their immediate demobilization needs, such as documentation, food, transport and monetary benefits. Other important components of the IRS such as outreach activities, mapping of opportunities and referrals were not emphasized.

Information and referral service


According to field registration compilations nationwide, there were a total of 34,437 visits by DS for assistance during this period. This figure includes repeat visits and therefore is not an accurate representation of the actual number of DS who visited the IRS offices. In addition, 1,105 DS contacts were made through outreach.

As can be seen from the following data, the primary reasons for visiting the IRS offices at this early stage was for information and assistance with demobilization benefits (eg. lost or incorrect UN demobilization cards), especially RSS payments (checkbooks). Assistance was spread over all 10 provinces with heavier concentrations in Sofala, Maputo, Manica and Tete.



Note: Even when from an operational perspective the activities implemented by the IRS to support the demobilization benefits became a "de-facto" IRS function, the original design did not contemplate these as part of the IRS direct responsibilities. For this reason, and in order to avoid confusion with different reporting criteria, the activities represented in the previous and further charts will be classified as RIR (reintegration information and referral), as part of the original IRS concept, and the rest of the categories representing added functions to support the implementation of the demobilization benefit structure.

The number of visits to each provincial office were as follows:



It should be noted, that during this phase the IRS registered some 13,500 FRELIMO DS for UN demobilization cards and reintegration access. This activity is represented in the total access figures but not tracked as part of the chart showing the reasons for visiting the IRS offices.


b) Phase II: December 1994 - February 1995

During this stage the IRS offices were still very much involved in assisting with demobilization benefit problems, although as transport activities finished in November, the 16,000 had received their demobilization cards and initial problems such as emergency food distribution and RSS payment problems subsided, the numbers of DS requiring such assistance began to diminish.


Information and referral service

There were a total of 11,836 visits made by DS to IRS offices for assistance during this period. An additional 2,721 were contacted through outreach visits by IRS staff. With the PF upcoming, activities and operational structures began to change to accommodate needed project opportunities to deliver to PF recipients. This is depicted graphically below.

In addition, the IRS was supplying names of registered DS and their requested areas of need to other reintegration program implementers, especially the ILO/DHO and GTZ/ORF.





The number of visits to each provincial office were as follows:



Provincial fund

During this first stage of the Provincial Phase, 49 pilot projects were funded for a total number of 1340 beneficiaries, of which 1165 were DS and 175 civilians. Funding for these projects totaled \$215,216 averaging \$188.59 per beneficiary. Pilot projects were

predominantly implemented in Gaza and Maputo provinces and focused on agriculture, industry and crafts, construction, public works and trade and services. Project were mainly concentrated on income generation and permanent employment. In addition, IRS/PF offices in the central region were assisting GTZ identifying both eligible DS and feasible projects for GTZ/ORF funding.



The following table summarizes the provincial fund outcomes for its pilot phase, segregated by province.

Province	# projects	\$ spent	Tot. benef.	\$ per benef.	% cancel
CAB	4	5171	46	79.98	25.0%
GAZ	9	36961	185	212.75	11.1%
INH	1	180	1	180.00	.0%
MAN	1	871	3	290.33	.0%
MAP	24	128511	570	227.49	33.3%
NAM	6	15544	203	103.82	.0%
NIA	2	5189	32	142.49	.0%
ZAM	2	22789	300	62.97	.0%
Phase total	49	215216	1340	188.59	20.4%


c) Phase III: March 1995 - June 1996

In March, 1995, the PF became fully operational in Maputo, Gaza, Zambezia, Nampula, Cabo Delgado and Niassa, while GTZ began programming in Inhambane, Manica, Sofala and Tete. With IOM becoming responsible for the PF, and demobilization benefits problems already resolved, the IRS shifted its focus to supporting the implementation of PF projects.


Beneficiaries visiting the IRS/PF offices

According to IOM reports, there were a total of 28,775 visits made by DS to provincial IRS/PF offices for assistance during this period and 21,815 contacts with DS made in

outreach visits. During this stage visits to the offices for information and assistance dwindled, as the DS were no longer in need of demobilization benefit assistance or mere information but wanted to be targeted to access PF project activities and funding. This is depicted graphically below.





The distribution of visits to each provincial office were as follows (it should be noted that Cabo Delgado and Nampula provincial IRS/PF offices were no longer registering DS visits due to lack of compliance with IOM's standard procedures, and therefore while they were fully operational and may have used the IRS mechanism for identifying potential DS project recipients, the database was limited to PF assistance only):



Provincial Fund

3,748 PF activities were funded during this period, with a total expenditure of \$3,840,603 averaging \$186.67 per beneficiary. 23,037 beneficiaries participated in these activities, 19,887 DS and 3,150 civilians. Projects were implemented predominantly in Zambezia, Maputo and Gaza in trade and services, and agriculture. Activities were significantly focused on income generation and micro-enterprise.



The following table shows the outputs and expenditures of the PF in each of the ten provinces:

Province	# projects	\$ spent	Tot. benef.	\$ per benef.	% cancel
Missing	1	2883	10	288.30	.0%
CAB	216	410376	2549	188.73	6.9%
GAZ	392	420032	2032	236.31	3.6%
INH	369	145057	865	201.14	2.4%
MAN	118	95846	363	207.70	6.8%
MAP	430	536699	2007	265.71	15.3%
NAM	310	851990	7243	164.57	15.2%
NIA	154	335904	1988	187.85	12.3%
SOF	275	136592	633	196.19	19.6%
TET	251	75172	491	136.50	5.6%
ZAM	1232	830052	4856	149.94	17.5%
Phase total	3748	3840603	23037	186.67	12.3%


It is interesting to note the skewed beneficiary per project numbers for the province of Nampula. This was due to the fact that the World Bank monies utilized in Nampula stipulated a lower per beneficiary cost than the USAID Grant. In order to respond to this, IRS/PF staff in Nampula placed DS in much larger groups (averaging 23.36 DS per project) than normal so that project beneficiary costs met World Bank requirements. This 'forced' grouping caused many of the project obstacles reported in the next chapter of this report.

d) Phase IV: July 1996 - January 1997


During this period the IRS/PF underwent phased closure. Few new projects were funded at this time, current projects continued to be monitored and funded to the end of their terms. IRS activities were largely confined to resolving pension issues.

Beneficiaries visiting the IRS/PF offices

During this phase out period, there were a total of 4,448 visits by DS to IRS/PF offices and 4,894 DS contacts through the outreach program.




The number of visits to each provincial office were as follows:



Provincial Fund

During this period the PF programming was phasing out but still succeeded in funding 608 projects for 1,705 DS and 40 civilians. Funding for these projects totaled \$330,311 or an average per beneficiary cost of \$216.02. Projects focused on trade and services, industry and crafts and agriculture in Manica, Sofala, Maputo and Nampula predominantly for income generation activities.



The following table shows the outputs and expenditure of the PF in each of the ten provinces:

Province	# projects	\$ spent	Tot. benef.	\$ per benef.	% cancel.
CAB	1	1233	6	205.50	.0%
GAZ	5	3684	15	182.42	.0%
MAN	167	49526	135	269.33	.6%
MAP	74	9364	32	175.72	2.7%
NAM	117	151682	949	199.68	2.6%
NIA	15	33977	220	177.34	.0%
SOF	206	75082	351	200.88	6.8%
TET	5	1176	10	117.60	20.0%
ZAM	18	4587	77	138.09	27.9%
Phase total	608	330311	1745	216.02	4.3%



2. Summary of programmatic outcomes during the life of the project

a) Information and referral service


According to IOM reports, over the course of the project there have been 79,496 visits made by DS to provincial IRS/PF offices, and an additional 30,449 DS were contacted through the outreach programs in rural areas. The total number of IRS contacts made (both in offices initiated by the DS and through outreach initiated by the IRS) was 109,945. The average

number of visits of DS to or with IRS staff was four (4). 34,605 recorded requests were made to the IRS for the following services:

Type of assistance	Requests
Training	13,919
Employment	7,486
Assistance with RSS payments	1,921
Assistance with other demobilization benefits/services	5,073
Self-employment	4,747
Reforma pensions	833
Disability pensions	616



As time progressed, the demobilization benefit assistance required by the DS decreased. The following graph depicts how the type of assistance required changed over time, based on a monthly average of visits for each phase.





The graph clearly demonstrates the waning of IRS activities as DS' requirements for demobilization benefits lessened, and resources were directed towards the PF.

b) Provincial fund interventions


Overall PF project costs were \$4,396,988 for the implementation of 4,415 projects for 26,175 beneficiaries, 22,757 of which were DS. The average cost per beneficiary was \$190.47 and the average project duration was 3 months.

Province	# projects	\$ spent	Tot. benef	\$ per benef.	% cancel
Missing	1	2883	10	288.30	.0%
CAB	222	418247	2609	187.24	7.2%
GAZ	406	460677	2232	235.28	3.7%
INH	370	145237	366	201.08	2.4%
MAN	286	146243	551	245.53	3.1%
MAP	530	675274	2612	262.16	14.3%
NAM	433	1019216	9295	170.68	11.5%
NIA	173	382956	2278	186.72	11.0%
SOF	482	212084	986	198.23	14.1%
TET	257	76348	501	136.12	6.2%
ZAM	1255	957823	5235	149.66	17.7%
Project total	4415	4396988	26175	190.49	11.3%

The following charts summarize the distribution of PF projects and their beneficiaries by province. Again, the highly skewed beneficiary numbers in Nampula is noteworthy.



The following charts depict the cumulative workload for the provincial fund activities, both cumulative expenditures and number of beneficiaries.



The data for these charts is calculated on a monthly average in order to take into account the different time periods.

3. Other outcomes of the IRS/PF

In addition to the primary outcomes of its core activities, the IRS/PF program has had a number of secondary outcomes as described below.

a) Institutional capacity building:

Ten Ministry of Labor employees were seconded to the IRS/PF field offices (one at each office) in order to increase their skills and knowledge-base, intending to build the capacity of the Ministry of Labor's provincial departments. Areas of competency envisaged were increased computer training, work opportunity identification mapping and contracting processes, and monitoring and reporting instrument development.



b) Conflict Resolution Team

In addition, the conflict resolution team (CRT) of three government officials, one from the Ministry of Labor, one from the Ministry of Defense and one from the Ministry of Finance, was placed in the IRS/PF head office in Maputo. The CRT (originally constituted and funded by CORE) was intended to be a mechanism which would respond quickly to potential crisis situations and facilitate coordination between the three ministries. The main contribution of the CRT was in helping to quiet unrest in Nampula when initial misinformation regarding PF opportunities created AMODEG supported demonstrations.



c) Opportunity mapping

Over the course of the project the IRS/PF mapped a total of more than 10,000 employment opportunities for DS. These were primarily opportunities for PF interventions, and included

few opportunities for training or non-PF-related employment. The opportunities mapped in different sectors can be represented as follows:



The following charts show the number of opportunities identified over each project calendar quarter and its correspondent number of demobilized soldiers who could benefit from those opportunities.



d) Support activities to other programs

UN Technical Unit

The role of the IRS as a provincially based UN unit to resolve demobilization benefit problems proved to be essential to the successful completion of demobilization by offering services to reissue demobilization cards, record transportation needs, Government subsidy problems and food distribution information.

UNDP/RSS

In the initial phases of reintegration, the IRS was vital to maintaining the satisfaction of DS related to the UNDP/RSS program. Although eventually, BPD branches were enabled to implement the payment of checks, the initial phases depended on IRS interventions. In fact,

the IRS developed the first RSS payment request and checkbook reissuance forms for the UNDP.

GTZ/ORF and the ILO/OSD

Finally, the IRS/PF offered assistance to the other reintegration programs, specifically the GTZ/ORF in the central region and the ILO/OSD nationwide to identify DS and project activities. This was of particular importance to the success of training initiatives implemented by ILO/OSD which did not have field offices but was managed only from its central office in Maputo. The IRS/PF proved to be of significant importance to the successful implementation of the other UN reintegration projects, a role which developed over the course of the IRS/PF operation.

B. Project qualitative impact

The Information and Referral Service and Provincial Fund activities resulted in demonstrating positive indications that tasks for which both projects had been created were, in fact, achieved: to support the socioeconomic reintegration of the demobilized soldiers to ensure the successful culmination of the peace process.

1. The impact of the information and referral service

The IRS contributed to the following impacts:

a) Demobilized perception of self



⇒ The information and referral service contributed to linking beneficiaries with other programs. For most activities, the access rate reported by the interviewees increased if the respondent contacted the IRS seeking information. As an example, 26 % of the respondents not contacting the IRS received vocational kits. This number increases to 36 % for the ones who did contact IRS offices and received information or referrals. The following table summarizes the impact of the IRS in the access rates to other programs.

Did you visit an IRS office for information?	Did you receive RSS payments? Yes	Did you get PF financing from IOM? Yes	Did you get other financing for projects? Yes	Did you receive vocational training? Yes	Did you receive self-employment toolkits? Yes	Did you receive any type of pension? Yes
No	99.8%	35.5%	8.7%	26.2%	20.9%	26.2%
Yes	99.8%	58.3%	10.6%	36.2%	22.7%	33.4%
Total cases	99.8%	47.9%	9.7%	31.8%	22.0%	30.1%

This table shows that even when CORE reintegration programs were not designed to enforce beneficiary access through the IRS' referral mechanisms, the program has been able to increase beneficiaries' chances of accessing other benefits. For example, 47% of all

interviewees had been able to access the provincial fund activities. This overall number is compounded from a 35% of the population being able to access the program on their own and a 58% of the population having received PF financing after being referred by the IRS. It can be seen from this example that the IRS was able to substantially increase the possibilities for its beneficiaries to receive PF financing for projects.

⇒ The information and referral service appears to have little impact in the DS perception of their own reintegration. In fact, the analysis of the survey results shows that a slight decrease in the median perception for reintegration exists for the cases having received information and/or referral. The chart on the left shows this change in the population median, even when the overall distribution does not change. On further exploration, the chart on the right shows the change of expectations created by the different combination of IRS and PF programs. This difference shows that in some cases the IRS might have created expectations for benefits or programs which it could not or was not meant to deliver. These expectations had a negative impact on the demobilized perception of reintegration.



b) Social and economic factors

Due to the nature of the information and referral service, that is, to provide information about other activities and to refer specific cases to other implementers, there is no direct impact correlation observed in our data sample in relation to social or economic changes attributable to IRS interventions. However, the increase in the access to other benefits and the support provided by the IRS to the early implementation of other reintegration programs, have without doubt made a difference in the target population. All survey questions were specifically designed to assess the impact of the IRS per se, therefore, no further information is available in relation to the possible combined impact of the IRS and other activities which were the recipients of DS referred by the IRS.



2. The impact of the provincial fund

The PF programs contributed to the following changes in the target population's perspectives and situation.

a) Demobilized perception of self


⇒ The provincial fund activities have positively impacted on the beneficiaries perspectives in relation their own welfare and their reintegration.

- The chart on the left shows an increment in how the respondents considered themselves reintegrated. For interviewees not having participated in IRS/PF activities and those who did participate in the provincial fund projects, the median perception of reintegration increases from "somewhat reintegrated" (3), to "much reintegrated" (4).
- The chart on the right shows the increase in the respondents' perception of improvement over the last two years. For respondents not having accessed PF benefits to the ones having taken advantage of the its activities, the median increases from "same" (3) to "better" (4).



⇒ The provincial fund contributed to changing the way the DS believe they are perceived by their communities and how they would like to be perceived.


- The chart on the left bellow shows the change in the way the respondents believe they are perceived by their communities as a function of having participated in provincial fund activities. It can be seen that while less DS believe they are perceived as military personnel – from 27% for respondents not having accessed the PF to 14% for the ones that did –, there is also an increase in the number of respondents who believe they are perceived as demobilized and a correspondent decrease for the ones believing that they are perceived as civilians. This is most probably related to the fact that the provincial fund involved mostly DS in its operations, therefore creating the impression in the DS that they would be easily identifiable as former combatants because of their participation in the program.



- The chart on the right above shows the change in the way the DS soldiers would like to be perceived by their communities as a function of having participated in the provincial fund activities. Once again, there is a clear reduction in the number of respondents wanting to be perceived as military once involved in PF interventions. There is also a significant increase in the number of interviewees wanting to be perceived as demobilized, probably resulting from the perception of special benefits and/or status associated with their participation as demobilized in the PF.

⇒ The provincial fund has impacted in the value the demobilized place on reintegration programming.


- The next two charts show the change in perception of those demobilized soldiers not having accessed provincial fund financing and the those who did. The chart on the left represents the change in value placed on programming as a contributor to reintegration. The chart on the right shows the difference in the level of satisfaction of the DS by the level of support provided by programs for their reintegration. In both graphs, a clear increasing trend is perceived by PF beneficiaries.



b) Social factors


⇒ The provincial fund has contributed to improve the DS perspective of the social benefits of peace.

- When asked which group or sector benefited most with peace in Mozambique, over 50% of the responses included "All Mozambicans". On further exploration of responses, there is a clear correlation between PF benefit recipients and responses to this question. For respondents not having accessed the PF, the total responses for "Civilians" account for 37% of the cases, increasing to 53% for PF beneficiaries. This indicates that the PF successfully contributed to an improved perception that civil society directly benefited by the peace.
- The provincial fund beneficiaries are also more optimistic about their personal and family situations and expectations for the future. In almost every category, an increase of nearly 20% can be observed between respondents not having participated in the PF and those receiving financing from PF projects.
- Participation in the provincial fund increased the respondents' expectations for improving their house in the near future. The following chart shows a significant increase in the expectations of the respondents for improvements in their houses. This can be related to several factors (discussed in the economic sector below), but is probably related to the fact that the PF contributed to the reduction of DS most immediate needs, allowing for expectations of improvement in less essential areas.




⇒ The provincial fund beneficiaries feel more optimistic about their future than other demobilized soldiers.

- When asked about their expectations for an improved future, the median for beneficiaries not having accessed the PF is "same", improving to "better" for the respondents having benefited from the PF, denoting a sense of hope and higher expectations.



c) *Economic factors*

- ⇒ The provincial fund has impacted on the economic conditions of its target population.
- The following chart represents the economic distribution of the sample as a function of access to PF activities. It should be noted that in order to provide a comparative analysis, information was requested in relation to improvement in income and not in relation to the actual amount.
 - As can be examined in the chart, the PF beneficiaries constituting the lower income brackets were able to improve their economic situation. This shows that PF interventions provided a relief economic measure for the most vulnerable, instead of a developmental program which would have increased the economic situation of all income brackets.



⇒ The following tables show the change in the sources of income for our interviewees according to their participation in the provincial fund activities.

- Beneficiaries having accessed the PF concentrate more on informal sector activities and agriculture/animal production.
- Respondents with PF financing are less dependent on formal employment and pensions.
- These trends suggest a pattern in the DS populations moving from economic dependency towards self-sustainability as a result of PF projects.

Group \$Q19 Main source of income for respondents not having accessed the PF

Category label	Code	Count	Pct of Responses	Pct of Cases
Agric/Anim	1	346	49.1	70.5
Employment	2	62	8.8	12.6
Informal sect.	3	162	23.0	33.0
Pensions/help	4	69	9.8	14.1
Others	5	51	7.2	10.4
DK/DA	6	14	2.0	2.9
Total responses		704	100.0	143.4

2 missing cases; 491 valid cases

Group \$Q19 Main source of income for PF participants

Category label	Code	Count	Pct of Responses	Pct of Cases
Agric/Anim	1	334	49.5	74.2
Employment	2	46	6.8	10.2
Informal sect.	3	180	26.7	40.0
Pensions/help	4	61	9.0	13.6
Others	5	44	6.5	9.9
DK/DA	6	10	1.5	2.2
Total responses		675	100.0	150.0

1 missing cases; 450 valid cases

- ⇒ The PF also contributed to the increase in economic stability of the demobilized population. Close to 70% of all demobilized not accessing PF opportunities expect to continue in the same type of activity in the future. This number increases to almost 85% for the demobilized who have accessed PF activities.
- ⇒ Close to 81% of the respondents having accessed provincial fund financing ranked their projects' success from "average" to "very good". Half of these considered their project to be from "good" to "very good". When asked about the success of their neighbors in the same type of activity, 71% of the respondents felt that neighbors' activities ranked from "average" to "very good", indicating a higher perceived success rate for PF sponsored projects than for non-DS community initiatives.
- ⇒ Over 83% of the respondents who received PF financing considered these activities to be from "somewhat" to "very" important for their reintegration. Asked if they would exchange their existing micro-project for formal employment with a comparative income, a significant 71% responded "no", indicating expected sustainability for ongoing PF sponsored activities.

V. Factors Affecting Project Outcomes

While the project outcomes presented in the previous chapter reveal many positive results of the IRS/PF initiative, this section identifies factors which were recognized as salient to the successful implementation of projects which the team considers vital for future programming of this type. It has been compiled from project monitoring reports, team observations, and surveys implemented to identify both the beneficiaries' and implementers' perspectives in relation to these activities. The purpose of this chapter is to utilize information gathered and lessons learned to better inform future projects of issues which may require specific planning inputs to help ensure greater project success. This chapter does not intend to dilute the efforts and impact of those activities implemented by the IRS/PF but to analyze how internal and external factors may affect activity results based on the IRS/PF experience.

1. *Operational considerations*

a) *The IRS as a demobilization outreach program*

It became clear to the evaluation team that the IRS provided a rapid response mechanism for DS and ensured an immediate and continued field presence throughout the country. This was most vital in phase one when the IRS served as the field office for the Technical Unit and played a significant role in ensuring the delivery of demobilization benefits. Once other reintegration projects became available, which included deliverables, the statistics reveal that the IRS service decreased steadily until the IRS/PF closure. The IRS served as an independent structure that could attend to DS immediately upon their return to civilian society in their respective provinces. These actions and image proved vitally important to both the DS and to the country as a whole since incidents of disruption, always caused by the lack of delivery of an entitled benefit, were kept to a minimum and localized at IRS offices rather than in communities.

b) *Local DPT capacity building*

The IRS was in partnership with the Ministry of Labor (MOL) to employ and train local department staff at the IRS in order to provide a sustainable workforce once the IRS had closed. The IRS utilized the DHO program to identify and implement training opportunities for DPT staff in all provinces. In addition, workshops with DPT staff were held to help build transferable skills for the Ministry of Labor. Nonetheless, the MOL was at times unable to provide staff for these positions and identify further needs for the staff. In addition, CAII provided a transition study for the IRS/PF program which identified needed areas of skill transfer from the IRS to the MOL. However, transition measures to ensure that MOL staff returned to positions in their provinces where they could utilize knowledge and experience gained at the IRS were not finalized by the MOL leaving the entire capacity building exercise for DPTs, initially designed by CORE to ensure sustainability and reintegration partnerships between Government and implementing agencies, undocumented and less than optimal. If IOM had been able to increase the MOL participation in this regard, the results of the IRS/DPT partnership could have been measured and results identified. The team concluded that government - implementing agency partnerships could significantly enhance

reintegration programming outputs and should be promoted and measured for improved programming results.

c) Political hindrances

Existing dual administrations, and misinformation provided to DS by both parties regarding reintegration opportunities hindered IRS/PF staff's ability to carry out activities in some areas. Political hindrances were identified as one of four obstacles to reintegration falling outside of reintegration programming mandates (see CAII Study of Demobilized Soldiers Facing Difficulties in the Reintegration Process, 1996). The remaining three were: unresolved development needs; government responsibility to fulfill its commitments; and general community unrest unrelated to DS movement or activities. These obstacles fall outside of the reintegration mandate but are factors which might impede reintegration delivery.

d) Local authority and NGO participation

Projects were more likely to succeed when a good relationship had been established with local partners (i.e. GOM, AMODEG, ADEMIMO, DPCCN, NGO or employer implementers). Recruitment, monitoring and DS/community investment in project successes were much higher in those areas where local partners were included in project design, selection, implementation, and information dissemination. The perception of community involvement in DS projects is an important factor when planning activities for DS and should be considered as a project activity objective.

e) Utilizing the IRS and tracking reintegration

Provinces where the PF was running were consistently less able to report on DS needs, numbers of DS assisted and problematic or pending reintegration issues. "IRS-only" provinces actually provided a much clearer, informed and monitored picture of reintegration than the IRS/PF provinces where energies were spent delivering services rather than assessing needs and potential risks. This was most likely due to the time available to IRS staffs in these provinces to gather information and report on reintegration since they had no tangible goods or services to deliver.

In the case of PF/IRS provinces, often no matching occurred between IRS registration which identified requested DS needs and services and actual PF projects implemented. This points to the need for a functioning intra-project database system which is maintained and utilized by project staff for matching purposes.

In addition, IRS-only provinces were able to make other contributions to reintegration efforts by working closely with local NGOs with child soldiers; church groups; ADEMIMO and AMODEG, especially regarding recruitment, location and design of projects and; pensions. Again, this seems to be the result of increased time allocations to the IRS in these provinces.

It was estimated by some IRS staff that the introduction of the PF took at least 50% of their time which meant that the initiatives undertaken by IRS for DS and communities could not be accommodated. The PF thus doubled the workload, left the IRS unattended while staff and resources (i.e. vehicles) remained the same rendering the office much less effective at IRS

delivery. The team concluded that the issue here is to consider the initial design of the IRS, the added function of the PF and how this changed the expectations and function of the IRS. The change in IRS function is neither positive nor negative. The issue is that the articulated purpose and procedures of the IRS changed and thus its potential for delivery also changed. It is vital that future programs utilize an IRS type program as a separate centralized umbrella effort for all reintegration program delivery or use it as an integrated part of the PF providing the first step in the identification of DS needs and potential projects for implementation by a PF mechanism. If the intended function is not clearly articulated or changes during project implementation, the IRS may become less effective or not needed. This issue is discussed in the conclusion section of this report where centralized and decentralized models of reintegration programming may mandate different IRS functions.

f) Human and financial resources

At a national level, the IRS/PF program was under the direction of the Program Manager, who supervised the National Opportunities and PF Assistant Manager, responsible for the Provincial Fund, and the DS Services Assistant Manager, responsible for the IRS. The Program Manager also assumed direct responsibility for the work of the Regional Technical Advisers at the provincial level.

Two Regional Technical Advisor positions were created for the Northern and Southern regions respectively. These advisors were to support and assist staff at both the national and provincial levels with technical issues such as grant selection, administration and monitoring. In June, 1995, a third RTA was appointed to the central region, with the additional responsibility of coordinating closely with the GTZ regional officer.

At the provincial level each office was managed by a Provincial Coordinator of Programs (PCP) who was responsible for coordinating both the IRS and the PF at the provincial level. The Opportunities and PF Officer and the DS Services Counselor reported to the PCP. The Opportunities and PF Officer, assisted by the Opportunities and PF Assistant, was responsible for implementation of PF activities at the regional level and liaised directly with the National Opportunities and PF Assistant Manager. Similarly the DS Services Counselor, assisted by the Benefits Assistant and the Advising and Referral Assistant, was responsible for implementation of IRS activities at the regional level and liaised directly with the DS Services Assistant Manager.

Some constraints to personnel being able to deliver services effectively were identified:

- Scopes of work for support staff became convoluted implementing various projects.
- Use of RA's as administrators rather than technical experts for project activity design, validity, and implementation left some project designs to falter.
- Lack of a trained information manager at each office and in Maputo specifically tasked with IRS/PF database functions to ensure data collection and consistent and comprehensive reporting.
- Lack of personnel experience in PF type development projects.


- Shortages of staff and vehicles, due to increased workloads and sharing of resources, hindered IRS effectiveness.
- On-going mobility of IRS/PF staff (changing provinces and job responsibilities) was counterproductive and often led to a provincial office which did not share a common vision of IRS/PF purpose, procedures, role of the IRS, and desired reintegration results.

g) Monitoring and reporting

While the IRS/PF was able to fiscally monitor projects and fund them accordingly, a major operational obstacle was the lack of the implementation of ongoing project monitoring and standardized project qualitative reporting in the field. Overall, IRS/PF staff members may not have fully understood the importance of these functions. In addition to lack of monitoring, the lack of utilization of databases at the provincial and national levels led to some DS receiving more than one funding opportunity without IOM staff realizing this at the time of contract. While monitoring and reporting requirements were stipulated in the Operations Manual, provincial staff did not always adhere to these requirements, which was especially apparent in the provinces of Nampula and Cabo Delgado. A well documented database would have helped inform project decisions and monitor individual project and sector growth resulting from project interventions or other external factors. In some provinces, the GOM extension services, NGO implementers, and local authorities were able to provide project monitoring which assisted the IRS staff in measuring results. However, the lack of consistent monitoring decreased the ability of IRS/PF to learn from activity successes and failures in order to modify or target project operations and interventions. In addition, incorrect or misinterpreted categorization of projects by provincial staff made ongoing analysis and comparison of project types difficult.

h) Technical support and market studies

In cases where technical support and advice were needed, lack of technical capability within the IRS/PF staff led to misinformation or in some cases inappropriate activity design. Lack of technical expertise also impacted on the inappropriateness of submitted budgets for anticipated activities. The following graph shows how the beneficiaries deemed project success as a function of the technical assistance received during the design phase.



It is clear from the chart that as more assistance was provided for the design, the more successful the project was implemented.

Lack of market studies made the selection of projects arbitrary and therefore in some areas similar project activities flooded the market or no market existed for the goods or services generated by the activity.

i) Delivery of goods and services (warehouse purchases of goods and kits)

Often, goods described in contracts for purchase were either not available at local warehouse facilities or markets or were a variation of the type needed, were not immediately available or never available. This caused serious delays, project suspensions or project objective changes due to the inability to deliver promised goods for DS utilization to complete project activities.

Also, vocational kits, although reported as helpful for activity success, were reported by DS as inconsistent or incomplete allowing some to complete tasks and others to remain stagnant or disadvantaged since vital components were missing from kits.

2. Project design considerations

a) Access

Despite the innumerable efforts by IRS/PF staff to disseminate information related to the function and procedures of both the IRS and PF, it was surprising to note that some DS still considered access and selection criteria for project approval unclear. This was exacerbated by DS association or implementing NGO partners not fully understanding project mechanisms for funding and misinforming potential DS recipients. This led to dissatisfaction amongst some non-recipients since they did not understand why their projects were rejected and why

others were accepted, sometimes awarding multiple projects to the same DS. The problem most often cited by the DS related to the PF was the lack of a consistent information dissemination strategy to explain procedures, selection, and funding possibilities. This was particularly destructive in the beginning phases of the PF in Nampula province. In addition, some DS did not fully understand their PF contractual obligations and therefore had a difficult time attaining objectives. This problem speaks to the importance of an ongoing effort of reintegration implementers to continually inform recipients so as not to build false expectations or create dissatisfaction due to misinformation.

Activity concentrations in "high risk" districts (identified by IOM as those districts having a greater number of DS) lessened the amount of projects for vulnerable groups such as concentrations of DS (i.e. disabled centers) and the officer class which might have been better indicators of risk and project activity concentrations. Other reintegration needs (e.g. programming for child soldiers), while outside of the reintegration program mandate, might have been addressed through informed advocacy efforts with appropriate implementing agencies for these types of needed interventions.

b) DS partnerships

Successes were more evident among single or self-selected paired DS activity partners in income generation/micro-enterprise projects. In many cases, when project activity partners were selected by IOM or other agencies, these partnerships dissolved since the DS themselves were not invested in making that partnership work. This was especially evident in Nampula World Bank funded projects where larger groups of DS were "placed" together on projects with no guidance as to how to manage such a group. In many cases, projects were abandoned. goods were divided or certain DS left with their "portion" of goods. In other cases, no one claimed ownership and projects, including procured goods, were abandoned. This was the case with animal production projects or shared agricultural projects where no one "owned" goods or was designated a manager. The intended "greater purpose" for group teamwork toward project completion may have been promoted by IRS/PF but not adopted by the DS themselves.

While it is recognized that larger groups allow funds to serve a greater number of beneficiaries, this inversely correlated to successful project outcomes. Larger group activities was successful when they were involved with labor projects, for example, since these individuals worked on a common project with no goods or management responsibilities.

In addition, those micro-enterprise projects with one or two self-selected partners were reported to have been much more empowering to those individuals, increasing sustainability more than labor intensive or on-going business/on-the-job training projects.

c) Location of project

In many cases reported, the location of projects was either too far for successful participation or was not an appropriate location for that specific project activities. This was especially true for micro-enterprises/income generation projects which were located in poor sales areas. This

might have been avoided by increased technical assistance and/or enhanced market study efforts.

d) *Timing of project*

For agriculture and animal production projects, seasonal variance was often not taken into consideration and therefore agricultural success was impossible due to seasonal variation for planting or harvesting. In animal production projects, timing for reproduction and weaning was not always taken into consideration prolonging projected sales. It is worthy of note that cultural variation seemed to have played a role in the DS population being able to or desiring to be successful in animal production activities when cultural norms may not include or promote such activities. This is particularly apparent when noting the project successes and failures in this sector comparing the northern to the southern region of the country.

e) *Desired results of projects*

Often, expectations for project success were too ambitious due to the lack of technical expertise in the project activity area. In addition, project desired results often did not take into consideration extraneous factors which might impede successful project implementation. This was especially true regarding needed transport by the DS for sales, procurement, or reaching project locations. In addition, it was discovered that many DS did not, in fact, fully understand their contractual responsibilities and timelines.

f) *Pre-requisite knowledge and training*

In some activities, especially micro-enterprise/income generation activities, previous experience of sales, profit, purchasing, etc. were regarded as necessary for successful activities. Many projects failed due to lack of capability of DS to fully understand how to run their business effectively. Although some training was made available to DS (particularly by IDIL through OSD) field reports indicate that many attending these courses did not actually carry out their project activities. The reason most often cited was lack of interest of DS to complete training courses. It should be noted that not all training resulted in gainful employment since employment opportunities were limited despite provided training. This was another factor identified as causing the less than desirable participation or completion rate of DS training activities.

g) *Projects as primary or secondary beneficiary activity*

Project designs did not take into consideration whether the planned project activity was perceived by the DS as a primary or secondary income activity. This resulted in some DS leaving projects for machamba production and harvest or other activities requiring their time with only secondary consideration for PF project continuity and success.

h) *Project payments to beneficiaries*

As per design, the DS had to present reports of their project progression to the IRS/PF in order to receive further payments. Delays in this process lessened project viability and results due to waning DS interest and false expectations if payments were not forthcoming due to unfulfilled project objectives or reporting.

i) Social programming



The drive for economic projects limited the submission and solicitation of potential projects for social reintegration including children/wives of DS, schooling, health, etc. These project needs might have been identified using the IRS database. Although economic not social projects were mandated under the PF, increased number of projects which benefited communities while being economically advantageous to DS might have met both needs.

j) DS vs. community-based projects

Comments by DS and local authorities suggest that those projects which were community based (serving to improve local communities) were better received than those which were merely individually based with little or no visible contribution to community reconstruction. This might be accomplished through family/neighbor/community inclusion in project design and implementation schemes. As can be seen in project analyses, community based projects were minimal and rarely successful. IRS/PF staff realized that community based projects, while meeting community and DS needs, are expensive, require a longer time commitment for design, monitoring and implementation, and while meeting PF criteria, may not, in fact, be the best choice for short-term projects of the PF type since they are more developmental in nature.

3. Project category considerations

The following graphs show how the beneficiaries perceived different project categories and sectors as having different averages of performance.



Most project types were considered by the DS as average or better performers with the only exception being community development activities. In relation to the sectors for these interventions, only projects in the industry/crafts and trade/services sectors were deemed as less than average performers.

a) *Permanent employment promotion activities*

Obstacles to these project successes were:

- slow procurement of goods for project implementation
- inability or unwillingness to pay proposed salaries
- unrealistic expectations of DS performance or skills
- transport to work sites was not ensured
- food, work equipment were not provided as promised
- DS were not interested in type of employment offered
- conditions of work were not fully explained to DS
- difficulty in supervising, monitoring and managing an enterprise proved to lessen results and measurable outcomes
- DS did not use company equipment, services or OJT as promised but were delegated to manual labor

These projects were more successful when:

- employers demonstrated an interest in the PF objectives for DS rather than their own growth potential
- DS were recruited prior to contract implementation to ensure DS participation rather than falling back on civilian hires or project cancellation

b) *Labor intensive activities*

These projects were more successful due to:

- easier recruitment for a specific job activity with no management or design responsibility of the DS
- on-the-job training was provided
- seen as serving the community not just the DS as a privileged group

They were less successful when:

- work conditions were difficult
- work not permanent
- upon completion, DS in same situation as before activity


c) *Micro-enterprise/Income generating activities*

These projects were more successful when:


- DS had proven management skills
- DS had prior experience in the project sector
- goods, transport, appropriate locations, viable marketing and sales were part of the design
- seasonal needs were considered
- training provided was for all partners and not just one
- technical assistance was available
- real prices (considering inflation, devaluation) were considered so procurement costs were realistic
- transport for activity implementation was ensured

- project activity was primary source of income
- market studies were conducted for feasibility of project
- kits were consistent and timeously delivered
- they were urban based guaranteeing IOM monitoring and assistance
- when given to one individual or one individual who manages others (if capable)
- offered to single participants who tended to work more hours and ensure personal success
- DS had accounting experience
- clear lines of access to goods was articulated
- goods were available
- training programs were short enough to hold DS interest

The graph below describes how different project categories were threatened by different factors as revealed by PF beneficiaries. These factors suggest that the successful implementation of various projects depend on the implementing agency's ability to identify and appropriately plan for potential project threats.



As the graph below demonstrates, micro-enterprise/income generating activities are seen to have many factors which influence their success including previous experience, financing amounts, group composition and project timing. In labor intensive and permanent employment activities, the employer or implementing agency partner is by far the most significant factor influencing project success.



VI. Conclusions

A. Project contribution to pacification goals

The Scope of Work for the final evaluation of IOM's Information and Referral Service / Provincial Fund reintegration program called for an assessment of how project activities and their immediate impact have contributed to the overall objective of maintaining peace and assist demobilized soldiers to make the transition from military to civilian life. This sub-section will focus on assessing the program's contribution to these goals using the demobilized soldiers perspectives and viewpoints.

1. Maintaining peace

The overarching goal of maintaining peace is undoubtedly dependent in an array of complex factors, most of them independent of the demobilized soldiers situation or attitudes. In order to assess how the reintegration of this particular vulnerable group may have contributed to the overall pacification of Mozambique, the team identified several factors associated with the objective of maintaining peace. These factors include:

- DS perception of reconciliation/depolarization
- Expectations for a stable and peaceful future
- Improvement in personal security
- Improvement in overall personal and family status
- Resettlement

These areas were addressed by the survey administered to demobilized soldiers in order to identify their perceptions and to correlate those perceptions with IOM's reintegration programming. The following are the results of these analyses:

- ⇒ The demobilized were asked for their opinions in relation to the group or groups which have won the most with the arrival of peace. It is assumed that in any negotiated peace settlement, all sectors would consider themselves as the ones benefiting the most, indicating a strong polarization of opinions. The beginning of reconciliation is signaled by a shift in opinions towards an understanding that Mozambique as a nation, independent of sectors or political differences, should be the foremost beneficiary of peace.
- For interviewees not having accessed IRS/PF benefits, 70% of the responses included "All Mozambicans" as the primary beneficiaries of peace, followed by 28% "FRELIMO" and 14% "the demobilized". Note that the distribution totals over 100% because interviewees were allowed to choose up to two different answers.
 - For demobilized having accessed the IRS/PF, the responses for "All Mozambicans" accounted for 78%, followed by "FRELIMO" with 23 %, and the demobilized with 19 %. An interesting difference is found in the cases

responding “No one”, decreasing from 2% for people not accessing IOM’s reintegration programming to about 0.5% for project beneficiaries.

⇒ The interviewees were asked for their opinion in relation to Mozambique’s immediate future. Considering that previous surveys for rural and urban dwellers had indicated that most demobilized did not consider violence as a valid option for resolving differences, we expected an overwhelming number opting for a peaceful future. For this reason our analysis focused on the responses which did not include a peaceful future.

- As we expected, an overwhelming 80% of the sample perceived a peaceful future for all Mozambicans.
- The following table shows the changes in the DS perspectives for Mozambique’s future crosstabulated by access to IRS/PF financing. Even when differences are not high between these two categories, a trend can be observed showing the reduction of opinions related to potential violent futures for Mozambique from the respondents having accessed IOM’s reintegration programming activities.

Q6 How do you see Mozambique's future? by Q29 Did you get PF financing from IOM?


		Q29		Page 1 of 1	
		Count			
Q6	Row Pct	No	Yes		Row
	Col Pct				Total
			1	2	
No response	0	51	30	81	
		63.0	37.0	8.6	
		10.4	6.6		
War	1	7	4	11	
		63.6	36.4	1.2	
		1.4	.9		
Conflict	2	20	13	33	
		60.6	39.4	3.5	
		4.1	2.9		
Instability	3	34	33	67	
		50.7	49.3	7.1	
		7.0	7.3		
Peace	4	377	372	749	
		50.3	49.7	79.6	
		77.1	82.3		
Column Total		489	452	941	
		52.0	48.0	100.0	

Number of Missing Observations: 11

⇒ The survey also specifically looked for changes in the respondents’ perception of their own personal security and their relationship with IOM’s reintegration programming.



- The following chart shows the statistical distribution of responses in relation to increases in the last two years in the respondents’ perception of personal security as a function of having accessed IOM’s reintegration programming. In both cases, the distributions are identical, indicating an increase in the perceptions ranging from “same” to “safer”. The median for both populations is in the “safer” range, but no changes can be attributed to reintegration programming itself. Therefore,

the perception of personal security has improved in our respondents as a result of external factors not directly related to IOM's programs.




⇒ We explored the interviewees' perceptions of improvements in their personal and family situation from a general viewpoint. The evaluation team believes that if reintegration programming can develop a sense of better life conditions in its target populations, it is effectively contributing to consolidate peace through the stabilization of a highly volatile vulnerable group.

- The following two graphs depict the change in our respondents' perceptions of improvement in their personal and family situation respectively, as a function of having accessed IOM's reintegration programming. Both charts show a clear increase in the perception of improvement as a result of participation in IRS/PF activities.



⇒ The last factor explored by the team in relation to IOM's reintegration programming's contribution to pacification is the resettlement of the DS population. The team believes that a physically stable population is less prone to become involved in violent activities and more easily merges with mainstream society.

- Access to IRS/PF programming has improved the housing conditions for demobilized soldiers. The following graph shows an increase in the number of respondents owning, renting or living in family properties and a correspondent decrease in the numbers borrowing houses as a function of involvement in IRS/PF activities.




- An overwhelming majority of the respondents (about 83%) expect to continue residing at their current residence. The following table summarizes the distribution of responses' frequencies from our sample.

Q13 Do you expect to stay at your current house in the future?

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
Yes	4	780	81.9	82.5	82.5
Maybe	3	63	6.6	6.7	89.1
Doubt it	2	12	1.3	1.3	90.4
No	1	84	8.8	8.9	99.3
NA	0	7	.7	.7	100.0
		6	.6	Missing	
Total		952	100.0	100.0	
Valid cases	946	Missing cases			
		6			

- Of those expecting to stay at their current location, a clear trend can be identified for IOM's reintegration programming beneficiaries in relation to expected improvements in their houses. Those who have participated in programs, expect

to invest in improving their houses much more than those who have not been IRS/PF beneficiaries.



2. *Demobilized soldiers transition to civilian life*

In order to assess IOM's reintegration programming contribution to demobilized soldiers' transition from military to civilian life, the team agreed on the following indicators:

- DS perception of reintegration
- Family composition
- Optimism for their future
- Perceptions of DS from the general population perspective.
- Satisfaction with programs

These were also areas addressed by the reintegration survey and the following are the results of the analyses:

- ⇒ We asked the demobilized about their subjective opinion of their own reintegration. We used these responses to correlate several factors associated with reintegration and to assess the impact of reintegration programming.
- Factors affecting reintegration and the specific IRS/PF program contribution for the transition from military to civilian life were analyzed after identifying the relative incidence of these programs in the overall CORE reintegration scheme. For this reason, we first asked the DS which activities they considered the most valuable for their reintegration. The following table shows the results of these



questions. The RSS payments and pensions were the most important benefits for reintegration as perceived by the overwhelming majority of the population (83 % of cases). It is followed by transportation activities (52% of cases) and by micro-projects with about 36%. Once again, it should be noted that the total distribution of cases adds up to over 100% because respondents were asked to choose up to three options.

Group \$Q55 Most useful program for your reintegration


Category Label	Code	Count	Pct of Responses	Pct of Cases
Transportation	1	492	25.0	52.5
RSS/Pensions	2	780	39.7	83.2
Training/Education	3	124	6.3	13.2
Information/referral	4	34	1.7	3.6
Micro-projects	5	336	17.1	35.9
Employment	6	37	1.9	3.9
Credit	7	23	1.2	2.5
Others	8	97	4.9	10.4
DK/DA	9	43	2.2	4.6
Total responses		1966	100.0	209.8

15 missing cases; 937 valid cases


- Based on the previously explained results, the team recognizes that even when IOM's reintegration programming played a significant role in the DS' perspectives of reintegration, it might not be the only factor involved. Also, having the micro-projects as the third ranked category of importance for reintegration from the DS perspective, the combination of benefits might have a bigger impact on the population than IOM's reintegration programming per se.
- Other factors identified and discussed in previous analyses were the DS marital status and their housing situation as significant contributors to the perception of reintegration. The following charts show how these two factors, completely outside of IOM's reintegration programming goals, have a direct correlation to these populations' perception of their own reintegration.



⇒ The IRS/PF program also contributed to improving the demobilized soldiers' self perception of reintegration. The graph on the left shows how the reintegration level perceived by the respondents increases from interviewees not having accessed IOM financing to the ones who did. The chart on the right shows that the increase of perception in relation to their reintegration is not only a function of accessing the program but also of the program effectiveness. In summary, IRS/PF beneficiaries in general considered themselves more reintegrated than the others, and among these, the ones participating in the most successful projects are also the most reintegrated.



⇒ IRS/PF beneficiaries are more optimistic about their future than the demobilized soldiers not having accessed IOM's reintegration programming. The following chart depicts this trend, showing that average IRS/PF beneficiaries expect to be "better" next year, when the rest of the sample expects to be the "same".



⇒ Another factor considered by the evaluation team as part of the transition from military to civilian life is the DS' self-perception. We believe that a reintegrated new civilian changes the way he considers to be perceived by the rest of the society and also changes the way he would like to be perceived by the mainstream society.

- The following tables show the distribution of responses from demobilized soldiers when asked about how other people perceive them, and how they would like to be perceived. From the distribution presented in the second table, it is clear that over 96% of the respondents would like to be perceived as civilians. This implies a strong desire to be considered part of the mainstream society. However, only 75% of the population considers to already be perceived as civilians. Exploring this further, the team realized that less PF beneficiaries consider themselves to be perceived as civilians than non-PF recipients (see section on the IRS/PF impact). The team therefore concludes that the "DS targeted" nature on the IRS/PF activity might have contributed to the perception in DS respondents that they continue to be identified as demobilized rather than civilian because of their participation in these programs.

Q26 How do you think your neighbors perceive you?

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
Other	4	2	.2	.2	.2
Civilian	3	693	72.8	73.6	73.9
Demobilized	2	211	22.2	22.4	96.3
Military	1	27	2.8	2.9	99.1
DK/DA	0	8	.8	.9	100.0
.	.	11	1.2	Missing	
Total		952	100.0	100.0	

Valid cases 941 Missing cases 11

Q27 How would you like to be perceived?

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
Other	4	5	.5	.5	.5
Civilian	3	900	94.5	95.6	96.2
Demobilized	2	30	3.2	3.2	99.4
Military	1	4	.4	.4	99.8
DK/DA	0	2	.2	.2	100.0
.	.	11	1.2	Missing	
Total		952	100.0	100.0	

Valid cases 941 Missing cases 11

⇒ Finally, the team asked the demobilized soldiers about their level of satisfaction with IOM's reintegration programming activities and how much these activities may have contributed to their reintegration.

- Almost 60% of the respondents deemed the level of satisfaction with their visits to the IRS to be from "somehow" satisfied to "very" satisfied. The following table summarizes the frequency of responses for each category.

Q51 Are you satisfied with your visits to the IRS?

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
Very much	5	46	4.8	9.1	9.1
Much	4	159	16.7	31.4	40.5
Some	3	97	10.2	19.2	59.7
Little	2	44	4.6	8.7	68.4
No	1	153	16.1	30.2	98.6
NA	0	7	.7	1.4	100.0
.	.	446	46.8	Missing	
Total		952	100.0	100.0	

Valid cases 506 Missing cases 446

- Close to 62% of the respondents considered their visits to the IRS to be from “somewhat” to “very” important for their reintegration. The following table shows the distribution of responses from the survey participants.

Q54 How important was the IRS for your reintegration ?

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
Very much	5	28	2.9	5.9	5.9
Much	4	155	16.3	32.4	38.3
Some	3	112	11.8	23.4	61.7
Little	2	63	6.6	13.2	74.9
None	1	105	11.0	22.0	96.9
NA	0	15	1.6	3.1	100.0
.	.	474	49.8	Missing	
Total		952	100.0	100.0	

Valid cases 478 Missing cases 474

- About 79% of Provincial Fund participants considered the success of their respective micro-initiatives to be from “average” to “very good”. The table below shows the distribution of responses for the success ratio of PF initiatives from the beneficiaries’ perspective.

Q41 How do you rank the success of your project?

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
Very good	5	20	2.1	4.7	4.7
Good	4	148	15.5	34.7	39.4
Average	3	168	17.6	39.4	78.9
Bad	2	37	3.9	8.7	87.6
Very bad	1	14	1.5	3.3	90.8
NA	0	39	4.1	9.2	100.0
.	.	526	55.3	Missing	
Total		952	100.0	100.0	

Valid cases 426 Missing cases 526

- Close to 82% of the respondents ranked the PF activities from “somewhat” to “very much” useful for their reintegration. The following table summarizes the provincial fund beneficiaries’ perspective in relation to the project contribution to reintegration goals.

Q45 How important was this project for your reintegration?

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
Very much	5	46	4.8	9.9	9.9
Much	4	231	24.3	49.7	59.6
Some	3	103	10.8	22.2	81.7
Little	2	51	5.4	11.0	92.7
None	1	22	2.3	4.7	97.4
NA	0	12	1.3	2.6	100.0
	.	487	51.2	Missing	
	Total	952	100.0	100.0	

Valid cases 465 Missing cases 487

B. General recommendations

Based on the findings and analyses presented in this report, the following section offers suggestions for future reintegration program planning and delivery. Its purpose is to assist future program designers and implementers make informed decisions regarding appropriate reintegration programming options based on lessons learned from the Mozambican model.

1. Reintegration programming design considerations

In light of the findings of this study, the team recommends that attention be paid to those factors which impact on the success of reintegration programs but do not necessarily fall under their mandates. For this reason it is advisable to enter into reintegration programming knowing that risk may be caused by extraneous factors to reintegration programming and these risks should be accommodated during the planning stages to avoid DS false expectations. Such risks should also inform decision makers about the types of assistance required to ensure peaceful reintegration which might include assisting Governments fulfill their commitments.

Political commitments fall outside of programming mandates and can only be fulfilled by appropriate Government departments. For example, the non-payment of pensions caused serious dissatisfaction but could not be remedied since the responsibility was on the Government Ministry responsible for payment, not reintegration programs. Reintegration programs can, however, serve as delivery arms for Government or UN bodies once action by these entities (e.g. pension payment) is ensured. In addition, political bodies responsible for post demobilization endeavors (e.g. closing disabled DS centers or areas of concentration to ensure that these DS resettle with their families) do not always comply with their stated intentions. Again, reintegration programming might plan to assist political bodies in fulfilling their commitments or at least plan for activity interventions should these commitments remain unfulfilled.

Political interventions have also been found to be outside of reintegration mandates yet have varying degrees of hindrance to successful reintegration programming. For example, the presence of double local administrations disallows programming to be coordinated with local authorities since both parties may be claiming responsibility for certain geographic areas or changes in newly appointed positions for local authorities do not occur prior to programming implementation.

In addition, long term development needs (especially infrastructure such as roads, schools, water facilities, health clinics, electricity, etc.) should be considered when planning reintegration programs. These needs can either be incorporated into reintegration programming objectives or considered from the outset as obstacles to implementation particularly to rural outreach programs.

Finally, local community unrest (e.g. resettlement of other vulnerable groups, general increase in crime) should be factored into reintegration planning as not to target DS as potential criminals but to realize that DS will be returning to a potentially increased higher crime era.

2. Maintaining realistic expectations

The team found that throughout the operational period of the IRS/PF, the only incidents of dissatisfaction were caused by the non-delivery of real or perceived demobilization or reintegration entitlements. Cases where DS raised their voices in protest occurred when they were not able to access their benefits (e.g. pensions, RSS checkbooks, Government subsidies) or perceived that a particular programming deliverable was an entitlement (e.g. all DS were to receive \$250 for reintegration from the PF, emergency food distribution was a right for all DS even in urban areas, etc.). These were the cases that hindered the smooth transition for the DS. It was not found that the DS themselves were initiating discontentment by demanding something outside of what was due them. This is a vital factor for the transition period and all reintegration programs must clearly articulate how and if DS will benefit to avoid dissatisfaction imposed on the DS through misinformation or failure to deliver goods or services.

3. Structuring reintegration programming delivery

If one considers the mechanisms used for the CORE proposed IRS, PF and the other reintegration programs implemented by UNDP, ILO and GTZ, it is clear that a decentralized delivery model was used. This means that no one implementing organization (although all under one Ministry directive) took responsibility for reintegration but reintegration was assumed through the successful implementation of all the programming partners. There are strengths and weaknesses associated with this model which need to be considered.

a) Strengths

The major strengths to the decentralized approach is that programs are very flexible and accountable only to the implementing organization's funder/s. This means that programming

might offer more options, be implemented more quickly (avoiding centralized decision making and bureaucracies) and potentially reach more DS. Given the limitations of infrastructure support in Mozambique, this model offers an implementing agency driven program. This model also fosters contracting of various agencies for implementation.

b) Weaknesses

The major weaknesses of this approach are clearly demonstrable by the lack of a comprehensive database and documentation system which can show the various components of reintegration, how they succeeded and the obstacles they faced. One must obtain reports from various agencies, formatted and compiled in various manners, in order to derive any conclusions about the overall design and implementation of the UN/CORE program for Mozambique. Whether this was due to the organizational preferences of departments or individuals in UNOMOZ or simply the difficulty of different implementing organizations collaborating on reintegration implementation is not clear. However, it is clear that the lack of coordinated efforts negatively effected the DS since programming modification, extension or termination was based on a single organization's preference or funding capability rather than based on the identified needs of the DS. This was particularly visible regarding the role of the Ministry of Labor, the extension of RSS payments, the lack of programming options for the disabled, officers, and child soldiers, and other programming areas which were not fully addressed. A centralized model, where the IRS holds DS information data, selects the optimal reintegration program for a specific DS, and then ensures delivery of that service, might offer a more comprehensive approach.

In addition, the IRS was rendered less effective due to the fact that it, compared to the other reintegration programs, had no tangible deliverables. While this was never an IRS objective, the IRS could have been much more effective as a tracking and referral service if all reintegration programming had utilized its services in a centralized programming model. What occurred in the Mozambique model was that in the initial demobilization phase, services were essential. But then the IRS workload dropped drastically in order to implement the PF. The visits to offices were therefore for accessing the PF not for the referral for goods or services of all reintegration programs as was initially envisaged. In reintegration programs where the IRS function does, in fact, refer DS to programming options which the IRS also manages, the information and delivery services are centralized and programs are maximized utilizing the information and tracking of the IRS to inform the DS and project selection process.

c) Combining the IRS/PF in a decentralized model

One of the obstacles to fully utilize the IRS was that the same agency implemented both a referral and a delivery program which meant that IRS interests were primarily directly to PF implementation rather than reintegration programming on the whole. While this had its advantages for the IRS/PF (human and financial resources), the combination, which was not originally planned for in the CORE IRS design, may have rendered the IRS less effective. Had the IRS been implemented as a separate service, its contribution to the reintegration program might have been much more significant. In fact, the major contribution of the IRS initially reported prior to the PF was simply that the DS had a place to go to discuss their

problems with IRS staff. IRS staff reported that the resolution to problems was only secondary as long as the DS felt that they had "a shoulder to lean on", especially in the early phases. This may have been sufficient cause alone to maintain that IRS function as a separate entity to other reintegration projects serving as an umbrella reintegration service.

If the IRS/PF combination had been planned for in the initial design, the IRS could have ended once the demobilization benefits issues had been resolved and the PF could have then taken over fully. These options again depend on the choice of either a centralized or decentralized reintegration program implementation design either utilizing the IRS as a centralized umbrella program serving all reintegration projects (as originally designed) or as an agency specific decentralized project component of a PF type mechanism (as actually occurred) assisting other projects if and when possible.

d) Information management

As stated above, the need for a comprehensive database is essential to track, monitor and measure the reintegration processes and results. This means that implementing agencies must mandate that information be gathered and documented regularly. A centralized database, as opposed to agency specific databases, would have allowed for a much more comprehensive and much easier method of reporting. The major objectives of such a database are twofold:

A tool to better assist DS : The major objective of the database is to inform implementing agencies about the needs and programming options for DS. The database should allow programs to address DS requests and problems to eliminate false expectations and lack of delivery of project goods or services.

A reporting mechanism for Governments and Donors : Another objective is to keep Governments and donors apprised on the current reintegration status and opportunities and obstacles faced by the DS which might hinder the process of maintaining sustainable peace. Implementing agencies should clearly articulate the intended use of such a database and not confound its purpose or limit its use.

C. Final conclusion

The immediate availability of IRS services for DS upon their return to civilian society and the flexibility and provincial autonomy for implementing PF projects resulted in very favorable project outputs, based on documented qualitative and quantitative data, which contributed to a successful reintegration process. As in all projects, lessons can be learned from hands-on experience to enhance future programming and improve upon project design and delivery mechanisms to obtain even greater project impact and results. This evaluation has reported on both of these components in an effort to serve our client as well as a broader readership to hopefully inform future reintegration programming endeavors. Based on information gathered from various sources, our data analysis reveals that the IRS/PF project did successfully attain its programming objectives by positively contributing to the successful

reintegration of demobilized soldiers thus contributing to the overarching objective of maintaining peace in Mozambique.

D. Acknowledgments

The team wishes to thank the invaluable support and collaboration of the IOM senior management, provincial staff and survey team who assisted greatly in the compilation of data for this report. In addition, the team thanks the Government of Mozambique, donors, other implementing agencies, local authorities and especially the more than 1600 demobilized soldiers who all gave so willingly of their time to discuss IRS/PF reintegration programming which resulted in the identification of project outcomes and impact presented in this report.

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B. Definitions and glossary

1. Definition of terms

<i>Armed conflict</i>	A state of open, armed, often prolonged conflict carried on between nations, states, or parties. While a war can be carried on in different ways, the armed conflict refers to the military actions between fighting parties.
<i>Beneficiary</i>	The individual that has qualified for a service or benefit and had accessed it. Beneficiaries vary by benefit; they always are a sub-set of each targeted population.
<i>Benefits</i>	The set of programs, activities, and services designed and intended exclusively for a targeted group. Basic access to benefits is restricted to those individuals able to prove that they are part of the special target population. Usually estimations of the number of potential beneficiaries are made in the design phase to guarantee the availability of services. Examples of benefits include departure packages, cash payments, training services, and special "soft" credit lines or grants.
<i>Cease-fire</i>	The situation in which parties in conflict temporarily suspend armed conflict. This is always a requirement to discuss and implement demobilization activities. The cease-fire has to be guaranteed by all factions involved. An international monitoring presence has proven highly effective to help make the cease-fire permanent.
<i>Counseling</i>	An intervention designed to provide guidance and advice to ex-combatants in relation to issues surrounding the transition from military to civilian life. Often the most effective channel to provide objective and neutral information about access and requirements for programs and benefits, users benefit the most when the counseling process includes linkage to programs and opportunities. This provides for a one-stop neutral mechanism for ex-combatants to discuss their needs and to access benefits.
<i>Demobilization</i>	The process of discharge from military service related exclusively to the implementation of peace process activities. Demobilization takes place when combatants turn their weapons in for disposal, effectively reducing each faction operational capability and thereby stabilizing the cease-fire period.
<i>Demobilization ID or card</i>	Certification provided by appointed officials or international verification missions to eligible ex-combatants to guarantee access to programs and benefits targeted specifically to demobilized and to facilitate benefits tracking and accountability.
<i>Demobilized</i>	Former combatant group who has been mustered-out from active

	military service through the implementation of peace agreements and complies with eligibility requirements for access to special treatment or benefits. Demobilized personnel are usually certified through a specially issued demobilization identification.
<i>Disabled</i>	DS who have sustained lasting injuries which result in permanent handicaps as a result of the war
<i>Donor</i>	An organization or individual who contributes something, such as money, to a cause or fund; in this specific case, representative members of the international community assisting the war to peace transition through economic support, technical assistance and peace accords compliance monitoring.
<i>Eligibility Criteria</i>	<p>The set of rules previously agreed by all the involved stakeholders/policy-makers used to determine if a potential beneficiary qualifies for access to a benefit. The basic components of an ex-combatant eligibility criteria should include at least the following definitions:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Identification requirements. Defines the minimum documents or certifications required to be identified as part of the targeted population. • Access window or time frames. Determines for how long the opportunity or benefit will be available to interested populations. • Special groups definitions. This can help to define the access rights when a specific sub-set of the targeted population is intended to be served. Examples include gender, age, educational requirements, social situation, geographical origin/destination, and years of service.
<i>Ex-combatant</i>	Any participant in the armed conflict active as a fighting party after the demobilization process took place. This term is usually replaced with <i>demobilized</i> when specific eligibility criteria qualify a sub-set of the ex-combatant population for special treatment or benefits, and <i>veterans</i> for the rest of the ex-combatant population.
<i>Linkage</i>	Liaison between targeted populations, usually unaware of program requirements and access mechanisms, and services or benefits providers. This referral or liaison is most effective when provided through a counseling and referral service.
<i>Opportunities</i>	The set of offerings available only at a certain period, usually non-repeatable, driven basically by social and economic factors, and not intended to be group-specific. Due to the volatile characteristic of the opportunities, the access is generally ruled by a "first come, first served" approach. Examples of these cases can be found in job placement programs and NGO development activities.

<i>Peace Accords</i>	The set of documents produced through peace negotiations defining the terms for the cease-fire and further activities to attain a sustainable peace. In this document the term "peace accord" refers to the General Peace Agreement signed between the Government of Mozambique and the Mozambican National Resistance (RENAMO).
<i>Practitioners</i>	Persons and institutions with an active role in the definition, management or implementation of reintegration programming.
<i>Reconstruction</i>	Programs or activities designed and intended to repair the effects of the armed conflict. These activities usually target damaged infrastructure and basic services with a focus on restoring war damaged social fabric.
<i>Reinsertion</i>	Incorporation of an individual or special group into the mainstream society after a traumatic experience. For the ex-combatants' case, the term is usually interchangeable with <i>reintegration</i> , but in strict terms, reinsertion should refer to a person's holistic return to civil society.
<i>Reintegration</i>	Social and economic rehabilitation of groups or individuals who have been demobilized.
<i>Stakeholder</i>	Any individual or group which has a stake or interest in a given issue. Stakeholders in matters of reintegration may include the demobilized soldiers themselves, their relatives, local communities, representative bodies, government, donors and aid agencies amongst others.
<i>Target Group</i>	The pool of potential beneficiaries for each reintegration activity. Each activity targets a specific group; the individuals who actually accessed the service are the beneficiaries.
<i>Veteran</i>	Ex-combatant who has retired from active service but who fails to meet the eligibility requirements to qualify as a DS (with access to benefits or special treatment). An example could be a combatant who was mustered out from military service before the end of armed conflict.
<i>Vulnerable Groups</i>	Special groups or specific social segments who are disadvantaged in relation to their communities as result of the armed conflict. These groups usually include war wounded or war disabled, orphans, child soldiers, displaced people and refugees.

2. Glossary of acronyms

AA	Assembly Area
ADEMIMO	Associação dos Deficientes Militares Moçambicanos (Mozambican Association of War Disabled)
AMODEG	Associação Moçambicana dos Desmobilizados da Guerra (Mozambican Association of Demobilized Soldiers)

BDP	<i>Banco Popular de Desenvolvimento</i> (Peoples Development Bank)
CAII	Creative Associates International, Inc.
CORE	<i>Comissão de Reintegração</i> (Reintegration Commission)
CNRS	<i>Comissão Nacional para a Reinserção Social</i> (National Commission for Social Reintegration)
CRT	Conflict Resolution Team
DRP	Demobilization and Reintegration Process
DS	Demobilized soldier(s)
DSS/AM	DS Services Assistant Manager
DPT	<i>Departamento Provincial de Trabalho</i> (Provincial Directorate of Labor), Ministry of Labor
GCI	<i>Grupo de Coordenação e Informação</i> (Coordination and Information Group), Ministry of Labor
GOM	Government of Mozambique
GT	<i>Grupo de Trabalho</i> (Working Group), Ministry of Labor
GTZ	<i>Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit</i> , the German technical assistance agency
IA	Implementing Agency
ILO	International Labor Organization
INEFP	<i>Instituto Nacional do Emprego e Formação Profissional</i> (National Institute for Employment and Professional Training)
IOM	International Organization for Migration
IRS	Information and Referral Service for Demobilized Soldiers (<i>Serviços de Informação e Referência</i> or SIR)
ISCOS	<i>Instituto Sindical per la Cooperazione allo Sviluppo</i>
MINLAB	Ministry of Labor
MINSOC	Ministry for the Coordination of Social Welfare
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NOPF/AM	National Opportunities and PF Assistant Manager
ONUMOZ	United Nations Operation for Mozambique
ORF	GTZ's Open Rehabilitation Fund for Demobilized Soldiers (<i>Fundo Aberto de Reintegração</i> or FAR)
OSD	ILO's Occupational Skills Development Program (<i>Desenvolvimento das Habilitações Ocupacionais</i> or DHO)

PCP	Provincial Coordinator of Programs, IOM
PF	Provincial Fund for Demobilized Soldiers (<i>Fundo Provincial</i> or FP)
RENAMO	<i>Resistência Nacional de Moçambique</i> (Mozambican National Resistance), the main opposition party
RSS	Reintegration Support Scheme (<i>Esquema de Apoio de Reintegração</i> or EAR)
RTA	Regional Technical Advisor (IRS/PF staff)
UCP	<i>Unidade de Coordenação dos Programas</i> (Unit for Program Coordination), Ministry of Labor
UCPP	<i>Unidade de Coordenação Provincial dos Programas</i> (Unit for Provincial Coordination of Programs), Ministry of Labor
UNDP	United Nations Development Program (<i>Programas das Nações Unidas de Desenvolvimento</i> or PNUD)
UNOHAC	United Nations Office for Humanitarian Assistance Coordination
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
WFP	World Food Program

C. Approved scope of work

IRS/PF FINAL EVALUATION

Background

After two and a half years of operations, the IRS/PF project will close in January, 1997. On-going monitoring and formative evaluations of project outputs have been conducted and identification of potential problem areas have been tracked. Both components of project were designed under CORE and implemented by the IOM.

Purpose

The purpose of the final evaluation is to take into account the various project outputs in order to identify how the IRS/PF assisted demobilized soldiers make the transition from military to civilian life. This evaluation aims to analyze areas of impact of both the IRS and PF components and articulate how these areas of immediate impact have contributed to the overall objective of maintaining peace.

Performance Objectives

The consultant team will perform the following tasks

- Task 1: Review relevant documentation and complete quantitative and qualitative analyses of services provided to date.
- Task 2: Conduct selected site visits as needed to IRS/PF offices and/or project sites to determine how the IRS/PF has contributed to the transition from war to peace.
- Task 3: Compile series of interviews with demobilized soldiers in urban and rural areas to complement existing information in relation to their reintegration status and remaining serious problems.
- Task 4: Compile and analyze the above data in order to identify project outputs and impact and the salient factors which contributed to positive project outputs as impact as well as those which did not demonstrate positive impact.
- Task 5: Analyze the above findings to extrapolate conclusions and formulate lessons learned about the role of the IRS/PF in the overall Mozambican reintegration program.

Reporting Objectives

Final reporting documents will include the following information:

1. Summary of the roles, stages and phases of the IRS/PF program in the overall CORE designed reintegration program.
2. Graphical description of the process of the IRS/PF project (sequence, staffing, procurement, delivery and outputs).
3. Description of services provided and functions and typologies of funded activities.
4. Analysis of project overall contribution to the demobilized soldiers transition to civilian life, focusing on pending reintegration issues.
5. Assessment of project's level of success to achieve its objectives, including the identification of the project's strengths and weaknesses.

Team Composition

Team Leader: Marcelo Fabre
Researchers: Abu Sultan
Edward Burke
Valter Fainda
Gregorio Firmino
Supervisor: Douglas Passanisi

Timeframe

The evaluation will be conducted over a four week period. The intended schedule for major activities includes:

Nov 14 Arrival of team leader

Nov 15 Briefing and workplan discussion with IOM

Nov 18-22 Instrument development and analysis of documentation. Site visits proposed.

Nov 25-29 Site visits. Institutional interviews. Existing data collection and analysis

Dec 2-6 Compilation of new data and analysis of findings

Dec 9-11 Draft report production

Dec 12 Debriefing and first draft report submitted

Dec 20 Final presentation

D. Approach, methodology and team composition

This section presents the evaluation team's approach and methodology to satisfy the scope of work within the level of effort allocated. We follow with a description of how we defined and measured reintegration and project contribution to pacification goals, along with a discussion of our sources of data.

1. An internal review of activities

CAII performed the final evaluation of the information and referral service / provincial fund reintegration program through a scope of work approved by the IOM and USAID/Mozambique in December, 1996. CAII proposed this scope of work as part of its technical support component of the ongoing USAID Grant Agreement 656-0235-G -00-4019-00 to the IOM for the implementation of the Information and Referral Service/Provincial Fund reintegration programs.

To perform this evaluation, CAII drew on in-house expertise available through three mechanisms.

- As a technical assistance provider for IOM on reintegration programming Mozambique, CAII was thoroughly familiar with the issues surrounding these activities, allowing our team to hit the ground running with a minimal learning curve.
- Through our Communities in Transition Division, we brought exceptional expertise in reintegration programming worldwide, allowing our team to draw on experience in other regions.
- Through our Johannesburg regional office for Southern Africa, we provided backstopping mechanisms for document production and overall supervision and quality control.

Together our team was able to draw on these three resources to develop a data-driven report.

2. Approach

The team performed this final evaluation in five discrete phases during the periods of November- December 1996 and February-March 1996

- *Phase 1:* We developed and secured approval for the scope of work and devised a methodology for fulfilling our mandate (December 1996).
- *Phase 2:* We evaluated and performed statistical analyses for all available data sources, including baseline information from the demobilization, IRS tracking database, opportunity mapping registries and PF tracking systems. (December 1996 and March 1997).

- *Phase 3:* We collected and analyzed data from 1,000 respondents, comprised of ex-combatants from RENAMO and FRELIMO, urban dwellers as well as disabled veterans (December 1997).
- *Phase 4:* We reviewed relevant documents and interviewed stakeholders to derive qualitative data to supplement the quantitative analysis (December 1997 and March 1997).
- *Phase 5:* We presented our preliminary findings, lessons learned and recommendations to the IOM, using the feedback obtained to complete the final evaluation report (March 1997).

We relied on a five-pronged approach to assess the project contribution to reintegration and pacification goals in Mozambique.

- *Our evaluation is driven by data.* We were careful to base all of our findings on hard data, and to link all lessons learned and recommendations to these data-driven findings. We did so because we believe that findings and recommendations based on speculation, beliefs or feelings and not grounded in verifiable data do not serve our clients in documenting the impact of their activities.
- *We focused on results.* We asked a series of questions about the various reintegration program options available to our ex-combatant populations. This information was vital to correlate reintegration with benefits.
- *We compared ex-combatants to civilians.* Our scope of work asked us to assess the impact of reintegration programming and the project contribution to pacification goals, and naturally, our research focused on the demobilized. However, we also examined baseline data of civilians, representing, by definition, the standard for reintegration.
- *We assessed how reintegration programming was designed, implemented and managed.* We believe that results begin in the planning stage, when objectives are defined and benchmarks established for achieving these objectives. We therefore examined how reintegration objectives were initially defined as well as how programming was implemented in order to derive lessons learned and make informed recommendations for future design, implementation and management of reintegration programming.
- *We stressed communication with the IOM throughout the evaluation process.* Team members kept the IOM informally and formally apprised of the evaluation's progress, preliminary findings and stumbling blocks throughout the evaluation process. We valued these key stakeholders' knowledgeable input into our findings and interpretations of data, and we believe that ongoing communication with clients greatly facilitated the process of finalizing the evaluation report.

3. Methodology

The team was partially based in Maputo and compiled information at the national level with visits to relevant agencies.

The team took the following specific steps to implement the five tasks identified in the scope of work.

- Between November 14 and November 15, the team leader arrived to the country, briefing meetings were held with IOM staff and management, preliminary data sources were identified and the draft scope of work was revised.
- In the week of November 18 to November 22, instruments were developed for the identification of the urban demobilized situation and allowed for a comparative analysis with previous information about rural cases. The final SOW was agreed to by the IOM and meetings were organized in Maputo with different stakeholders.
- The week comprising November 25 to November 29 was utilized for survey activities with demobilized soldiers residing in urban areas of Maputo and Beira. Simultaneously, preliminary information from existing databases began to be analyzed.
- In the week of December 2 to December 6, all data from the urban survey was analyzed and different problems were identified in relation to existing data sources. The team was unable to identify consistent outcome information for the activities implemented and presented its preliminary findings to IOM's senior management.
- The period between December 9 to December 12 was utilized to restructure the evaluation schedule to allow for improvements and updates to be made in the tracking databases for the provincial fund and information and referral service. Simultaneously, a survey activity targeting about 1,000 demobilized was designed to gather data in relation to the DS' perspectives of specific project contributions to reintegration and pacification goals.
- Between December 10 and December 20, close to 1,000 demobilized soldiers were interviewed and the resulting data was input into a specially designed database. All further evaluation activities were postponed until project operations were concluded and final outcome information was available.
- In the week of February 24 to February 28, the final evaluation activities were reinitiated with the analysis of the newly updated databases for the project activities. Preliminary statistical findings were presented to IOM and discussed to ensure the team understanding of the conditions surrounding the project implementation. Preliminary information about the reintegration survey results were also discussed and prepared for final analysis.

- The week of March 3 to March 10 was defined by the collection of all remaining available information, compilation of data for the final report, presentation of the evaluation results and a CAII/IOM team debriefing.

a) *Understanding impact, contribution and reintegration*

The team agreed upon the following definitions and indicators:

Impact is change. We distinguished between a project's impact — change — and outcomes or immediate results. The hypothetical case below illustrates this differentiation.

"My work always used to be late. Then I took a time management course. Now my work is on time because I know how to set priorities and make to-do lists."

In this hypothetical example:

- The **subject** is the person who was always late.
- The **input or intervention** is training.
- The **outcome** is his ability to make to-do lists and set priorities.
- The **impact** is the change in his work, from late to on time.
- The **direct beneficiaries** from this input are supervisors and co-workers.
- The **indirect beneficiaries** are the clinics which now receive vaccines on time, the health workers in these clinics who can now perform their duties as scheduled, and, ultimately, the children who are vaccinated, families whose children are healthier, mothers who are freed up for other activities, communities whose infant mortality rates decrease, and so on.

Contribution to pacification goals for any specific reintegration project is defined by the project's ability to impact on beneficiary attitudes in relation to becoming a potential source of violence and/or political instability. We assessed contributions to pacification goals by comparing the demobilized expectations and attitudes of project beneficiaries to other demobilized not having accessed the activities.

Social reintegration is related to perceptions of both the DS individual and the community. Central to the concept of social integration is the eradication of the demobilized soldier as a special case, with special needs and privileges. In general terms, the DS can be considered socially reintegrated when both the community and the DS himself/herself is considered an ordinary, active member of the community. In order to reach this stage, the phasing out of special treatment of the DS is essential since the DS will always remain an identifiable interest group apart from the rest of the community.

In addition to internal and external perceptions, certain benchmarks are needed to gauge the success of reintegration programs. The CAII evaluation team, responsible for the IRS/PF's Internal Review of Activities (February 1996) identified the following indicators to measure the progression of the social reintegration process:

- Reestablishment with family
- Access to shelter
- Reconnection with community through non-military activities such as religion, sports, etc.

Economic reintegration cannot be entirely separated from social reintegration. Self-sufficiency and economic contribution to the community are important aspects of social as well as economic reintegration. Most national and international development institutions and agencies have focused on issues of economic integration as the involvement of DS in economic activities has seemed to be the most appropriate and achievable strategy. In order to benchmark the impact of these interventions, the following indicators have been widely used:

- Incorporation to formal employment mechanisms
- Self employment in the formal and informal sectors
- Any other income generating initiative.

4. Sources of data

The team collected generic and specific data from several sources. Most documents provided quantitative information about reintegration programming costs and numbers of beneficiaries served. Although some inconsistencies were noted according to different sources, especially in relation to the total outcome numbers for each of the reintegration programs, the relative independence of data sources and different counting criteria easily account for all inconsistencies.

The assessment established a series of findings in this report, driven by interviews with IOM staff at the provincial offices, reports and relevant documents and interviews at the national level with all agencies involved in reintegration programming.

- The team relied on **quantitative** data obtained directly from reporting mechanisms, databases, inventories and an array of documents from IOM's field staff as well as from the Maputo central office.
- The team supplemented and expanded the quantitative data with **qualitative** information obtained through interviews at the national level and a specially developed survey instrument probe for DS at the provincial level.

The most important information and data sources consulted for the evaluation included:

- Databases used for project tracking and reporting. This information included the analysis of multiples databases and their recompilation for statistical purposes.

- Survey instruments applied to demobilized soldiers in urban areas nationwide to construct a situational analysis to assess project contributions to reintegration and pacification goals.
- Demobilized soldiers, through direct and indirect probes used by different program implementers to assess program outcomes and measure progress.
- Interviews with donors representatives, Government of Mozambique officials, managers in charge of reintegration services at the national level, project implementers' staff at provincial level and provincial GOM representatives.
- Reports from project implementers with beneficiaries' access rates.
- Interviews with demobilized association representatives.

Complete lists of documents consulted are provided in the appendices.

5. Team composition

The team was comprised of a full time team leader, four part time researchers and an evaluation supervisor. These personnel participated in the evaluation with varying levels of effort according to the previously explained tasks and phases. The team was also supported by IOM's field staff for the implementation of survey activities in rural areas.

E. Profile of urban vs. rural reintegration

1. Demographics

- *The urban sample included only 10% ex-RENAMO, almost all from Sofala province. The demographics of DS interviewed in the rural areas were somewhat different, as the interview teams targeted rural RENAMO areas to study reintegration program outreach impact. As a result, 48% of rural interviewees were ex-RENAMO, 52% were ex-FRELIMO. Of the interviewees in urban areas, 20% were low-ranking soldiers at demobilization time. 75% were NCOs and 5% were high ranking officers. The spread in the rural areas was more even. 39% were low-ranking soldiers, 51% were NCOs and 10% were high level officers.*

According to the survey, the age distribution of urban respondents is relatively irregular compared with the baseline data provided by the UNOMOZ Technical Unit (TU) database. This can be partly attributed to discrepancies related to the small sample size. Nonetheless, there still seems to be a significant gap in the 30 to 34 year range. Figures relating to age were not available for rural respondents.

The gender distribution of the urban survey is significantly skewed towards women. About 15% of the respondents in this survey were female, whereas women only make up about 1.5% of the DS population, according to the TU database. This may be because it was reported that many women were largely involved in administrative work, and were therefore based in urban headquarter areas. After demobilization, these women most likely remained in these urban areas. The survey results of the rural population are closer to the baseline figures, 95% of the rural interviewees were male, 5% female.

The level of education for urban demobilized soldiers is almost unchanged from the distribution identified by the UNOMOZ Technical Unit at the time of demobilization. This suggests that most demobilized have not pursued studies and are not engaged in educational activities. In rural areas, the situation was similar. Only 21% of the respondents have any formal training and 67% have only primary school education or no education at all. Nonetheless, DS still have a very similar education level distribution to that of the general population of Mozambique.

2. DS Movement

- *There was a migration toward cities after demobilization. In Sofala, the proportion of DS originally from that urban area is not unexpectedly low, however, 43% of the interviews which took place in Maputo revealed that only 8.8% of the interviewees were originally from the capital. Both cities have received a massive influx of demobilized soldiers after demobilization, mostly from Zambezia (14.3%), Inhambane (9.9%), Manica (6.6%) and Nampula (6.6%).*

The main reasons given for migrating to the two major cities are: return to current family location (43.8%), better opportunities (31.3 %) and the effects of the armed conflict (20.3%). Families have relocated to cities mainly from Cabo Delgado, Sofala, Inhambane and Gaza. DS have moved from Niassa, Manica, Inhambane and Gaza in order to seek better opportunities. DS moved from Niassa, Manica and Nampula to escape the effects of war. In the case of the urban group, close to 75% of the cases expecting to join their families were able to do so.

In the rural areas, 46% of interviewees have returned to their place of origin, usually in order to reunite with their families. In the case of 54% of the DS interviewed in rural areas, who have not returned to their places of origin, many have stayed in the ex-military zones where they were stationed because they established families there during the war or because their families moved there to join them. Young demobilized soldiers who were demobilized and transported to provinces of origin but returned to former military zones cited that they could not find their families in their places of origin (due to death or lack of information about their present residence).

3. Reasons for leaving the military

- *Both urban and rural dwellers (93%) do not consider the military a viable or desired future option.*

Close to 92% of the urban sample was demobilized under the GPA, another 8% claims to have been demobilized because of being wounded as a result of the conflict and were awaiting transport home. Only 8% of the urban demobilized would have preferred to stay in the military, citing reasons of economic stability. The rest remaining 92% wanted to be demobilized. The main reasons given by the DS for wanting to leave the military included that they wanted to continue with their personal lives (31%) and that they had contributed enough during the war years. In the rural areas, only 6% of the DS did not want to be demobilized at the time of demobilization. The reasons given for wanting to leave the military were similar: they were tired of fighting; they had not wanted to fight in the first place; their conscription period was over and; they were needed by their families.

4. Perceptions of reintegration

- *More rural DS perceive themselves as reintegrated due to the importance given to social rather than economic reintegration and the ease with which social reintegration (housing, family reunification) was achieved. Economic reintegration was more significant to urban DS. In both cases, those having attained production activities considered themselves more reintegrated.*

Over half of the urban interviewees judge themselves as reintegrated (56%). The main factors which can be correlated with this perception are:

Owning a house.	Every demobilized not having a house considers himself not reintegrated.
Marital status.	62% of the married interviewees considered themselves reintegrated. This perception reduces to 32% for the cases still single.
Occupation.	86% of the self-employed respondents regarded themselves as reintegrated. This perception changes to 60% for employed cases and reduces even more to a mere 23% for the unemployed.

An even larger proportion of the rural DS interviewed consider themselves to be reintegrated (80%). The most important reasons given for this are that they are in the same situation as others in their communities, that they are reunified with their families, and that they are working on their machambas. Respondents also stressed the importance of civilian rights and acceptance by their communities, and listed owning their own houses as an important consideration. Again, employment was listed as a factor, but was not seen to be nearly as important as self-sufficiency.

Urban respondents felt that their reintegration could be improved mostly through business finance (28%), employment (28%), and support from the government (13%). The remainder of the responses concentrated on pensions, housing, studies and training (less than 5% each). The rural respondents overwhelmingly felt that assistance with self-employment or machamba production (52%) is the most important factor that could aid in their personal reintegration, followed by employment (17%) and pensions (12%). Other factors mentioned included housing (10%), cattle (10%), training (5%) and help with family matters (3%).

The urban interviewees aspirations for the future include employment (26%), initiating micro-projects (24%) and continuing studies (14%). 15% of the rest of responses considered their main expectation for the future to be general well-being. Once again, rural respondents listed self-employment as their foremost aspiration, followed by employment and then training.

5. Perceptions of current reintegration status

- *80% of all DS now consider themselves civilians. The major reason for considering themselves as demobilized rather than civilian was non-payment of pensions. Less than 5% of all DS still consider themselves as military, the major reasons cited being: the dependency on military structures (pensions); the need for support of military communities or colleagues (mostly disabled concentrations); DS still awaiting "military orders" or instruction (RENAMO). 75% of all respondents considering themselves as military were disabled.*

Most of the urban respondents consider themselves to be civilians (79%). About 16% of the cases consider themselves demobilized and less than 5% of the interviewees still consider

themselves to be military. Nonetheless, close to 14% of the total urban respondents acknowledge having considered returning to military life, mostly for economic reasons.

82% of rural DS consider themselves civilians. The reasons given for this are that they are outside military structures, they no longer bear arms, they are demobilized, they enjoy civilian rights, and they are no longer under imposed military recruitment and therefore can return to their civilian lives. 16% consider themselves demobilized rather than civilian because they are still waiting for pension payments, have meager means of subsistence, still fear further conscription and/or, have fewer opportunities than their civilian counterparts. 2% still consider themselves to be military because they are disabled and are dependent on state pensions, they feel secure in the military disabled community, or they do not consider themselves to be demobilized and are still waiting for military orders (in RENAMO areas). It should be noted that the majority (over 75%) of those still considering themselves to be military are disabled. Only 2% of rural DS would join the military again if called to do so.

6. *Perceptions about problem solving*

- *Over 98% of all DS consider force not to be a viable response to problem resolution. The remaining three percent would use force if considered appropriate.*

Relatives are the primary resource for problem solving, friends and traditional leaders the next (a much higher percentage of rural DS depend on traditional leaders for support). Solicitation of military structures for assistance in problem solving is virtually none. Disabled DS tend to depend much more heavily on family support for reintegration and problem solving.

When the urban DS population confronts problems, it relies mostly on family members for support (47%). Nonetheless, significant number of cases rely on friends (28%) or others (11%). 12% of the respondents do not rely on anybody for support to their problems, and less than 5% relies on government mechanisms or traditional leadership. Of the rural DS, 34% of the sample relies primarily on relatives for support and assistance with problems. The support of relatives is also crucially important to rural DS, 34% of the sample stated that family is its primary source of support. According to the survey, disabled DS often depend heavily on the support of family members who also facilitate rehabilitation and community integration. DS interviewed, especially the disabled, also mentioned that the role of the family was crucial in helping to control anger and aggressive behavior during the difficult initial stages of adaptation to civilian life. 20% of the rural sample turns first to traditional leaders. This figure may be higher in the case of rural DS because traditional structures are stronger in the rural areas. 14% turns to friends. Once again, 10% does not turn to anybody for support. It is interesting to note that neither the urban nor the rural sample attaches much weight to former military structures as a source of support for problems.

An overwhelming 97% of the urban interviewees consider that no conflict can be resolved through force. A mere 3% regard violence as sometimes effective and no one considered it

always appropriate. Similarly, the rural interviewees feel strongly about this issue, 99% of whom feel that force is not an appropriate tool for conflict resolution.

7. Perceived social reintegration

- *Perceived social reintegration seems more likely for married DS (single DS rate themselves much lower on the reintegration scale), whose average two school-aged children have successfully entered schools, and who have secured their own residence.*

The demobilized have successfully started new families and an increasing number of them are now married. At demobilization time, 54% of the demobilized were married, 39% were single and 7% were divorced or widowed. Today, the survey sample showed that urban married DS have increased to 75%. In the rural areas, the figures are even higher, revealing a significant 94% of DS interviewed who are married.

The urban households have a varying composition, from 1 member to a maximum of 14. The average is around 5 to 6 members, coincident with the household composition for civilian populations. Most of the sample clusters in the 4 to 7 family members range. Only 10% reported living alone. The households have from zero to 12 children, averaging 2 with most of the cases in the zero to 2 children range. This represents a change in the traditional distribution for average civilian families, probably explained by the relatively young DS households. Most school aged children attend school (83%), the main reasons for the remainder not to attend schools are economic.

Rural households tend to have greater numbers of children but similar total family aggregates. In the rural sample, 86% of the DS have three or more people in their households. 59% of DS have two or more children in their households. The percentage of children of school-going age actually attending school is even higher in the rural areas than in urban areas at 86%. 64% of families whose children do not attend school indicated that this was for economic reasons. The remainder stated that it was due to reasons of accessibility.

8. Home and shelter

- *Urban dwellers (25%) have a more difficult time securing their own home while only 2% of rural dwellers find establishing a home difficult, one of the four most important endeavors in the social reintegration process. Movement of DS after resettlement is related to successfully obtaining a home*

Most of the urban demobilized live with their families in their own houses (68%). Another 20% rents houses, 4% has a borrowed place and the rest have no houses at all. Nearly 66% of the interviewees are planing to stay at their current location. Most of the respondents

expecting to move are the ones who do not own their own houses. Rural interviewees indicated that obtaining their own house was one of their main intentions at the time of demobilization and a much higher 83% of this group have realized this intention, which is also cited as an important component of the DS' perception of their own reintegration. A further 10% lives in the houses of immediate or extended family, 5% in rented accommodation and 3% in borrowed accommodation. Only 2% of those interviewed is homeless. 83% of DS have no intention of moving from their present locations. 10% resides in their families' houses.

9. *Perceived economic reintegration*

- *Those starting small or informal businesses were much more satisfied with post-demobilization activities than those seeking limited formal employment. Social reintegration and self-sufficiency were more highly rated among rural DS than with the urban DS whose major goal was finding formal employment.*
- *Although both rural and urban DS consider themselves to be the primary household earner, most economic reintegration depends on other household earners contributing to the family income.*

After demobilization, the urban interviewees expected to find jobs (31%), start self-employment activities or micro-business (25%) and continue studying (22%). However, most are not satisfied with the degree of actual accomplishment of their expectations. 72% stated that they had not been able to fully attain their goals during the immediate post-demobilization period. In the rural areas, intentions for after demobilization were much the same, although greater stress was placed on returning home and reestablishing a domestic environment. 59% of DS in these areas stated that their intentions were not realized. Only 15% feel that they have realized their intentions.

Levels of accomplishment for post-demobilization expectations seem to be related to the type of activities in which the interviewees wanted to engage. 53% of new DS small business owners were satisfied with their accomplishments. However, 80% of those hoping to engage in agriculture and 65% of those expecting formal employment felt they had not reached their post-demobilization goals. Urban dwellers have a particularly difficult time establishing agricultural security (machambas).

46% of the urban DS interviewed are employed. The rest of the sample are self-employed (24%), unemployed (29%), or students (1%). The high unemployment rate for this population, however, is significantly lower than the unemployment rate for the general population in Mozambique which is estimated at 47% (source: [http:// www.hmnet.com /africa/mozambique/ mozambique.html](http://www.hmnet.com/africa/mozambique/mozambique.html)).

In the rural areas, 60% of DS interviewed classified themselves as unemployed, but many of these engage in self-employment activities and subsistence agriculture (machamba) which they do not consider to be formal employment. In fact, self-employment and machambas

were seen by rural DS as the most important factors which would further facilitate reintegration.

Both rural and urban DS tend to be the primary income earner, however, both have other family members contributing to the household income. Rural families tend to have a greater number of members contributing to household incomes.

Family income of urban DS varies significantly from nothing to about 3,000,000 MT/month. The median for this sample is around 490,000 MT/month, representing about one and a half times Mozambique's minimum wage. Close to 13% of the urban sample claims to have no income and covers its basic needs through friends and family support. In most cases, the interviewee claimed to be the only source of income for the household. Upon further questioning, most acknowledged that at least one other family member contributes to the family income. In the case of rural DS, this figure is as high as 87%.

10. Other reintegration issues

Reforma Pensions: About 96% of the urban sample perceive themselves to be eligible and entitled to receive a *reforma* pension. Nearly 50% of those have actually received the benefit. In the rural areas, 28% of DS claimed to be eligible for reforma pensions. 41% of these actually receive *reforma* payments. Although an entitled payment to those eligible, the reforma pension problems never emerged as a significant trouble area or obstacle to peace. The major problem was misinformation as to who was eligible (much confusion and resentment from RENAMO soldiers who either did not understand that they were ineligible and thought the government was mistreating them through non-payment or that the agreement between RENAMO and FRELIMO not to provide these pensions to RENAMO was unfair) and non or delayed payments by the GOM to recipients.

Disability Pensions: A highly contentious issue, the non-payment of disability pensions is one of the single-most significant obstacles cited as a serious impediment to successful reintegration. This has resulted in the perceived continued need for the existence of military structures and the inability of concentrations of disabled to forego their identification as being military rather than civilian. It was also reported that the lack of access, transport, appropriate social and medical services and training for the disabled also caused a skewed perception of the significance of the pension payment. 75% of all those considering themselves not reintegrated were disabled DS.

11. Community organization participation

- 50 - 60% of all DS tend to affiliate with community organizations, rural dwellers having a greater tendency than urban. Religious groups are by far the most popular activity group and both urban and rural DS have about a 40% leadership rate within those organizations.

Less than half of the urban respondents do not belong to any kind of organization. The remainder mostly participates in religious groups (22%), political parties (8%) and cultural or sporting associations (7%). The ones belonging to an organization do participate actively, with close to 41% of the cases holding positions of responsibility.

In the rural areas more than half of the DS interviewed (59%) are affiliated with some kind of organization. Of these, 39% hold some position of authority in their organization. Once again religious groups are the most popular community organizations (32% of all rural interviewees belong to such groups), followed by political parties (14% of all interviewees).

12. Perceptions about the IRS/PF reintegration program

- It was perceived that IRS/PF funded more urban than rural DS although actual contacts of IRS/PF with urban and rural populations were similar. In addition, the urban, better educated had more access to and support from the IRS/PF programs than the rural and uneducated.*

The major reasons for not utilizing IOM offices were their location (distance or lack of information). Urban DS perceived formal employment as the major desired reintegration support whereas rural populations tend to spread desired reintegration assistance across self-employment, formal employment and agricultural activities (machamba).

Most of the urban interviewees claimed to have accessed IOM programs (74%). The main reasons for not having taken advantage of the programs are lack of knowledge (8%), not knowing where the offices are (7%), and not being able to reach the offices (6%). 48% of the rural interviewees had direct contact with some reintegration services and an additional 37% had at least minimal contact through the IOM outreach program, totaling 85% of rural DS interviewees. The main reasons for non-participation in further programming were that IOM offices were too far away (34%) or the DS were unsure of the location of the IOM offices (18%). Nonetheless, 107 assistance activities were provided by the IOM to the 176 rural DS interviewed, nearly 60% of which involved project funding through the PF.

The single most important factor linked to further successful reintegration by the urban interviewees is employment (59%). This is followed by self-employment (25%), family unification (7%) and machamba production (6%). These percentages show a strong perception of income generation as a determining factor for reintegration. Consistently, the main inhibitors for reintegration identified by the respondents were unemployment (23%), lack of money (15%), lack of credits (12%) and lack of favorable conditions (11%). Interestingly, 19% of the urban respondents considered that there were no important factors impeding their reintegration.

Less Rural DS cited perceived impediments to successful reintegration. Rural DS tend to be more dependent on social reintegration, economic reintegration only a consideration once

social factors have been accommodated. Rural DS also stressed economic factors as being important in ensuring sustained reintegration. They rated assistance with self-employment (46%), machamba production (42%) and formal employment (42%) as the most important needs. On the other hand, the three most important factors mentioned as impediments to reintegration were unemployment (22%), lack of cash for self-employment projects (38%) and the lack of pension payments (9%), again all economic factors. 8% of rural DS felt that there were no significant impediments to their reintegration. It seems that rural DS attach less importance to formal employment than the urban DS. DS in rural areas appear to aspire more to self-sufficiency through self-employment and machamba production than to salaried employment.

13. Perceptions about contributing to sustained peace

- *The major DS perception of their contribution to sustained peace is by participating in economic activities. This is also the perception of the communities where DS reside: Work is viewed as the major positive contribution that a DS can offer to civil society in this post-war situation.*

The majority of the urban DS interviewed consider that the demobilized can contribute to sustain the peace by securing gainful employment (55%). Urban DS also feel that they can contribute to peace through community activities (13%), being calm or undemanding (13%), participating in conflict resolution (7%), and integrating into projects (6%). Rural DS also feel that their economic activities were their most important contribution to lasting peace, followed by their contribution to development efforts and participation in community activities.

F. Data collection instruments

1. Urban demobilized soldier interview forms

Guião para as Entrevistas dos Soldados Desmobilizados

Data: _____ Entrevistador: _____

Local da Entrevista: _____ Província: _____

Distrito _____

Localidade _____

I. IDENTIFICAÇÃO

1. Nome: _____

2. Idade 3. Sexo

4. Origem: Província _____ Distrito _____ Localidade _____

Se não esta a viver na sua localidade de origem, indique as causas _____

5. Habilitações literárias 6. Estado Civil

7. O que fazia antes da vida militar?

Actividade

Trabalhava
Estudava
Desempregado

8. Teve alguma formação profissional? Sim ☐ Não ☐

9. Em que exercito serviu? FRE ☐ REN ☐

10. Patente: Oficial superior Subalterno Soldado

11. Porque foi desmobilizado? AGP ☐ Ferido ☐ Outro ☐

12. Queria ser desmobilizado? ☐ Sim ☐ Não Porque? _____

13. O que queria fazer após a desmobilização?

Conseguiu materializar os seus desejos após a desmobilização?

14. E portador de alguma deficiência física devido a guerra? Sim ☐ Não ☐

(Se sim, preencher a secção IV)

II. SITUAÇÃO SOCIO-ECONOMICA ACTUAL

1. A casa em que vive e de quem?

Própria ☐ Da família ☐ Alugada ☐ Emprestada ☐ Sem Casa

2. Vai ficar a viver nesta localidade? Sim ☐ Não ☐ Porque? _____

3. Total de membros do agregado familiar incluindo o entrevistado:

5

Quantos filhos

Os que estão em idade escolar, vão a escola?

Sim ☐ Não ☐

Se não, indique as razões:

Falta de acesso ☐

Falta de escola perto ☐

Falta de meios ☐

Outras prioridades ☐ Quais?

4. Quantos contribuem para o sustento do Agregado? (dinheiro e outras formas)

Só o entrevistado ☐

O entrevistado e esposa ☐

Mais de duas pessoas ☐

5. Quanto dinheiro o agregado familiar consegue juntar pôr mês?

6. Ocupação

Empregado ☐ Actividade _____ Empregador _____

Auto-empregado ☐ Actividade _____

Desempregado ☐ Como sobrevive? _____

7. Recebeu o subsidio da ONUMOZ do BPD? Sim ☐ Não ☐

O que esta a acontecer agora que pararam os pagamentos? _____

8. E membro de alguma organização? Sim ☐ Não ☐

Religiosa ☐ Cívica ☐
Política ☐ Tradicional ☐
Cultural/Desportiva ☐ Outro tipo ☐ Qual? _____

Ocupa algum cargo de responsabilidade nessa organização? Sim ☐ Não ☐

9. A quem recorre frequentemente quando enfrenta dificuldades? _____

Porque? _____

III. REINTEGRAÇÃO

1. Já foi aos escritórios da OIM? Sim ☐ Não ☐
Se não, Porque? Nunca ouviu falar ☐
Não sabe onde fica ☐
Fica longe e inacessível ☐
Não precisa da assistência da OIM ☐
Recebeu visita de OIM na sua localidade ☐

Se sim, que tipo de assistência solicitou? _____

2. Quais são os factores mais importantes para assegurar a sua reintegração na vida civil?

Porque?

Emprego	<input type="checkbox"/>	_____
Auto-emprego	<input type="checkbox"/>	_____
Reunificação com a família	<input type="checkbox"/>	_____
Machamba	<input type="checkbox"/>	_____
Grupo social	<input type="checkbox"/>	_____
Apoio dos líderes locais	<input type="checkbox"/>	_____
Pagamento das pensões	<input type="checkbox"/>	_____
Desenvolvimento das infraestruturas locais	<input type="checkbox"/>	_____
Materiais de trabalho	<input type="checkbox"/>	_____
Construção de uma casa	<input type="checkbox"/>	_____

Outro(s) _____

3. Que factores impedem ou dificultam a sua reintegração na vida civil?

4. Neste momento, considera-se: Civil ☐ Militar ☐ Desmobilizado ☐

Porque? _____

5. Considera-se reintegrado na vida civil:

Sim Porque? _____

Não Porque? _____

6. O que poderia facilitar ou melhorar a sua reintegração na vida civil?

7. Neste momento, quais são os seus principais desejos em relação ao futuro?

8. Como pensa que os desmobilizados poderão contribuir para assegurar a paz no país?

9. Acha que os conflitos devem ser resolvidos pela força? _____

10. Considerando a sua vida actual, alguma vez lhe ocorreu regressar a vida militar?

Sim Não Porque? _____

IV. PARA OS QUE DEVEM RECEBER PENSÕES

A. INVALIDEZ

1. Fez a junta medica para a avaliação do seu nível de deficiência? Sim Não

Se não, porque? _____

Data da junta medica? _____

2. Esta a receber a pensão de invalidez? Sim Não

Explique _____

3. Qual e o tipo de apoio que recebe para a reabilitação? (saúde, próteses, transporte, construção da casa, projectos, etc.)

4. Recebe qualquer outra forma de assistência para apoiar a sua reintegração?

5. Quais são as suas necessidades (sócio/económicas) para a sua reintegração sustentável? _____

6. Outros comentários _____

IV. PARA OS QUE DEVEM RECEBER PENSÕES

B. REFORMA

1. Tem direito a pensão? Sim Não Se sim, esta a receber? Sim Não

Se não, porque? _____

2. Quais são as suas necessidades (sócio/económicas) para a sua reintegração sustentável? _____

3. Recebe qualquer outra forma de assistência para apoiar o processo de reintegracao? _____

4. Outros comentários _____

2. Reintegration survey form

I O M		12-05-96	
O I M			
ORGANIZAÇÃO INTERNACIONAL PARA AS MIGRAÇÕES SERVIÇOS DE INFORMAÇÃO E REFERÊNCIA / FUNDO PROVINCIAL AValiação FINAL - INQUÉRITO DE OPINIÃO DOS BENEFICIÁRIOS			
A - Validação do entrevistado:		(As respostas aos No 1 e 2 devem ser afirmativas)	
01 É portador do cartão de desmobilização da ONUMOZ?	<input type="checkbox"/> - Não <input type="checkbox"/> Sim		
02 É hoje considerado como um civil? (Não membro de qualquer força policial ou de segurança)	<input type="checkbox"/> - Não <input type="checkbox"/> Sim		
03 É portador de alguma deficiência física como resultado do conflito armado?	<input type="checkbox"/> - Não <input type="checkbox"/> Sim		
04 Número do cartão de desmobilização da ONUMOZ	<input type="checkbox"/> - NS/NC	Cartão #	<input type="text"/>
B - Factores sociais, económicos e de comportamento associados à reintegração			
B-1 Reintegração social		(Todos entrevistados)	
05 Quem na sua opinião foi mais beneficiado pela paz em Mocamb?	1 <input type="checkbox"/> - Moçambicanos 2 <input type="checkbox"/> - RENAMO 3 <input type="checkbox"/> - FRELIMO	4 <input type="checkbox"/> - Desmobilizados 5 <input type="checkbox"/> - Civis 6 <input type="checkbox"/> - Comun. internac.	7 <input type="checkbox"/> - Outros 8 <input type="checkbox"/> - Nenhum 9 <input type="checkbox"/> - NS/NC
(Marque até 2 respostas - Enumere)			
06 Como preve o futuro do Mocambique	<input type="checkbox"/> (0-NR 1-Guerra 2-Conflito 3-Instabilidade 4-Paz)		
07 A sua situação pessoal melhorou com a paz?	<input type="checkbox"/> (0-NR 1-Não 2-Pouco 3-Sufic. 4-Muito 5-Bastante)		
08 A situação da sua família melhorou com a paz?	<input type="checkbox"/> (0-NR 1-Não 2-Pouco 3-Sufic. 4-Muito 5-Bastante)		
09 Como pensa que será a sua situação no próximo ano?	<input type="checkbox"/> (0-NR 1-Pessima 2-Pior 3-Igual 4-Melhor 5-Bastante)		
10 Possui uma casa?	<input type="checkbox"/> (0-NR 1-Não 2-Centro 3-Empres 4-Aluga 5-Fam 6-Prop)		
11 Melhorou a sua casa nos últimos dois anos?	<input type="checkbox"/> (0-NR 1-Não 2-Pouco 3-Sufic 4-Muito 5-Bastante)		
12 Pensa melhorar a sua casa no próximo ano?	<input type="checkbox"/> (0-NR 1-Não 2-Pouco 3-Sufic 4-Muito 5-Bastante)		
13 Pensa permanecer no local da sua residência actual?	<input type="checkbox"/> (0-NR 1-Não 2-Difícil 3-Talvez 4-Sim)		
B-2 Reintegração económica		(Todos entrevistados)	
14 Consegue mais rendimento agora do que na vida militar?	<input type="checkbox"/> (0-NR 1-M. menos 2-Menos 3-Igual 4-Maior 5-Bastante)		
15 Como compara o rendimento da sua família com a dos vizinhos?	<input type="checkbox"/> (0-NR 1-M. menos 2-Menos 3-Igual 4-Maior 5-Bastante)		
16 Como se compara com outras famílias de SD?	<input type="checkbox"/> (0-NR 1-Pessima 2-Pior 3-Igual 4-Melhor 5-M. melhor)		
17 Como espera que sua família se encontre econ. no prox. ano?	<input type="checkbox"/> (0-NR 1-Pessima 2-Pior 3-Igual 4-Melhor 5-Muito melhor)		
18 Tem mais pessoas da família a ganhar agora do que a 2 anos?	<input type="checkbox"/> (0-NR 1-M. menos 2-Menos 3-Igual 4-Mais 5-M. mais)		
19 Qual é a sua fonte de rendimento?	1 <input type="checkbox"/> - Agricultura/pec. 2 <input type="checkbox"/> - Emprego formal	3 <input type="checkbox"/> - Sector informal 4 <input type="checkbox"/> - Pensões/apoios	5 <input type="checkbox"/> - Outros 6 <input type="checkbox"/> - NS/NR
(Marque até 2 respostas - Enumere)			
20 Espera continuar a fazer o mesmo no futuro?	<input type="checkbox"/> - Não <input type="checkbox"/> - Sim <input type="checkbox"/> - NS/NC		
B-3 Percepção de si mesmo		(Todos entrevistados)	
21 Como compara a sua situação em relação a dos seus vizinhos?	<input type="checkbox"/> (0-NR 1-Pessima 2-Pior 3-Igual 4-Melhor 5-M. melhor)		
22 Como compara a sua situação agora em relação a 2 anos atrás?	<input type="checkbox"/> (0-NR 1-Pessima 2-Pior 3-Igual 4-Melhor 5-M. melhor)		
23 Como compara a sua situação com a de outros SD?	<input type="checkbox"/> (0-NR 1-Pessima 2-Pior 3-Igual 4-Melhor 5-M. melhor)		
24 Considera-se reintegrado, em termos gerais?	<input type="checkbox"/> (0-NR 1-Não 2-Pouco 3-Suficiente 4-Muito 5-Bastante)		
25 Considera-se mais seguro agora do que a dois anos atrás?	<input type="checkbox"/> (0-NR 1-M. menos 2-Menos 3-Igual 4-Mais 5-M. mais)		
26 Como pensa que os vizinhos o vêem?	<input type="checkbox"/> (0-NR 1-Militar 2-Desmobilizado 3-Civil 4-Outros)		
27 Como gostaria que os vizinhos o vissem?	<input type="checkbox"/> (0-NR 1-Militar 2-Desmobilizado 3-Civil 4-Outros)		

C - Programa de desmobilização e reintegração		
C-1 Acesso aos benefícios em geral (Todos entrevistados)		
26 Recebeu os subsídios do EAR?	<input type="checkbox"/> - Não	<input type="checkbox"/> - Sim <input type="checkbox"/> - NS/NC
29 Teve acesso ao financiamento de projectos da OIM?	<input type="checkbox"/> - Não	<input type="checkbox"/> - Sim <input type="checkbox"/> - NS/NC
30 Teve acesso a outros financiamentos de projectos?	<input type="checkbox"/> - Não	<input type="checkbox"/> - Sim <input type="checkbox"/> - NS/NC
31 Visitou algum escritório dos SIR/OIM à procura de informação?	<input type="checkbox"/> - Não	<input type="checkbox"/> - Sim <input type="checkbox"/> - NS/NC
32 Recebeu formação vocacional/profissional?	<input type="checkbox"/> - Não	<input type="checkbox"/> - Sim <input type="checkbox"/> - NS/NC
33 Alguma vez recebeu ferramentas (kits) para auto-emprego?	<input type="checkbox"/> - Não	<input type="checkbox"/> - Sim <input type="checkbox"/> - NS/NC
34 Recebeu a visita de algum represent. da OIM na sua localidade?	<input type="checkbox"/> - Não	<input type="checkbox"/> - Sim <input type="checkbox"/> - NS/NC
35 Recebe pensão de reforma ou de invalidez?	<input type="checkbox"/> - Não	<input type="checkbox"/> - Sim <input type="checkbox"/> - NS/NC
C-2 Fundo provincial (Só para os que respondem "Sim" à pergunta 29)		
36 O seu projecto foi concebido / elaborado por si?	1 <input type="checkbox"/> - Sim 2 <input type="checkbox"/> - OIM 3 <input type="checkbox"/> - Outro 4 <input type="checkbox"/> - NS/NC	
37 Que tipo de assistência recebeu da OIM para a concepção?	<input type="checkbox"/> (0-NR 1-Nada 2-Pouca 3-Algo 4-Muito 5-Bastante)	
38 Tempo entre a visita ao escritório e assistência recebida	<input type="text"/> (Número de meses - "1" si for menos de um mês)	
39 Tipo de projecto financiado	<div style="display: flex; justify-content: space-between;"> <div> 1 <input type="checkbox"/> - Geração de rendimento 2 <input type="checkbox"/> - Mão de obra intensiva 3 <input type="checkbox"/> - Desenvolvimento comunit. 4 <input type="checkbox"/> - Apoio ao reassentamento 5 <input type="checkbox"/> - Apoio institucional 11 <input type="checkbox"/> - NS/NC (Marque apenas 1 - Explore) </div> <div> 6 <input type="checkbox"/> - Prestação de serviços 7 <input type="checkbox"/> - Formação 8 <input type="checkbox"/> - Micro-empresa 9 <input type="checkbox"/> - Emprego permanente 10 <input type="checkbox"/> - Formação em trabalho </div> </div>	
40 Sub-tipo de actividade do projecto	<div style="display: flex; justify-content: space-between;"> <div> 1 <input type="checkbox"/> - Indústria e artesanat 2 <input type="checkbox"/> - Trabalhos e construção 3 <input type="checkbox"/> - Agricultura e pecuária 4 <input type="checkbox"/> - Florestas e ambiente (Marque apenas 1 - Explore) </div> <div> 5 <input type="checkbox"/> - Pesca 6 <input type="checkbox"/> - Comércio e serviços 7 <input type="checkbox"/> - Obras públicas 8 <input type="checkbox"/> - NS/NC </div> </div>	
41 Como classificaria o sucesso do seu projecto?	<input type="checkbox"/> (0-NR 1-Pessimo 2-Mau 3-Satisf 4-Bom 5-Muito bom)	
42 Quais sao os maiores problemas ou limitacoes do seu projecto?	<div style="display: flex; justify-content: space-between;"> <div> 1 <input type="checkbox"/> - Probl. entre os participantes DS 2 <input type="checkbox"/> - Montantes concedidos 3 <input type="checkbox"/> - Mercado (precos, materias, etc.) 4 <input type="checkbox"/> - Atrasos na implementação 5 <input type="checkbox"/> - Atrasos no financiamento 11 <input type="checkbox"/> - Outros 12 <input type="checkbox"/> - NS/NC (Marque até 3 respostas - Enumere) </div> <div> 6 <input type="checkbox"/> - Falta de experiências anter. 7 <input type="checkbox"/> - Falta de assistência técnica 8 <input type="checkbox"/> - Probl. com empregador/impl. 9 <input type="checkbox"/> - Localização errada 10 <input type="checkbox"/> - Concepção inapropriada </div> </div>	
43 Como classificaria o sucesso de vizinhos neste tipo de projecto?	<input type="checkbox"/> (0-NR 1-Pessimo 2-Mau 3-Satisf 4-Bom 5-M. bom)	
44 Quais consideraria serem as melhor potencialidades do seu projecto?	<div style="display: flex; justify-content: space-between;"> <div> 1 <input type="checkbox"/> - Apoio dos sócios 2 <input type="checkbox"/> - Montantes concedidos 3 <input type="checkbox"/> - Condições do mercado 4 <input type="checkbox"/> - Implementação rápida 5 <input type="checkbox"/> - Financiamento rápido 11 <input type="checkbox"/> - Outros 12 <input type="checkbox"/> - NS/NC (Marque até 3 respostas - Enumere) </div> <div> 6 <input type="checkbox"/> - Experiência anterior 7 <input type="checkbox"/> - Forte assistência técnica 8 <input type="checkbox"/> - Bom empregador/implement. 9 <input type="checkbox"/> - Boa localização 10 <input type="checkbox"/> - Concepção adequada </div> </div>	
45 Qual e a importância deste proj. na sua reintegração?	<input type="checkbox"/> (0-NR 1-Nenhuma 2-Pouca 3-Alguma 4-Muitas 5-Bastant)	
46 Trocaria o seu projecto por emprego perm.? (com o mesmo dinheiro)	<input type="checkbox"/> - Não	<input type="checkbox"/> - Sim <input type="checkbox"/> - NS/NC
C-3 Serviço de informação e referencia (Só para os que respondem "Sim" à pergunta 31)		
47 Quantas vezes visitou o SIR à procura de informações?	<input type="text"/> (Número de visitas)	
48 Quantos assuntos foi resolver as escritorio do SIR?	1 <input type="checkbox"/> - Um 2 <input type="checkbox"/> - Var 3 <input type="checkbox"/> - NS/NC	

49 Que escritórios visitou?		1 <input type="checkbox"/> - MAP	4 <input type="checkbox"/> - MAN	7 <input type="checkbox"/> - ZAM	10 <input type="checkbox"/> - CABO DEL
		2 <input type="checkbox"/> - GAZ	5 <input type="checkbox"/> - SOF	8 <input type="checkbox"/> - NAM	11 <input type="checkbox"/> - Nenhum
(Marque todas as respostas que apliquem)		3 <input type="checkbox"/> - INH	6 <input type="checkbox"/> - TET	9 <input type="checkbox"/> - NIA	12 <input type="checkbox"/> - NS/NC
50 Que tipo de informação procurava?		1 <input type="checkbox"/> - Cartão de desm.	4 <input type="checkbox"/> - Informac. gerais	7 <input type="checkbox"/> - Emprego	
		2 <input type="checkbox"/> - Pagamento EAR	5 <input type="checkbox"/> - Encaminhamento	8 <input type="checkbox"/> - Assist. pensões	
(Marque todas as respostas que apliquem)		3 <input type="checkbox"/> - Registro (16,000)	6 <input type="checkbox"/> - Inform. sobre proj.	9 <input type="checkbox"/> - NS/NC	
51 Ficou satisfeito com o resultado de suas visitas ao SIR?		<input type="checkbox"/> (0-NR 1-Nao 2-Pouco 3-Sufic 4-Muito 5-Bastante)			
52 Ficou satisfeito com o tempo que o SIR levou a responder?		<input type="checkbox"/> (0-NR 1-Nao 2-Pouco 3-Razoav 4-Muito 5-Bastante)			
53 Quando visitou os escritórios da OIM?		1 <input type="checkbox"/> - T2 '94	4 <input type="checkbox"/> - T1 '95	7 <input type="checkbox"/> - T4 '95	10 <input type="checkbox"/> - T3 '96
		2 <input type="checkbox"/> - T3 '94	5 <input type="checkbox"/> - T2 '95	8 <input type="checkbox"/> - T1 '96	11 <input type="checkbox"/> - T4 '96
(Marque todas as respostas que apliquem)		3 <input type="checkbox"/> - T4 '94	6 <input type="checkbox"/> - T3 '95	9 <input type="checkbox"/> - T2 '96	12 <input type="checkbox"/> - NS/NC
54 Qual foi a importância do SIR para a sua reintegração?		<input type="checkbox"/> (0-NR 1-Nenhuma 2-Pouca 3-Alguma 4-Muita 5-Bastante)			
C-4 Impressões gerais sobre os programas de reintegração		(Todos entrevistados)			
55 Qual foi a assistência mais útil para a sua reintegração?		1 <input type="checkbox"/> - Transporte	4 <input type="checkbox"/> - Infor/referencia	7 <input type="checkbox"/> - Credito	
		2 <input type="checkbox"/> - EAR / pensões	5 <input type="checkbox"/> - Micro-projectos	8 <input type="checkbox"/> - Outros	
(Marque até 3 respostas - Enumere)		3 <input type="checkbox"/> - Formação/educa.	6 <input type="checkbox"/> - Emprego	9 <input type="checkbox"/> - NS/NC	
56 Acha que os programas ajudaram a sua reintegração?		<input type="checkbox"/> (0-NR 1-Nao 2-Pouco 3-Sufic 4-Muito 5-Bastante)			
57 O que recomendaria a outros SD para facilitar a sua reintegração?		(Marque até 3 respostas - Enumere)			
1 <input type="checkbox"/> - Envolverse em proj.		4 <input type="checkbox"/> - Procurar trabalho	7 <input type="checkbox"/> - Parar com reclam.	10 <input type="checkbox"/> - Outros	
2 <input type="checkbox"/> - Reclamar direitos		5 <input type="checkbox"/> - Iniciar negocio	8 <input type="checkbox"/> - Integrarse na comun.	11 <input type="checkbox"/> - Nenhum/nada	
3 <input type="checkbox"/> - Solicitar apoio		6 <input type="checkbox"/> - Perm. com a familia	9 <input type="checkbox"/> - Conseguir pensão	12 <input type="checkbox"/> - NS/NC	
58 Qual e a sua opinião sobre o apoio concedido aos SD em geral?		<input type="checkbox"/> (0-NR 1-Pessim 2-Mau 3-Satisf 4-Bom 5-Muito bom)			
59 Teria dificuldades de reintegrar-se sem os programas de reint.?		<input type="checkbox"/> (0-NR 1-Nao 2-Poucas 3-Algumas 4-Muitas 5-Bastante)			
D - Dados gerais sobre o entrevistado					
60 Idade	<input type="text"/> (anos)	61 Sexo	<input type="checkbox"/> (0-NR 1-Homem 2-Mulher)	62 Grupo	<input type="checkbox"/> (0-NR 1-FRE 2-REN)
63 Estado civil	<input type="checkbox"/> (0-NR 1-Solteiro 2-Casado 3-Divorciado 4-Outro)	64 Numero de crianças	<input type="text"/>		
65 No de membros do agregado familiar	<input type="text"/>	66 No de membros do A. F. trabalhando	<input type="text"/>		
67 Província onde vivia antes da vida militar		1 <input type="checkbox"/> - MAP	4 <input type="checkbox"/> - MAN	7 <input type="checkbox"/> - ZAM	10 <input type="checkbox"/> - CABO DEL
		2 <input type="checkbox"/> - GAZ	5 <input type="checkbox"/> - SOF	8 <input type="checkbox"/> - NAM	11 <input type="checkbox"/> - Estrangeiro
(Marque apenas 1 - Explore)		3 <input type="checkbox"/> - INH	6 <input type="checkbox"/> - TET	9 <input type="checkbox"/> - NIA	12 <input type="checkbox"/> - NS/NC
E - Informações internas					
68 Data da entrevista		<input type="text"/> - <input type="text"/> - <input type="text"/> (Dia - Mês - Ano)			
69 Entrevista conduzida em:		1 <input type="checkbox"/> - MAP	4 <input type="checkbox"/> - MAN	7 <input type="checkbox"/> - ZAM	10 <input type="checkbox"/> - CABO DEL
		2 <input type="checkbox"/> - GAZ	5 <input type="checkbox"/> - SOF	8 <input type="checkbox"/> - NAM	
(Marque apenas 1 - Explore)		3 <input type="checkbox"/> - INH	6 <input type="checkbox"/> - TET	9 <input type="checkbox"/> - NIA	12 <input type="checkbox"/> - NS/NC
70 Método de identificação usado		1 <input type="checkbox"/> - Casual	2 <input type="checkbox"/> - Reunião	3 <input type="checkbox"/> - Organizada	4 <input type="checkbox"/> - Associação
71 Entrevistador		<input type="text"/>			
72 Data de registo		<input type="text"/> REFERENCIA <input type="text"/>			

G. Raw statistical data

1. General population

(Source: Food security survey - MSF/CIS - April/August 1996)

Persons per household

National media=5.6

National media for male household leaders=5.8

National media for female household leaders=4.9

Distribution

1-3=22.5%

4-6=45.9%

7-9=22.8%

10+=8.8%

Age distribution by gender

Age	Male	Female	Total
<4	6.8	7.3	14.1
5-9	7.7	7.8	15.5
10-14	7.9	7.4	15.2
15-19	5.8	6.4	12.1
20-24	3.3	4.6	7.9
25-29	2.7	4.0	6.7
30-34	2.4	3.1	5.4
35-39	2.0	3.1	5.0
40-44	1.9	2.3	4.2
45-49	1.8	1.7	3.5
50-54	1.4	1.3	2.7
55-59	1.1	1.0	2.1
60-64	1.0	0.8	1.7
65-69	0.7	0.6	1.3
>70	0.9	0.8	1.7
N/A	0.3	0.5	0.7
Total	47.5	52.5	100.0

Residence time

35.7% three years or less

64.1% more than three years

Displacement reasons

War = 82.3%

Drought = 2.1%

Service=5.5%

Others=10.2%


2. Baseline Information from Technical Unit database

Age distribution

AGE Age distribution

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
5-9	2	0	.0	.0	.0
10-14	3	90	.1	.1	.1
15-19	4	2581	3.1	3.1	3.2
20-24	5	17426	20.6	20.8	24.0
25-29	6	24503	29.0	29.3	53.4
30-34	7	11960	15.9	26.2	73.5
35-39	8	1117	1.1	11.3	80.9
40-44	9	1538	1.4	1.5	94.7
45-49	10	1505	1.8	1.8	98.1
50-54	11	990	1.2	1.2	99.2
55-59	12	328	.4	.4	99.6
60-64	13	169	.2	.2	99.8
65-69	14	62	.1	.1	99.9
70+	15	12	.1	.1	100.0
		976	1.2	Missing	
Total		84559	100.0	100.0	

Valid cases 83583 Missing cases 976





Gender distribution in demobilized population

GENDER

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
Male	1	83268	98.5	98.5	98.5
Female	2	1290	1.5	1.5	100.0
	0	1	.0	Missing	
Total		84559	100.0	100.0	


Valid cases 84558 Missing cases 1



DS marital status at demobilization

MARITAL by GENDER

		Count			
	Row Pct	Male	Female		Row
	Col Pct				Total
		1	2		
MARITAL					
	2	45177	242		45419
Married		99.5	.5		53.7
		54.3	18.8		
	3	4769	15		4784
Other		99.7	.3		5.7
		5.7	1.2		
	4	1443	40		1483
No info		97.3	2.7		1.8
		1.7	3.1		
	5	31878	993		32871
Single		97.0	3.0		38.9
		38.3	77.0		
	Column	83267	1290		84557
	Total	98.5	1.5		100.0



Number of Missing Observations: 2

Family composition

CHILDREN

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
-------------	-------	-----------	---------	---------------	-------------

0	56465	66.8	66.8	66.8
1	11123	13.2	13.2	79.9
2	7810	9.2	9.2	89.2
3	4264	5.0	5.0	94.2
4	2309	2.7	2.7	96.9
5	1253	1.5	1.5	98.4
6	676	.8	.8	99.2
7	372	.4	.4	99.7
8	191	.2	.2	99.9
9	95	.1	.1	100.0
10	1	.0	.0	100.0



Total 84559 100.0 100.0

Valid cases 84559 Missing cases 0

WIVES

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
0	52220	61.8	61.8	61.8	61.8
1	29756	35.2	35.2	96.9	96.9
2	2348	2.8	2.8	99.7	99.7
3	198	.2	.2	100.0	100.0
4	34	.0	.0	100.0	100.0
5	3	.0	.0	100.0	100.0
Total	84559	100.0	100.0		

Valid cases 84559 Missing cases 0




Ranks for the demobilized

RANK

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
Soldier	1	44057	52.1	52.1	52.1
3rd Sargent	2	2682	3.2	3.2	55.3
2nd Sargent	3	7878	9.3	9.3	64.6
1st Sargent	4	9699	11.5	11.5	76.1
Candidate	5	782	.9	.9	77.0
Cadet	6	11454	13.5	13.5	90.5
Lieutenant	7	2709	3.2	3.2	93.7
Commander	8	161	.2	.2	93.9
Captain	9	3845	4.5	4.5	98.5
Comp. Commander	10	68	.1	.1	98.6
Major	11	956	1.1	1.1	99.7
Lt. Colonel	12	158	.2	.2	99.9
Colonel	13	67	.1	.1	100.0
Brigadier	14	12	.0	.0	100.0
Major General	15	20	.0	.0	100.0
Lt. General	16	7	.0	.0	100.0

		4	.0	Missing
Total	84559	100.0	100.0	
Valid cases	84555			
Missing cases		4		




Demobilized occupations before conflict

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
Student	1	35819	42.4	42.4	42.4
Farmer	2	14924	17.6	17.6	60.0
Mechanic	3	2126	2.5	2.5	62.5
Fishing	4	1253	1.5	1.5	64.0
Agriculture	5	3005	3.6	3.6	67.6
Carpenter	6	896	1.1	1.1	68.6
Driver	7	539	.6	.6	69.3
Trader	8	1142	1.4	1.4	70.6
Ironworks	9	21	.0	.0	70.6
Tractorist	10	486	.6	.6	71.2
Potter	11	816	1.0	1.0	72.2
Electrician	12	364	.4	.4	72.6
Maid	13	98	.1	.1	72.7
Mason	14	506	.6	.6	73.3
Operator	15	1025	1.2	1.2	74.5
Clerical	16	406	.5	.5	75.0
Baker	17	72	.1	.1	75.1
Shoemaker	18	61	.1	.1	75.2
Teacher	19	1	.0	.0	75.2
Painter	20	156	.2	.2	75.4
Artisan	21	3	.0	.0	75.4
Professor	22	477	.6	.6	75.9
Doctor	23	11	.0	.0	75.9
Machinist	24	50	.1	.1	76.0
Nurse	25	196	.2	.2	76.2
Builder	26	22	.0	.0	76.2

Telecomm	27	49	.1	.1	76.3
Accountant	28	138	.2	.2	76.5
Aircraft crew	29	2	.0	.0	76.5
Computers	30	3	.0	.0	76.5
Programmer	31	1	.0	.0	76.5
Lumberjack	32	391	.5	.5	76.9
Designer	33	2	.0	.0	76.9
Metalworks	34	16	.0	.0	77.0
Photography	35	8	.0	.0	77.0
Electricity	36	15	.0	.0	77.0
Machinery	37	102	.1	.1	77.1
Military	38	449	.5	.5	77.6
Social	39	3	.0	.0	77.6
Miner	40	665	.8	.8	78.4
Husbandry	41	55	.1	.1	78.5
Other	66	6914	8.2	8.2	86.7
Unemployed	88	7685	9.1	9.1	95.8
None	89	3	.0	.0	95.8
NA	99	3582	4.2	4.2	100.0
		1	.0	Missing	
Total		84559	100.0	100.0	

Valid cases 84558 Missing cases 1



Level of literacy


Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
		1	.0	.0	.0
	01	24944	29.5	29.5	29.5
	02	22122	26.2	26.2	55.7
	03	20371	24.1	24.1	79.8
	04	2137	2.5	2.5	82.3
	05	258	.3	.3	82.6
	66	189	.2	.2	82.8
	99	14537	17.2	17.2	100.0
Total		84559	100.0	100.0	

Valid cases 84559 Missing cases 0



Service period (years)

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
	1	153	.2	.2	.2
	2	3198	3.8	3.8	4.0
	3	2990	3.5	3.6	7.5
	4	4382	5.2	5.2	12.7
	5	6821	8.1	8.1	20.8
	6	7095	8.4	8.4	29.3
	7	5987	7.1	7.1	36.4
	8	7447	8.8	8.8	45.2
	9	7852	9.3	9.3	54.6
	10	8411	9.9	10.0	64.6
	11	7394	8.7	8.8	73.3
	12	5598	6.6	6.7	80.0
	13	4372	5.2	5.2	85.2
	14	3615	4.3	4.3	89.5
	15	2261	2.7	2.7	92.2
	16	1565	1.9	1.9	94.0
	17	837	1.0	1.0	95.0
	18	312	.4	.4	95.4
	19	967	1.1	1.1	96.5
	20	867	1.0	1.0	97.6
	21	583	.7	.7	98.3
	22	333	.4	.4	98.7
	23	213	.3	.3	98.9
	24	162	.2	.2	99.1
	25	97	.1	.1	99.2
	26	85	.1	.1	99.3
	27	82	.1	.1	99.4
	28	92	.1	.1	99.5
	29	237	.3	.3	99.8
	30	124	.1	.1	100.0
	31	30	.0	.0	100.0
	32	6	.0	.0	100.0
	33	2	.0	.0	100.0
	34	1	.0	.0	100.0
	39	1	.0	.0	100.0
Total		84559	100.0	100.0	

Valid cases 84172 Missing cases 387



Incidence of disabled personnel



3. Information and Referral Service

**** ALL ANALYSES IN THIS SECTION ARE BASED ON A SAMPLE DS POPULATION OF 34,000 BENEFICIARIES REGISTERED ON THE IRS DATABASE. THESE BENEFICIARIES ACCOUNT FOR ABOUT 47,500 IRS CONTACTS. THE ACTUAL TOTAL OF CONTACTS IS ESTIMATED TO BE APPROXIMATELY 110,000 ACCORDING TO REPORTS FROM IRS FIELD STAFF ****


VISITS Number of Visits per beneficiary

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
	1	24858	73.1	73.1	73.1
	2	6359	18.7	18.7	91.8
	3	1831	5.4	5.4	97.2
	4	611	1.8	1.8	99.0
	5	190	.6	.6	99.6
	6	77	.2	.2	99.8
	7	43	.1	.1	99.9
	8	18	.1	.1	100.0
	9	7	.0	.0	100.0
	10	4	.0	.0	100.0
	11	2	.0	.0	100.0
Total		34000	100.0	100.0	



Valid cases 34000 Missing cases 0

Summary of beneficiaries, visits and average visits per beneficiary by project phase

Project phase	Benef.	Total visits	Average VPB
Missing	50	91	2
04/94-11/94	11407	12759	1
12/94-02/95	4495	5302	1
03/95-6/96	16906	26720	2
07/96-01/97	1142	2623	2
Project Total	34000	47495	1



IRS workload during project life



DEM_ID Problems with demobilization cards

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
Mistake	1	182	.5	9.1	9.1
Lost	2	1515	4.5	76.0	85.1
Replace	3	296	.9	14.9	100.0
.	.	32007	94.1	Missing	
Total		34000	100.0	100.0	

Valid cases 1993 Missing cases 32007

GOV_PAYM Cases with problems in government subsidies

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
Problem	1	1719	5.1	100.0	100.0
.	.	32281	94.9	Missing	
Total		34000	100.0	100.0	

Valid cases 1719 Missing cases 32281

FOOD Cases with problems in food reception

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
Problem	1	1058	3.1	100.0	100.0
.	.	32942	96.9	Missing	
Total		34000	100.0	100.0	

Valid cases 1058 Missing cases 32942

RSS Problems with RSS

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
Errors	1	479	1.4	25.5	25.5
Change of address	2	792	2.3	42.2	67.6
Death	3	19	.1	1.0	68.7
Lost	4	557	1.6	29.6	98.3
Auth. relative	5	32	.1	1.7	100.0
.	.	32121	94.5	Missing	
Total		34000	100.0	100.0	


Valid cases 1879 Missing cases 32121

MOVING Reasons for moving



Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
Opportunities in cit	1	84	.2	60.9	60.9
Couldn't find family	2	44	.1	31.9	92.8
Didn't have a macham	3	1	.0	.7	93.5
Didn't like rural li	4	9	.0	6.5	100.0
.	.	33862	99.6	Missing	
Total		34000	100.0	100.0	

Valid cases 138 Missing cases 33862

Relationship between IRS/PF specific activities and support to other programs by phases



Variation of caseload for support activities during project life




Attitude of DS at IRS/PF offices


Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
Very hostile	1	29	.1	.1	.1
Agressive	2	96	.3	.4	.6
Reserved	3	3999	11.8	18.5	19.0
Satisfied	4	17543	51.6	81.0	100.0
.	.	12333	36.3	Missing	
Total		34000	100.0	100.0	

Valid cases 21667 Missing cases 12333

Bottom 50% representation of the IRS beneficiaries attitudes



Change in caseload for provinces with and without PF activities



4. Provincial Fund

PF activities distribution by provinces

LOCATION Project location

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
CAB	1	222	5.0	5.0	5.0
GAZ	2	406	9.2	9.2	14.2
INH	3	370	8.4	8.4	22.6
MAN	4	286	6.5	6.5	29.1
MAP	5	530	12.0	12.0	41.1
NAM	6	433	9.8	9.8	50.9
NIA	7	173	3.9	3.9	54.8
SCF	8	481	10.9	10.9	65.7
TET	9	257	5.8	5.8	71.6
ZAM	10	1255	28.4	28.4	100.0
		1	.0	Missing	
Total		4415	100.0	100.0	


Valid cases 4414 Missing cases 1

Province distribution by project status


LOCATION Project location by STATUS Project status

LOCATION	Count Row Pct Col Pct	Finalize Canceled		Row Total
		1	2	
CAB	1	206	16	222
		92.8	7.2	
		5.3	3.2	
GAZ	2	391	15	406
		96.3	3.7	
		10.0	3.0	
INH	3	361	9	370
		97.6	2.4	
		9.2	1.8	
MAN	4	277	9	286
		96.9	3.1	
		7.1	1.8	
MAP	5	484	46	530
		91.7	8.3	
		11.6	15.2	
NAM	6	383	50	433
		88.5	11.5	
		9.8	10.0	
NIA	7	154	19	173
		89.0	11.0	
		3.9	3.8	
SCF	8	413	68	481
		85.9	14.1	
		10.6	13.6	
TET	9	241	16	257
		93.8	6.2	
		6.2	3.2	
ZAM	10	1033	222	1255
		92.3	17.7	
		26.4	44.4	
Column		3913	500	4413
Total		88.7	11.3	100.0

Status of PF projects



Number of beneficiaries



Number of Missing Observations: 2


PF project beneficiaries

Project location	Projected total beneficiaries Sum	Projected demobilized beneficiaries Sum	Actual total beneficiaries Sum	Actual demobilized beneficiaries Sum	Difference in Totals
Missing	10	10	10	10	0
CAB	2652	2520	2609	2407	-43
GAZ	2232	1932	2232	1935	0
INH	875	724	866	645	-9
MAN	610	580	551	523	-59
MAP	2984	2548	2612	2328	-272
NAM	8332	7198	8295	7043	-37
NIA	2703	2660	2278	2237	-425
SOF	994	950	986	942	-8
TET	504	451	501	449	-3
ZAM	5383	4350	5235	4289	-148
Grand Total	27179	23923	26175	22808	-1004

PF Project costs

Project location	Projected financing Sum	Actual financing Sum	Difference in cost
Missing	2883	2883	0
CAB	438334	418247	20087
GAZ	495207	460677	34530
INH	147445	145237	2208
MAN	157265	146243	11022
MAP	799653	675274	124379
NAM	1207551	1019216	188335
NIA	484427	382956	101471
SOF	225204	212084	13120
TET	79055	76348	2707
ZAM	961206	857823	103383
Grand Total	4998230	4396988	601242

All amounts in US dollars




Median cost per beneficiary by number of beneficiaries

- - Description of Subpopulations - -

Summaries of COST Cost per beneficiarie
By levels of ACTOTAL2 Actual beneficiaries ranked

Variable	Value	Label	Median	
Cases				
For Entire Population			190.4929	4123
ACTOTAL2	1	0-5	191.2932	3166
ACTOTAL2	2	5-10	201.7796	482
ACTOTAL2	3	10-15	224.8517	117
ACTOTAL2	4	20-25	175.4713	134
ACTOTAL2	5	25-30	189.6004	47
ACTOTAL2	6	30-35	135.8956	59
ACTOTAL2	7	35-40	137.1573	14
ACTOTAL2	8	40-45	139.3442	18
ACTOTAL2	9	> 45	131.7705	86

Total Cases = 4415
Missing Cases = 192 or 6.6 Pct





PF projects duration

PERIOD Project duration in months

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
	0	13	.3	.3	.3
	1	903	20.5	20.5	20.8
	2	587	13.3	13.3	34.1
	3	2297	52.0	52.1	86.1
	4	69	1.6	1.6	87.7
	5	104	2.4	2.4	90.0
	6	354	8.0	8.0	98.1
	7	2	.0	.0	98.1
	8	25	.6	.6	98.7
	9	32	.7	.7	99.4
	10	5	.1	.1	99.5
	11	1	.0	.0	99.5
	12	20	.5	.5	100.0
	15	1	.0	.0	100.0
	.	2	.0	Missing	
Total		4415	100.0	100.0	

Valid cases 4413 Missing cases 2

Variation of average number of beneficiaries as function of project length and cost.



Number of PF projects by phase

PHASE	Project phase					
Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent	
12/94-02/95	2	49	1.1	1.1	1.1	
3/95-6/96	3	3748	84.9	85.1	86.2	
7/96-2/97	4	608	13.8	13.8	100.0	
	.	10	.2	Missing		
	Total	4415	100.0	100.0		

Valid cases 4405 Missing cases 10

Level of effort by project phase

Project phase	Number of projects	Number of beneficiaries	Amount spent	Cost per beneficiary	Average duration (months)	Percentage of cancelled
Missing	10	53	10858	213.77	3	30.0%
12/94-02/95	49	1340	215216	188.59	5	20.4%
3/95-6/96	3748	23037	3840603	186.67	3	12.3%
7/96-2/97	608	1745	330311	216.02	3	4.3%
Grand Total	4415	26175	4396988	190.49	3	11.3%

Provincial activities by project phase

LOCATION Project location by PHASE Project phase

LOCATION	Count	PHASE			Row Total
		12/94-02/95	3/95-6/96	7/96-2/97	
	Row Pct	Col Pct	Col Pct	Col Pct	
CAB	1	4	216	1	221
		1.8	97.7	.5	5.0
		8.2	5.8	.2	
GAZ	2	9	392	5	406
		2.2	96.6	1.2	9.2
		18.4	10.5	.8	
INH	3	1	369		370
		.3	99.7		8.4
		2.0	9.8		
MAN	4	1	118	167	286
		.3	41.3	58.4	6.5
		2.0	3.1	27.5	
MAP	5	24	430	74	528
		4.5	81.4	14.0	12.0
		49.0	11.5	12.2	
NAM	6	6	310	117	433
		1.4	71.6	27.0	9.8
		12.2	8.3	19.2	
NIA	7	2	154	15	171
		1.2	90.1	8.8	3.9
		4.1	4.1	2.5	

SOF	8		275	206	481
			57.2	42.8	10.9
			7.3	33.9	
TET	9		251	5	256
			98.0	2.0	5.8
			6.7	.8	
ZAM	10	2	1232	18	1252
		.2	98.4	1.4	28.4
		4.1	32.9	3.0	
Column		49	3747	608	4404
Total		1.1	85.1	13.8	100.0

Number of Missing Observations: 11

Categories of PF projects

CATEGORY Project category

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
Income generating ac	1	3436	77.8	77.9	77.9
Service contracts	2	119	2.7	2.7	80.6
Training	3	73	1.7	1.7	82.2
Institutional streng	4	4	.1	.1	82.3
Labor intensive acti	5	110	2.5	2.5	84.8
Microenterprise	6	415	9.4	9.4	94.2
Community developmen	7	53	1.2	1.2	95.4
Permanent employment	8	133	3.0	3.0	98.4
Returnees support	9	31	.7	.7	99.1
On the job training	10	39	.9	.9	100.0
.	.	2	.0	Missing	
Total		4415	100.0	100.0	

Valid cases 4413 Missing cases 2



Sectors for PF projects

TYPE Project sector

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
Agriculture	1	1267	28.7	28.7	28.7
Industry and crafts	2	784	17.8	17.8	46.5
Construction	3	193	4.4	4.4	50.9
Forestry and environ	4	18	.4	.4	51.3
Fishing	5	222	5.0	5.0	56.3
Trade and services	6	1773	40.2	40.2	96.5
Public works	7	155	3.5	3.5	100.0
.	.	3	.1	Missing	
Total		4415	100.0	100.0	

Valid cases 4412 Missing cases 3

Number of beneficiaries by sectors



Type of projects by locations

LOCATION Project location by TYPE Project sector

LOCATION	Count Row Pct Col Pct	TYPE							Row Total
		Agriculture	Industry and crafts	Construct	Forestry and env	Fishing	Trade and service	Public wrks	
		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
CAB	1	160	18	19	4	7	7	7	222
		72.1	8.1	8.6	1.8	3.2	3.2	3.2	5.0
		12.6	2.3	9.9	22.2	3.2	4	4.5	
GAZ	2	179	91	12	1	13	107	3	406
		44.1	22.4	3.0	.2	3.2	26.4	.7	9.2
		14.1	11.6	6.3	5.6	5.9	6.0	1.9	
INH	3	196	76	13		7	78		370
		53.0	20.5	3.5		1.9	21.1		8.4
		13.5	9.7	6.8		3.2	1.4		
MAN	4	21	61			6	193	5	286
		7.3	21.3			2.1	67.5	1.7	6.3
		1.7	7.8			2.7	10.9	3.2	
MAP	5	73	127	37	2	19	244	28	530
		13.3	24.0	7.0	.4	3.6	46.0	5.3	12.0
		5.8	16.2	19.3	11.1	8.6	13.8	18.1	
NAM	6	162	91	36	6	26	93	19	433
		37.4	21.0	8.3	1.4	6.0	21.5	4.4	9.3
		12.8	11.6	19.8	33.3	11.7	5.2	12.3	
NIA	7	80	35	14	2	10	15	15	171
		46.9	20.5	8.2	1.2	5.8	8.8	8.8	3.9
		6.3	4.5	7.3	11.1	4.5	.8	9.7	
SOF	8	65	91	40	1	25	248	12	482
		13.5	18.9	8.3	.2	5.2	51.5	2.5	10.9
		5.1	11.6	20.8	5.6	11.3	14.0	7.7	
TET	9	80	60	2		39	76		257
		31.1	23.3	.8		15.2	29.6		5.8
		6.3	7.7	1.0		17.6	4.3		
ZAM	10	251	134	19	2	70	712	66	1254
		20.0	10.7	1.5	.2	5.6	56.8	5.3	28.4
		19.8	17.1	9.9	11.1	31.5	40.2	42.6	
Column Total		1267	784	192	18	222	1773	155	4411
Total		28.7	17.8	4.4	.4	5.0	40.2	3.5	100.0

Number of Missing Observations: 4

Type of projects by phase


TYPE Project sector by PHASE Project phase

Page 1 of 1

TYPE	Count Row Pct Col Pct	PHASE			Row Total
		12/94-02/95	3/95-6/96	7/96-2/97	
		2	3	4	
		1	2	3	
Agriculture	1	13	1153	99	1265
		1.0	91.1	7.8	28.7
		26.5	30.8	16.3	
Industry and cra	2	11	620	150	781
		1.4	79.4	19.2	17.7
		22.4	16.5	24.7	
Construction	3	7	177	9	193
		3.6	91.7	4.7	4.4
		14.3	4.7	1.5	
Forestry and env	4	4	14		18
		22.2	77.8		.4
		8.2	.4		
Fishing	5	2	181	39	222
		.9	81.5	17.6	5.0
		4.1	4.8	6.4	
Trade and servic	6	6	1459	305	1770
		.3	82.4	17.2	40.2
		12.2	38.9	50.2	
Public works	7	6	143	6	155
		3.9	92.3	3.9	3.5
		12.2	3.8	1.0	
Column		49	3747	608	4404
Total		1.1	85.1	13.8	100.0

Number of Missing Observations: 11



Median cost per beneficiary by type of project and phase




Summary of projects by category

Project Category	Number of projects	Number of benef.	Amount spent	Cost per beneficiary	Average duration (months)
Missing	2	38	7886	205.25	5
Income generating activities	3436	12765	2225751	192.80	3
Service contracts	119	194	100104	108.54	2
Training	73	792	113931	178.14	2
Institutional strengthening	4	34	1638	98.54	2
Labor intensive activities	110	6283	952236	150.82	5
Microenterprise	415	1982	278045	175.98	3
Community development support	53	759	159174	135.88	4
Permanent employment promotion	133	1896	327844	192.59	6
Returnees support	31	632	86513	210.33	3
On the job training	39	800	143866	227.14	4
Grand Total	4415	26175	4396988	190.49	3


Cost and number of beneficiaries by project category



Level of PF expenditures over project life



PF has improve its implementation mechanisms over time



5. Opportunity mapping

Summary of opportunities mapped

Categories	Type	Activities	Months	Beneficiaries
Income generating activities	Agriculture	117	2	1540
	Industry and crafts	15	1	258
	Construction	1	1	20
	Fishing	24	2	297
	Trade and services	3	1	3
	Public works	1	1	1
Service contracts	Agriculture	1	1	1
	Industry and crafts	1	1	1
Training	Agriculture	15	1	192
	Industry and crafts	103	3	1754
	Construction	19	3	216
	Fishing	1	1	5
	Trade and services	3	4	275
	Public works	10	4	70
Labor intensive	Agriculture	5	3	204
	Industry and crafts	3	3	7
	Construction	20	4	469
	Forestry and environ	3	1	22
	Fishing	1	1	1
	Public works	1	1	100
Microenterprise	Agriculture	3	5	28
	Industry and crafts	5	6	42
	Fishing	3	9	216
	Trade and services	7	11	32
Community resettlement	Agriculture	22	5	100
	Construction	14	3	612
	Public works	9	1	9
Permanent employment	Agriculture	10	3	317
	Industry and crafts	18	4	1832
	Construction	11	5	257
	Forestry and environ	2	4	28
	Fishing	2	4	22
	Trade and services	5	2	140
	Public works	8	5	697
Returnees support	Construction	1	4	10

	Public works	2	1	2
On the job training	Agriculture	3	1	52
	Industry and crafts	6	3	425
	Construction	6	1	126
	Fishing	1	1	50
	Public works	2	8	36
Activity Total		487	3	10469

Distribution of opportunities by target group

TARGET Target group

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
General pop.	1	62	12.7	12.7	12.7
Demobilized	2	392	80.5	80.5	93.2
Vulnerable	3	27	5.5	5.5	98.8
Others	4	6	1.2	1.2	100.0
Total		487	100.0	100.0	



Valid cases 487 Missing cases 0

Distribution of opportunities duration (months)

Valid Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Percent	Cum Percent
	1	332	68.2	68.2	68.2
	2	9	1.8	1.8	70.0
	3	19	3.9	3.9	73.9
	4	2	.4	.4	74.3
	5	3	.6	.6	74.9
	6	88	18.1	18.1	93.0
	7	1	.2	.2	93.2
	8	13	2.7	2.7	95.9
	9	3	.6	.6	96.5
	10	4	.8	.8	97.3
	12	3	.6	.6	97.9
	16	1	.2	.2	98.2
	18	3	.6	.6	98.8
	24	4	.8	.8	99.6
	25	2	.4	.4	100.0
Total		487	100.0	100.0	

Valid cases 487 Missing cases 0

Categories and types of identified opportunities



Categories of opportunities made available to different target groups

CATEGORY Categories by TARGET Target group


Page 1 of 1

CATEGORY	TARGET					Row Total
	Count	General	Demobilized	Vulnerable	Others	
	Row Pct Col Pct	1	2	3	4	
1		9	143	6	3	161
Income generation		5.6	88.8	3.7	1.9	33.1
		14.5	36.5	22.2	50.0	
2		1	1			2
Service contract		50.0	50.0			50.0
		1.6	.3			
3			148	1	2	151
Training			98.0	.7	1.3	31.0
			37.8	3.7	33.3	
4		11	17	5		33
Labor intensive		33.3	51.5	15.2		6.8
		17.7	4.3	18.5		
5		1	17			18
Microenterprise		5.6	94.4			3.7
		1.6	4.3			
6		22	9	13	1	45
Community resett		48.9	20.0	28.9	2.2	9.2
		35.5	2.3	48.1	16.7	
7		9	47			56
Permanent employ		16.1	83.9			11.5
		14.5	12.0			
8		2		1		3
Returns support		66.7		33.3		6
		3.2		3.7		
9		7	10	1		18
On the job train		38.9	55.6	5.6		3.7
		11.3	2.6	3.7		
Column Total		62	392	27	6	487
		12.7	80.5	5.5	1.2	100.0



Number of Missing Observations: 0

Number of beneficiaries per opportunity identified

Value Label Percent	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum
0-5	221	45.4	45.4	45.4
5-10	79	16.2	16.2	61.6
10-15	98	19.1	19.1	79.7
15-20	31	6.4	6.4	86.0
20-25	6	1.2	1.2	87.3
25-30	11	2.3	2.3	89.5
30-35	3	.6	.6	90.1
35-40	7	1.4	1.4	91.5
40-45	1	.2	.2	91.7
45-50	4	.8	.8	92.5
50-60	35	7.2	7.2	100.0
Total		487	100.0	
Valid cases	487	Missing cases	0	



Opportunity mapping over project life



6. Reintegration survey

Sample overview

Q1 Do you carry a UNOMOZ demob ID?

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
Yes	2	948	99.6	100.0	100.0
	.	4	.4	Missing	
	Total	952	100.0	100.0	

Valid cases 948 Missing cases 4

Q2 Are you considered a civilian?

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
No	1	115	12.1	12.1	12.1
Yes	2	832	87.4	87.9	100.0
	.	5	.5	Missing	
	Total	952	100.0	100.0	

Valid cases 947 Missing cases 5

Q3 Do you have a physical disability?

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
No	1	745	78.3	81.2	81.2
Yes	2	172	18.1	18.8	100.0
	.	35	3.7	Missing	
	Total	952	100.0	100.0	

Valid cases 917 Missing cases 35

STRATUM Population segment

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
Demobilized	1	681	71.5	71.5	71.5
Disabled	2	173	18.2	18.2	89.7
Non-civilian	3	95	10.0	10.0	99.7
Others	4	3	.3	.3	100.0
	Total	952	100.0	100.0	

Valid cases 952 Missing cases 0

Q68 Dates of interviews

Number of valid observations (listwise) = 936.00

Variable	Mean	Std Dev	Minimum	Maximum	Valid N	Label
Q68	1.307E+10	1487792.95	06-DEC-96	16-DEC-97	936	Interview date

Q69 Place of interview

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
MAP	1	96	10.1	10.3	10.3

GAZ	2	99	10.4	10.6	20.9
INH	3	102	10.7	10.9	31.8
MAN	4	99	10.4	10.6	42.4
SOF	5	99	10.4	10.6	53.0
TET	6	72	7.6	7.7	60.7
ZAM	7	109	11.4	11.7	72.4
NAM	8	121	12.7	13.0	85.3
NIA	9	86	9.0	9.2	94.5
CAB	10	51	5.4	5.5	100.0
.	.	18	1.9	Missing	
Total		952	100.0	100.0	

Valid cases 934 Missing cases 18

Q70 Identification method

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
Random	1	595	62.5	66.4	66.4
Meeting	2	134	14.1	15.0	81.4
Organized	3	130	13.7	14.5	95.9
Association	4	37	3.9	4.1	100.0
.	.	56	5.9	Missing	
Total		952	100.0	100.0	

Valid cases 896 Missing cases 56

Demographics

Q60 Age distribution

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
	18	1	.1	.1	.1
	19	1	.1	.1	.2
	20	3	.3	.3	.5
	21	6	.6	.6	1.2
	22	16	1.7	1.7	2.9
	23	14	1.5	1.5	4.3
	24	21	2.2	2.2	6.5
	25	30	3.2	3.2	9.7
	26	56	5.9	5.9	15.6
	27	42	4.4	4.4	20.1
	28	55	5.8	5.8	25.9
	29	37	3.9	3.9	29.8
	30	54	5.7	5.7	35.5
	31	52	5.5	5.5	41.0
	32	99	10.4	10.5	51.4
	33	54	5.7	5.7	57.1
	34	51	5.4	5.4	62.5
	35	41	4.3	4.3	66.8
	36	75	7.9	7.9	74.8
	37	38	4.0	4.0	78.8
	38	48	5.0	5.1	83.8
	39	24	2.5	2.5	86.4
	40	24	2.5	2.5	88.9
	41	18	1.9	1.9	90.8
	42	18	1.9	1.9	92.7
	43	12	1.3	1.3	94.0
	44	9	.9	1.0	94.9
	45	8	.8	.8	95.8
	46	15	1.6	1.6	97.4
	47	4	.4	.4	97.8
	48	2	.2	.2	98.0
	49	4	.4	.4	98.4
	50	1	.1	.1	98.5
	51	1	.1	.1	98.6

52	1	.1	.1	98.7
53	3	.3	.3	99.0
54	3	.3	.3	99.4
55	1	.1	.1	99.5
56	1	.1	.1	99.6
57	1	.1	.1	99.7
59	1	.1	.1	99.8
60	1	.1	.1	99.9
67	1	.1	.1	100.0
.	5	.5	Missing	
Total	952	100.0	100.0	

Mean 33.046 Minimum 18.000 Maximum 67.000

Valid cases 947 Missing cases 5

Q61 Gender

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
Male	1	936	98.3	98.7	98.7
Female	2	12	1.3	1.3	100.0
.	.	4	.4	Missing	
Total		952	100.0	100.0	

Valid cases 948 Missing cases 4

Q62 Group

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
NA	0	13	1.4	1.4	1.4
FRELIMO	1	793	83.3	83.8	85.2
RENAMO	2	140	14.7	14.8	100.0
.	.	6	.6	Missing	
Total		952	100.0	100.0	

Q63 Marital status

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
Single	1	95	10.0	10.2	10.2
Married	2	827	86.9	88.8	99.0
Divorced	3	5	.5	.5	99.6
Other	4	4	.4	.4	100.0
.	.	21	2.2	Missing	
Total		952	100.0	100.0	

Mean 1.912 Minimum 1.000 Maximum 4.000

Valid cases 931 Missing cases 21

Q64 Number of children

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
	0	47	4.9	5.1	5.1
	1	109	11.4	11.8	16.8
	2	226	23.7	24.4	41.3
	3	197	20.7	21.3	62.5
	4	136	14.3	14.7	77.2
	5	77	8.1	8.3	85.5

	6	52	5.5	5.6	91.1
	7	35	3.7	3.8	94.9
	8	28	2.9	3.0	97.9
	9	11	1.2	1.2	99.1
	10	3	.3	.3	99.5
	11	1	.1	.1	99.6
	12	1	.1	.1	99.7
	13	2	.2	.2	99.9
	17	1	.1	.1	100.0
	.	26	2.7	Missing	
		-----	-----	-----	
	Total	952	100.0	100.0	
Mean	3.301	Minimum	.000	Maximum	17.000
Valid cases	926	Missing cases	26		

Q65 Number of family members

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
	0	1	.1	.1	.1
	1	9	.9	1.0	1.1
	2	26	2.7	2.8	3.9
	3	65	6.8	7.0	10.8
	4	154	16.2	16.5	27.3
	5	137	14.4	14.7	41.9
	6	163	17.1	17.4	59.4
	7	109	11.4	11.7	71.0
	8	82	8.6	8.8	79.8
	9	53	5.6	5.7	85.5
	10	38	4.0	4.1	89.5
	11	34	3.6	3.6	93.2
	12	29	3.0	3.1	96.3
	13	10	1.1	1.1	97.3
	14	5	.5	.5	97.9
	15	9	.9	1.0	98.8
	16	4	.4	.4	99.3
	17	1	.1	.1	99.4
	18	2	.2	.2	99.6
	22	2	.2	.2	99.8
	26	1	.1	.1	99.9
	36	1	.1	.1	100.0
.	17	1.8	Missing		
Total		952	100.0	100.0	
Mean	6.514	Minimum	.000	Maximum	36.000
Valid cases	935	Missing cases	17		

Q66 Number of productive family members

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
	0	125	13.1	14.8	14.8
	1	149	15.7	17.7	32.5
	2	273	28.7	32.3	64.8
	3	117	12.3	13.9	78.7
	4	68	7.1	8.1	86.7
	5	34	3.6	4.0	90.8
	6	22	2.3	2.6	93.4
	7	23	2.4	2.7	96.1
	8	9	.9	1.1	97.2
	9	7	.7	.8	98.0
	10	8	.8	.9	98.9
	11	3	.3	.4	99.3
	13	3	.3	.4	99.6
	16	2	.2	.2	99.9
	26	1	.1	.1	100.0
.	108	11.3	Missing		
Total		952	100.0	100.0	

Mean 2.519 Minimum .000 Maximum 26.000
Valid cases 844 Missing cases 108

Q67 Residence before conflict

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
MAP	1	41	4.3	4.4	4.4
GAZ	2	57	6.0	6.1	10.4
INH	3	115	12.1	12.2	22.6
MAN	4	83	8.7	8.8	31.4
SOF	5	130	13.7	13.8	45.2
TET	6	70	7.4	7.4	52.7
ZAM	7	155	16.3	16.5	69.1
NAM	8	126	13.2	13.4	82.5
NIA	9	104	10.9	11.0	93.5
CAB	10	60	6.3	6.4	99.9
FOREIGN	11	1	.1	.1	100.0
	.	10	1.1	Missing	
Total		952	100.0	100.0	

Valid cases 942 Missing cases 10

Social Reintegration

Group \$Q5 Who won the most with peace?

Category label	Code	Count	Pct of Responses	Pct of Cases
All Mozambicans	1	688	52.0	72.8
RENAMO	2	42	3.2	4.4
FRELIMO	3	249	18.8	26.3
Demobilized	4	160	12.1	16.9
Civilians	5	78	5.9	8.3
Internat. comm.	6	35	2.6	3.7
Others	7	32	2.4	3.4
Nobody	8	13	1.0	1.4
No response	9	27	2.0	2.9
Total responses		1324	100.0	140.1

7 missing cases; 945 valid cases

\$Q5 (group) Who won the most with peace? by STRATUM Population segment

STRATUM					
	Count	Demobili	Disabled	Non-civi	Row
	Row pct	zed		lian	Total
	Col pct				
\$Q5		1	2	3	
All Mozambicans	1	510	114	61	685
		74.5	16.6	8.9	72.7
		75.6	66.3	64.2	
RENAMO	2	30	10	2	42
		71.4	23.8	4.8	4.5
		4.4	5.8	2.1	
FRELIMO	3	174	43	32	249
		69.9	17.3	12.9	26.4
		25.8	25.0	33.7	
	4	125	27	8	160

Demobilized		78.1	16.9	5.0	17.0
		18.5	15.7	8.4	
<hr/>					
Civilians	5	56	11	11	78
		71.8	14.1	14.1	8.3
		8.3	6.4	11.6	
<hr/>					
Internat. comm.	6	24	7	4	35
		68.6	20.0	11.4	3.7
		3.6	4.1	4.2	
<hr/>					
Others	7	23	9	0	32
		71.9	28.1	.0	3.4
		3.4	5.2	.0	
<hr/>					
Nobody	8	8	5	0	13
		61.5	38.5	.0	1.4
		1.2	2.9	.0	
<hr/>					
No response	9	17	9	1	27
		63.0	33.3	3.7	2.9
		2.5	5.2	1.1	
<hr/>					
Column		675	172	95	942
Total		71.7	18.3	10.1	100.0

Percents and totals based on respondents

942 valid cases; 10 missing cases

Q6 How do you see Mozambique's future? by STRATUM Population segment

		STRATUM					
		Count	Demobili	Disabled	Non-civi	Others	
		Row Pct	zed		lian		
		Col Pct	1	2	3	4	
Q6							Row Total

Number of Missing Observations: 6

Q7 Has your personal situation improved with peace?

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
Very much	5	40	4.2	4.2	4.2
Much	4	288	30.3	30.4	34.6
Some	3	279	29.3	29.4	64.0
Little	2	180	18.9	19.0	83.0
No	1	155	16.3	16.4	99.4
NA	0	6	.6	.6	100.0

.	4	.4	Missing
Total	952	100.0	100.0

Valid cases 948 Missing cases 4

Q8 Has your family situation improved with peace?

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
Very much	5	28	2.9	2.9	2.9
Much	4	300	31.5	31.5	34.5
Some	3	299	31.4	31.4	65.9
Little	2	180	18.9	18.9	84.9
No	1	133	14.0	14.0	98.8
NA	0	11	1.2	1.2	100.0
.	.	1	.1	Missing	
Total		952	100.0	100.0	

Valid cases 951 Missing cases 1

Q9 How do you perceive your situation next year?

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
Much better	5	10	1.1	1.1	1.1
Better	4	384	40.3	40.4	41.4
Same	3	329	34.6	34.6	76.0
Worse	2	61	6.4	6.4	82.4
Much worse	1	29	3.0	3.0	85.5
NA	0	138	14.5	14.5	100.0
.	.	1	.1	Missing	
Total		952	100.0	100.0	

Valid cases 951 Missing cases 1

Q10 Do you own a house?

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
Owned	6	797	83.7	83.9	83.9
Family	5	52	5.5	5.5	89.4
Rented	4	64	6.7	6.7	96.1
Borrowed	3	5	.5	.5	96.6
Center	2	3	.3	.3	96.9
No	1	22	2.3	2.3	99.3
NA	0	7	.7	.7	100.0
.	.	2	.2	Missing	
Total		952	100.0	100.0	

Valid cases 950 Missing cases 2

Q11 Have you improved your house in the last year?

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
Very much	5	32	3.4	3.4	3.4
Much	4	164	17.2	17.3	20.7
Some	3	206	21.6	21.7	42.4
Little	2	190	20.0	20.0	62.4
No	1	292	30.7	30.8	93.2
NA	0	65	6.8	6.8	100.0
.	.	3	.3	Missing	

	Total	952	100.0	100.0
Valid cases	949	Missing cases	3	

Q12 Do you expect to improve your house next year?

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
	6	1	.1	.1	.1
Very much	5	22	2.3	2.3	2.4
Much	4	238	25.0	25.1	27.6
Some	3	183	19.2	19.3	46.9
Little	2	221	23.2	23.3	70.2
No	1	181	19.0	19.1	89.3
NA	0	101	10.6	10.7	100.0
	.	5	.5	Missing	
Total		952	100.0	100.0	

Valid cases	947	Missing cases	5
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Q13 Do you expect to stay at your current house?

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
Yes	4	780	81.9	82.5	82.5
Maybe	3	63	6.6	6.7	89.1
Doubt it	2	12	1.3	1.3	90.4
No	1	84	8.8	8.9	99.3
NA	0	7	.7	.7	100.0
	.	6	.6	Missing	
Total		952	100.0	100.0	

Valid cases	946	Missing cases	6
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Economic reintegration

Q14 Do you have a higher income now than in active service?

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
Much more	5	37	3.9	3.9	3.9
More	4	584	61.3	61.5	65.4
Same	3	104	10.9	10.9	76.3
Less	2	139	14.6	14.6	90.9
Much less	1	74	7.8	7.8	98.7
NA	0	12	1.3	1.3	100.0
	.	2	.2	Missing	
Total		952	100.0	100.0	

Valid cases	950	Missing cases	2
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Q15 How do you compare your income with your neighbors?

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
Much more	5	8	.8	.8	.8
More	4	119	12.5	12.5	13.4
Same	3	316	33.2	33.3	46.6
Less	2	351	36.9	36.9	83.6

Much less	1	72	7.6	7.6	91.2
NA	0	84	8.8	8.8	100.0
.	.	2	.2	Missing	
Total		952	100.0	100.0	

Valid cases 950 Missing cases 2

Q16 How do you compare it with other DS families?

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
Much better	5	14	1.5	1.5	1.5
Better	4	139	14.6	14.7	16.1
Same	3	518	54.4	54.6	70.8
Worse	2	144	15.1	15.2	86.0
Much worse	1	43	4.5	4.5	90.5
NA	0	90	9.5	9.5	100.0
.	.	4	.4	Missing	
Total		952	100.0	100.0	

Valid cases 948 Missing cases 4

Q17 How do you expect your family to be next years?

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
Much better	5	19	2.0	2.0	2.0
Better	4	392	41.2	41.4	43.4
Same	3	315	33.1	33.3	76.7
Worse	2	58	6.1	6.1	82.8
Much worse	1	27	2.8	2.9	85.6
NA	0	136	14.3	14.4	100.0
.	.	5	.5	Missing	
Total		952	100.0	100.0	

Valid cases 947 Missing cases 5

Q18 Are there more family members generating income?

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
Much more	5	10	1.1	1.1	1.1
More	4	140	14.7	14.8	15.9
Same	3	487	51.2	51.6	67.6
Less	2	74	7.8	7.8	75.4
Much less	1	77	8.1	8.2	83.6
NA	0	155	16.3	16.4	100.0
.	.	9	.9	Missing	
Total		952	100.0	100.0	

Valid cases 943 Missing cases 9

Group \$Q19 Main source of income

Category label	Code	Count	Pct of Responses	Pct of Cases
Agric/Anim	1	684	49.3	72.3
Employment	2	108	7.8	11.4
Informal sect.	3	345	24.9	36.5
Pensions/help	4	131	9.4	13.8
Others	5	95	6.8	10.0
DK/DA	6	24	1.7	2.5

Total responses 1387 100.0 146.6

6 missing cases; 946 valid cases

Q20 Do you expect to continue doing the same in the future?

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
No	1	188	19.7	22.5	22.5
Yes	2	646	67.9	77.3	99.8
DK/DA	3	2	.2	.2	100.0
.	.	116	12.2	Missing	
Total		952	100.0	100.0	

Valid cases 836 Missing cases 116

Perception of self

Q21 How do you compare your situation with your neighbors?

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
Much better	5	5	.5	.5	.5
Better	4	148	15.5	15.7	16.3
Same	3	478	50.2	50.8	67.1
Worse	2	210	22.1	22.3	89.4
Much worse	1	69	7.2	7.3	96.7
NA	0	31	3.3	3.3	100.0
.	.	11	1.2	Missing	
Total		952	100.0	100.0	

Valid cases 941 Missing cases 11

Q22 How do you compare your situation now with two years ago?

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
Much better	5	26	2.7	2.8	2.8
Better	4	455	47.8	48.3	51.1
Same	3	307	32.2	32.6	83.7
Worse	2	101	10.6	10.7	94.4
Much worse	1	47	4.9	5.0	99.4
NA	0	6	.6	.6	100.0
.	.	10	1.1	Missing	
Total		952	100.0	100.0	

Valid cases 942 Missing cases 10

Q23 How do you compare yourself with other DS?

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
Much better	5	8	.8	.9	.9
Better	4	159	16.7	16.9	17.7
Same	3	590	60.9	62.6	79.4

Worse	2	93	9.8	9.9	89.3
Much worse	1	42	4.4	4.5	93.7
NA	0	59	6.2	6.3	100.0
.	.	11	1.2	Missing	
Total		952	100.0	100.0	

Valid cases 941 Missing cases 11

Q24 Do you consider yourself reintegrated?

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
Very much	5	48	5.0	5.1	5.1
Much	4	397	41.7	42.2	47.3
Some	3	297	31.2	31.6	78.9
Little	2	110	11.6	11.7	90.5
No	1	84	8.8	8.9	99.5
NA	0	5	.5	.5	100.0
.	.	11	1.2	Missing	
Total		952	100.0	100.0	

Valid cases 941 Missing cases 11

Q25 Do you consider yourself safer now than two years ago?

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
Much more	5	131	13.8	13.9	13.9
More	4	535	56.2	56.9	70.9
Same	3	144	15.1	15.3	86.2
Less	2	75	7.9	8.0	94.1
Much less	1	35	3.7	3.7	97.9
NA	0	20	2.1	2.1	100.0
.	.	12	1.3	Missing	
Total		952	100.0	100.0	

Valid cases 940 Missing cases 12

Q26 How do you think your neighbors perceive you?

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
Other	4	2	.2	.2	.2
Civilian	3	693	72.8	73.6	73.9
Demobilized	2	211	22.2	22.4	96.3
Military	1	27	2.8	2.9	99.1
DK/DA	0	8	.8	.9	100.0
.	.	11	1.2	Missing	
Total		952	100.0	100.0	

Valid cases 941 Missing cases 11

Q27 How would you like to be perceived?

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
Other	4	5	.5	.5	.5
Civilian	3	900	94.5	95.6	96.2
Demobilized	2	30	3.2	3.2	99.4
Military	1	4	.4	.4	99.8

DK/DA	0	2	.2	.2	100.0
	.	11	1.2	Missing	
	Total	952	100.0	100.0	
Valid cases	941	Missing cases	11		

Access to reintegration programming

Q28 Did you receive RSS payments? by STRATUM Population segment

		STRATUM				Row Total
		Count	Demobili- zed	Disabled	Non-civi- lian	
		Row Pct	1	2	3	4
		Col Pct				
Q28						
No	1		2			2
			100.0			.2
			.3			
Yes	2		673	171	95	3
			71.4	18.2	10.1	.3
			99.7	100.0	100.0	100.0
Column			675	171	95	3
Total			71.5	18.1	10.1	.3
						944
						100.0

Number of Missing Observations: 8

Q29 Did you get PF financing from IOM? by STRATUM Population segment

		STRATUM				Row Total
		Count	Demobili- zed	Disabled	Non-civi- lian	
		Row Pct	1	2	3	4
		Col Pct				
Q29						
No	1		387	76	28	2
			78.5	15.4	5.7	.4
			57.0	44.4	29.8	66.7
Yes	2		292	95	66	1
			64.3	20.9	14.5	.2
			43.0	55.6	70.2	33.3
Column			679	171	94	3
Total			71.7	18.1	9.9	.3
						947
						100.0

Number of Missing Observations: 5

Q30 Did you get other financing for projects? by STRATUM Population segment

		STRATUM				Row Total
		Count	Demobili- zed	Disabled	Non-civi- lian	
		Row Pct	1	2	3	4
		Col Pct				
Q30						
No	1		605	155	81	3
			71.7	18.4	9.6	.4
			89.9	91.7	90.0	100.0
Yes	2		68	14	9	
			74.7	15.4	9.9	
			10.1	8.3	10.0	
Column			673	169	90	3
Total			72.0	18.1	9.6	.3
						935
						100.0

Number of Missing Observations: 17

Q31 Did you visit an IRS office for information? by STRATUM Population segment

		STRATUM				Row Total
		Count	Demobili- zed	Disabled	Non-civi- lian	
		Row Pct	1	2	3	4
		Col Pct				
Q31						
No	1		310	72	39	1
			73.5	17.1	9.2	.2
			45.9	42.4	41.1	33.3
Yes	2		366	98	56	2
			70.1	18.8	10.7	.4
			54.1	57.6	58.9	66.7
Column			676	170	95	3
Total			71.6	18.0	10.1	.3
						944
						100.0

Number of Missing Observations: 8

Q32 Did you receive vocational training? by STRATUM Population segment

		STRATUM				Row Total
		Count	Demobili- zed	Disabled	Non-civi- lian	
		Row Pct	1	2	3	4
		Col Pct				
Q32						
No	1		454	114	71	2
			70.8	17.8	11.1	.3
			67.4	67.9	74.7	66.7
Yes	2		220	54	24	1
			73.6	18.1	8.0	.3
			32.6	32.1	25.3	33.3
Column			674	168	95	3
Total			71.7	17.9	10.1	.3
						940
						100.0

Number of Missing Observations: 12

Q33 Did you receive self-employment toolkits? by STRATUM Population segment

		STRATUM				Row Total
		Count	Demobili- zed	Disabled	Non-civi- lian	
		Row Pct	1	2	3	4
		Col Pct				
Q33						
No	1		514	140	77	3
			70.0	19.1	10.5	.4
			76.3	82.4	81.9	100.0
Yes	2		160	30	17	
			77.3	14.5	8.2	
			23.7	17.6	18.1	
Column			674	170	94	3
Total			71.6	18.1	10.0	.3
						941
						100.0

Number of Missing Observations: 11

Q34 Were you contacted by an IOM representative? by STRATUM Population segment

		STRATUM				Row
		Count	Demobili- zed	Disabled	Non-civi- lian	
		Row Pct				
		Col Pct				

		1	2	3	4	Total
Q34						
	1	240	59	43	1	343
No		70.0	17.2	12.5	.3	36.9
		36.1	35.3	45.3	33.3	
	2	425	108	52	2	587
Yes		72.4	18.4	8.9	.3	63.1
		63.9	64.7	54.7	66.7	
	Column	665	167	95	3	930
	Total	71.5	18.0	10.2	.3	100.0

Number of Missing Observations: 22

Q35 Do you receive any type of pension? by STRATUM Population segment

		STRATUM				
		Count				
		Row Pct	Demobili	Disabled	Non-civi	Others
		Col Pct	zed	lian		
			1	2	3	4
Q35						
	1		463	104	76	2
No			71.8	16.1	11.8	.3
			70.2	63.0	80.0	66.7
	2		196	61	19	1
Yes			70.8	22.0	6.9	.4
			29.7	37.0	20.0	33.3
	3		1			
DK/DA			100.0			
			.2			
	Column		660	165	95	3
	Total		71.5	17.9	10.3	.3
						923
						100.0

Number of Missing Observations: 29

Provincial Fund (Only PF beneficiaries)

Q36 Was your project designed by yourself?

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
Yes	1	227	50.0	50.8	50.8
IOM	2	157	34.6	35.1	85.9
Others	3	63	13.9	14.1	100.0
	.	7	1.5	Missing	
	Total	454	100.0	100.0	

Valid cases 447 Missing cases 7

Q37 How much assistance did IOM provide in the design?

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
Very much	5	12	2.6	2.8	2.8
Much	4	151	33.3	34.8	37.6
Some	3	146	32.2	33.6	71.2
Little	2	47	10.4	10.8	82.0
None	1	66	14.5	15.2	97.2
NA	0	12	2.6	2.8	100.0
	.	20	4.4	Missing	

		Total	454	100.0	100.0
Valid cases	434	Missing cases	20		

Q38 How long did it take to get the financing?

Number of valid observations (listwise) = 421.00

Variable	Mean	Std Dev	Range	Minimum	Maximum	Valid N	Label
Q38	2.48	3.62	60.00	0	60	421	How long

Q39 Type of project financed

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
Microenterprise	8	213	46.9	48.3	48.3
Income generation	1	168	37.0	38.1	86.4
Training	7	19	4.2	4.3	90.7
Labor intensive	2	16	3.5	3.6	94.3
Permanent employment	9	13	2.9	2.9	97.3
On the job training	10	6	1.3	1.4	98.6
Community development	3	3	.7	.7	99.3
Services	6	2	.4	.5	99.8
Resettlement support	4	1	.2	.2	100.0
.		13	2.9	Missing	
Total		454	100.0	100.0	

Valid cases 441 Missing cases 13

Q40 Type of activity sector financed

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
Trade and services	6	172	37.9	39.2	39.2
Agriculture/Animals	3	145	31.9	33.0	72.2
Industry and crafts	1	69	15.2	15.7	87.9
Fishing	5	28	6.2	6.4	94.3
Public works	7	15	3.3	3.4	97.7
Construction	2	9	2.0	2.1	99.8
Forestry and environ	4	1	.2	.2	100.0
.		15	3.3	Missing	
Total		454	100.0	100.0	

Valid cases 439 Missing cases 15

Q41 How do you rank the success of your project?

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
	12	1	.2	.2	.2
Very good	5	20	4.4	4.9	5.2
Good	4	142	31.3	35.0	40.1
Fair	3	164	36.1	40.4	80.5
Bad	2	37	8.1	9.1	89.7
Very bad	1	14	3.1	3.4	93.1
NA	0	28	6.2	6.9	100.0
.		48	10.6	Missing	
Total		454	100.0	100.0	

Valid cases 406 Missing cases 48

Group \$Q42 Main project problems

Category label	Code	Count	Pct of Responses	Pct of Cases
Group composition	1	65	8.4	15.3
Financing amounts	2	186	24.0	43.9
Market forces	3	100	12.9	23.6
Implementation times	4	74	9.6	17.5
Financing times	5	31	4.0	7.3
Previous experience	6	36	4.7	8.5
Technical assistance	7	76	9.8	17.9
Implementer/employer	8	17	2.2	4.0
Location	9	37	4.8	8.7
Project design	10	23	3.0	5.4
Others	11	69	8.9	16.3
DK/DA	12	60	7.8	14.0
Total responses		774	100.0	182.5

30 missing cases; 424 valid cases

Q43 How do you rank the success of your neighbors in this type of project?

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
Very good	5	8	1.8	2.2	2.2
Good	4	114	25.1	31.1	33.2
Fair	3	138	30.4	37.6	70.8
Bad	2	21	4.6	5.7	76.6
Very bad	1	4	.9	1.1	77.7
NA	0	82	18.1	22.3	100.0
.	.	87	19.2	Missing	
Total		454	100.0	100.0	

Valid cases 367 Missing cases 87

Group \$Q44 Main project strengths

Category label	Code	Count	Pct of Responses	Pct of Cases
Group composition	1	99	11.3	23.1
Financing amounts	2	120	13.7	28.0
Market forces	3	83	9.5	19.4
Implementation times	4	69	7.9	16.1
Financing times	5	57	6.5	13.3
Previous experience	6	92	10.5	21.5
Technical assistance	7	69	7.9	16.1
Implementer/employer	8	17	1.9	4.0
Location	9	116	13.3	27.1
Project design	10	46	5.3	10.7
Others	11	33	3.8	7.7
DK/DA	12	72	8.2	16.8
Total responses		873	100.0	204.0

26 missing cases; 428 valid cases

Q45 How important was this project for your reintegration?

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
Very much	5	42	9.3	9.5	9.5
Much	4	225	49.6	50.9	60.4
Some	3	102	22.5	23.1	83.5
Little	2	48	10.6	10.9	94.3
None	1	21	4.6	4.8	99.1
NA	0	4	.9	.9	100.0

		.	12	2.6	Missing
		Total	454	100.0	100.0
Valid cases	442	Missing cases	12		

Q46 Would you exchange this project for permanent employment?

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
No	1	297	65.4	71.4	71.4
Yes	2	119	26.2	28.6	100.0
	.	38	8.4	Missing	
	Total	454	100.0	100.0	
Valid cases	416	Missing cases	38		

Information and Referral (Only for IRS beneficiaries)


Q47 How many times did you visit the IRS for information?

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
	1	98	18.8	20.4	20.4
	2	95	18.2	19.8	40.2
	3	84	16.1	17.5	57.7
	4	45	8.6	9.4	67.1
	5	37	7.1	7.7	74.8
	6	28	5.4	5.8	80.6
	7	17	3.3	3.5	84.2
	8	14	2.7	2.9	87.1
	9	2	.4	.4	87.5
	10	38	7.3	7.9	95.4
	11	1	.2	.2	95.6
	12	8	1.5	1.7	97.3
	13	1	.2	.2	97.5
	15	12	2.3	2.5	100.0
	.	42	8.0	Missing	
	Total	522	100.0	100.0	
Mean	4.171	Minimum	1.000	Maximum	15.000
Sum	2002.000				
Valid cases	480	Missing cases	42		

Q48 How many problems were you trying to resolve?

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
One	1	287	55.0	56.7	56.7
Many	2	214	41.0	42.3	99.0
DK/DA	3	5	1.0	1.0	100.0
	.	16	3.1	Missing	
	Total	522	100.0	100.0	
Valid cases	506	Missing cases	16		

Q47 How many times did you visit the IRS for by Q48 How many problems were you trying to resolve?



Group \$Q49 Which offices did you visit?

Dichotomy label	Name	Count	Pct of Responses	Pct of Cases
Did you visit Maputo office?	Q49A	67	12.6	13.3
Did you visit Gaza office?	Q49B	50	9.4	9.9
Did you visit Inhambane office?	Q49C	46	8.6	9.1
Did you visit Manica office?	Q49D	44	8.3	8.7
Did you visit Sofala office?	Q49E	69	13.0	13.7
Did you visit Tete office?	Q49F	40	7.5	7.9
Did you visit Zambezia office?	Q49G	49	9.2	9.7
Did you visit Nampula office?	Q49H	80	15.0	15.9
Did you visit Niassa office?	Q49I	47	8.8	9.3
Did you visit Cabo Delgado office?	Q49J	39	7.3	7.7
DK/DA	Q49L	1	.2	.2
Total responses		532	100.0	105.6

18 missing cases; 504 valid cases

Group \$Q50 What type of support you requested?

Dichotomy label	Name	Count	Pct of Responses	Pct of Cases
Information about DS cards	Q50A	36	5.0	7.2
Information about RSS	Q50B	16	2.2	3.2
Information about Registration	Q50C	12	1.7	2.4
General information	Q50D	112	15.6	22.3
Information about referral	Q50E	26	3.6	5.2
Information about projects	Q50F	419	58.4	83.3
Information about employment	Q50G	50	7.0	9.9
Information about pensions	Q50H	40	5.6	8.0
Don't remember	Q50I	6	.8	1.2
Total responses		717	100.0	142.5

19 missing cases; 503 valid cases

Q51 Are you satisfied with your visits to the IRS?

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
Very much	5	45	9.6	9.3	9.3
Much	4	152	29.1	31.5	40.9

Some	3	94	18.0	19.5	60.4
Little	2	42	8.0	8.7	69.1
No	1	144	27.6	29.9	99.0
NA	0	5	1.0	1.0	100.0
.		40	7.7	Missing	
Total		522	100.0	100.0	

Valid cases 482 Missing cases 40

Q52 Are you satisfied with the IRS response?

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
Very much	5	49	9.4	10.0	10.0
Much	4	122	23.4	24.9	35.0
Some	3	125	23.9	25.6	60.5
Little	2	53	10.2	10.8	71.4
No	1	133	25.5	27.2	98.6
NA	0	7	1.3	1.4	100.0
.		33	6.3	Missing	
Total		522	100.0	100.0	

Valid cases 489 Missing cases 33

Group \$Q53 When did you visit the IRS?

Dichotomy label	Name	Count	Pct of Responses	Pct of Cases
Did you visit the IRS in Q2-1994?	Q53A	18	1.5	3.6
Did you visit the IRS in Q3-1994?	Q53B	26	2.2	5.2
Did you visit the IRS in Q4-1994?	Q53C	37	3.1	7.4
Did you visit the IRS in Q1-1995?	Q53D	73	6.2	14.5
Did you visit the IRS in Q2-1995?	Q53E	116	9.8	23.1
Did you visit the IRS in Q3-1995?	Q53F	125	10.6	24.9
Did you visit the IRS in Q4-1995?	Q53G	113	9.6	22.5
Did you visit the IRS in Q1-1996?	Q53H	156	13.2	31.0
Did you visit the IRS in Q2-1996?	Q53I	183	15.5	36.4
Did you visit the IRS in Q3-1996?	Q53J	163	13.8	32.4
Did you visit the IRS in Q4-1996?	Q53K	146	12.4	29.0
Don't remember when you visit the IRS?	Q53L	22	1.9	4.4
Total responses		1178	100.0	234.2

19 missing cases; 503 valid cases

Q54 How important was the IRS for your reintegration?

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
Very much	5	26	5.0	5.8	5.8
Much	4	146	28.0	32.3	38.1
Some	3	110	21.1	24.3	62.4
Little	2	60	11.5	13.3	75.7
None	1	99	19.0	21.9	97.6
NA	0	11	2.1	2.4	100.0
.		70	13.4	Missing	
Total		522	100.0	100.0	

Valid cases 452 Missing cases 70

General opinions about reintegration programming

Group \$Q55 Most useful reintegration support

Category label	Code	Count	Pct of Responses	Pct of Cases
Transportation	1	492	25.0	52.5
RSS/Pensions	2	780	39.7	83.2
Training/Education	3	124	6.3	13.2
Information/referral	4	34	1.7	3.6
Microprojects	5	336	17.1	35.9
Employment	6	37	1.9	3.9
Credit	7	23	1.2	2.5
Others	8	97	4.9	10.4
DK/DA	9	43	2.2	4.6
Total responses		1966	100.0	209.8

15 missing cases; 937 valid cases

Q56 Do you think programming helped reintegration?

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
Very much	5	54	5.7	6.3	6.3
Much	4	312	32.8	36.3	42.6
Some	3	209	22.0	24.3	66.9
Little	2	177	18.6	20.6	87.4
No	1	93	9.8	10.8	98.3
NA	0	15	1.6	1.7	100.0
.	.	92	9.7	Missing	
Total		952	100.0	100.0	

Valid cases 860 Missing cases 92

Group \$Q57 What would you recommend to other DS?

Category label	Code	Count	Pct of Responses	Pct of Cases
Involve in projects	1	317	15.8	33.9
Claim rights	2	39	1.9	4.2
Ask for help	3	186	9.3	19.9
Find a job	4	558	27.8	59.7
Start business	5	268	13.3	28.7
Stay with family	6	120	6.0	12.8
Stop demands	7	58	2.9	6.2
Integrate in comm.	8	225	11.2	24.1
Get pensions	9	32	1.6	3.4
Others	10	133	6.6	14.2
Nothing	11	49	2.4	5.2
DK/DA	12	25	1.2	2.7
Total responses		2010	100.0	215.2

18 missing cases; 934 valid cases

Q58 What do you think about DS support in general?

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
Very good	5	57	6.0	6.2	6.2
Good	4	360	37.8	39.4	45.6
Fair	3	319	33.5	34.9	80.5
Bad	2	120	12.6	13.1	93.7
Very bad	1	43	4.5	4.7	98.4
NA	0	15	1.6	1.6	100.0
.	.	38	4.0	Missing	
Total		952	100.0	100.0	

Valid cases 914 Missing cases 38

Q59 How difficult would have been to reintegrate without programs?

Value Label	Value	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cum Percent
Very much	5	177	18.6	19.3	19.3
Much	4	370	38.9	40.4	59.7
Some	3	153	16.1	16.7	76.4
Little	2	78	8.2	8.5	84.9
No	1	90	9.5	9.8	94.8
NA	0	48	5.0	5.2	100.0
	.	36	3.8	Missing	
Total		952	100.0	100.0	

Valid cases 916 Missing cases 36